Independence (1960)


4.1 The modern state of Somalia was formed in 1960 by the independence and merger of British Somaliland in the north-west and the Italian-administered United Nations (UN) Trust Territory of Somalia. The new state was known as the independent Somali Republic . In the early years after independence, internal harmony was encouraged by the commitment of all political leaders, at the price of external conflict, to the policy of extending the boundaries of the new state to include ethnic Somali communities in neighbouring states. [1a]


4.2 Dr Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shirmarke, of the Darod clan-family, became President in 1967 and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, former Prime Minister of British Somaliland, from the northern Isaaq clan-family, became Prime Minister. Following agreements with Ethiopia and Kenya over borders, internal politics was marked by an upsurge of divisive tribalism. Over 1,000 candidates, representing 68 mostly clan-based political parties, contested seats in the 1969 legislative elections. The ruling Somali Youth League party won the elections and Egal was re-appointed Prime Minister, but the Government no longer reflected Somali society in general. [1a]


(For history prior to 1969 refer to Africa South of the Sahara -source [1a])  


Said Barre Regime 1969 - 1991


4.3 President Shirmarke was assassinated in October 1969. Army chief Major-General Mohamed Siad Barre seized power, promising to eliminate corruption and clanism. [1a] Barre abolished political parties, dissolved parliament and suspended the 1960 Constitution.  The country was renamed the Somali Democratic Republic. In 1970 Barre declared Somalia a socialist state and embarked upon a programme of national unification and social and economic reform. [1b] Most key sections of the economy were brought under state control; in 1975 land was nationalised.  Subsequent efforts to recover nationalised land became a major factor in inter-clan fighting from 1991. [1a]


4.4 In 1976 the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was established under Soviet influence.  Despite Barre's avowed intention to eliminate clanism, his regime became divided along clan lines as he favoured his own Marehan clan, part of the Darod clan-family, over others. His family and clan became increasingly dominant in government, prompting several clan-based insurgencies. [1a]


4.5 Under Barre , Somalia pursued its claim to Ethiopia 's Somali-populated Ogaden district by arming the Western Somali Liberation Front guerrillas. The Ogaden clan, part of the Darod clan-family and the clan of Barre's mother, was a key element of Barre's support.  In 1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia and quickly overran the Ogaden district but Ethiopia , with assistance from the Soviet Union , which had switched its support from Somalia to Ethiopia , recaptured the area by early 1978.  Large numbers of refugees moved into Somalia from the Ogaden district. [1a]


4.6 Military defeat, shifts in alliances and ideology and the effects of famine and refugee influxes have all had considerable impact on internal politics.  Opposition groups began to appear, notably the largely Majerteen-based Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Isaaq-based Somali National Movement (SNM).  Both groups received support from Ethiopia .  The SSDF took control of two small towns in central Somalia in the early 1980s but the organisation virtually collapsed with internal differences in the mid-1980s. [1a]


4.7  In 1988, the SNM was forced by Ethiopia to leave its Ethiopian bases. The SNM attacked and occupied Burao and part of Hargeisa in north-western Somalia . Government forces, led by Barre's son-in-law General Mohamed Siad Hersi 'Morgan', soon recaptured the towns in an uncompromising counter-offensive that virtually destroyed them, killing an estimated 40,000 in Hargeisa and forcing 400,000 to flee to Ethiopia; this only served to increase support for the SNM in the north-west. [1a]


4.8 In 1989 Hawiye intellectuals (the Hawiye are Somalia 's largest ethnic group and the dominant clan grouping in Mogadishu ) established the United Somali Congress (USC) [1b][8]. The USC and the National United Front of Somalia, a group allegedly dominated by disaffected army officers, were thought to have organised anti-Government demonstrations that took place in July 1989.  The security forces ruthlessly suppressed these protests resulting in more than 400 deaths.  During 1989 the ruling Marehan clan lost the support of the Ogadeni clan; Ogadeni army deserters subsequently established the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in the south and the Somali National Army in central Somalia . [1b] In August 1989 Barre announced that opposition parties would be allowed to contest elections due in 1990, and offered to relinquish power.  One effect of this was to encourage the creation of political parties within those major clans yet to evolve a political identity. [1a] By this time it was reported that the Government control did not extend much beyond Mogadishu , parts of Hargeisa and Berbera.  The USC gained support in the south, where its guerrilla forces fought alongside the SPM while in the north the emergence of the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) intensified the challenge to Barre's authority. [1b]


4.9 By January 1991 the USC's military wing, led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed, had captured most of Mogadishu and the SPM had taken Kismayo in the south.  Barre fled Somalia on 27 January 1991 and the USC assumed power in Mogadishu , while the SNM had seized control of the north-west and a resurgent SSDF the north-east. [1a]  


Collapse of Central Government in 1991 & Civil War


4.10 Ali Mahdi Mohamed, of the Abgal clan (part of the Hawiye clan-family), was declared interim President by the USC in late January 1991 but his appointment was opposed by the SNM and SPM.  The situation by mid-March 1991 was close to anarchy and division along clan lines was increasing. [1b] Although some non-Hawiye were given posts in the new administration, most posts were allocated to the Hawiye. [1a] In the north-west the SNM convened a series of meetings of clan Elders that led to the establishment of an administration and legislature in the area of former British Somaliland and a declaration of secession from the rest of Somalia in May 1991. SNM Chairman, Abd ar-Rahman Ahmed Ali 'Tur', became the first President of the new " Republic of Somaliland ". [1a][1b]


4.11 Reconciliation conferences held in Djibouti in mid-1991 confirmed Ali Mahdi as President for a two-year period and he assumed office in August 1991, with Umar Arteh Ghalib, an Isaaq, as Prime Minister. The SNM did not attend the conferences. [1a][1b] Difficulties arose at the conferences, as the Darod demanded the return of property seized after Siad Barre's overthrow. Darod and Isaaq clans were estimated to have owned as much as 60% of land and property in Mogadishu before 1989.  Most was looted in 1991 and appropriated by Hawiye, who were reluctant to return it.  The issue of property has since remained highly contentious and unresolved. [1a]


4.12 By June 1991 a major rift had opened up within the USC between Ali Mahdi and General Aideed. [1a][1b] The rift reinforced clan divisions; Ali Mahdi's Abgal clan was prominent in and around Mogadishu whereas Aideed's Habr Gedir comprised a significant element of the more rural, pastoral Hawiye in the central regions of Somalia. The Abgal had provided much of the support for Ali Mahdi's 'Manifesto' movement whereas the Habr Gedir comprised most of the Hawiye guerrilla forces. [1a] Aideed was elected USC Chairman in July 1991, increasing his power base. Ali Mahdi's refusal to award Ministerial posts to Aideed's supporters guaranteed conflict and heavy clashes took place in Mogadishu from September 1991 between the rival USC factions, leaving the city divided. Clashes continued through to an UN-brokered cease-fire in March 1992, by which time 30,000 people had died. Other important Hawiye clans, particularly the Hawadle and the Murosade, had taken control, respectively, of Mogadishu 's airport and sea port. [1a][1b]


4.13 Clashes for territory took place throughout Somalia during 1991 and 1992 between rival clan-based militias. The southern port of Kismayo changed hands several times during 1991; much of the fighting there was on a clan basis.  Barre's forces had re-grouped in the south as the Somali National Front (SNF). [1a] General Morgan led several advances of SNF forces towards Mogadishu during 1991 and 1992 but Aideed's forces repulsed them at Afgoi in April 1992 and went on to capture the town of Garba Harre on the Kenyan border where Barre had established his base. Barre fled to Kenya , he later went into exile in Nigeria .  After mid-1992 the SNF, although a largely Marehan faction, disassociated itself from Barre. [1b]


4.14 Having halted Morgan's attack on Mogadishu , Aideed's forces allied with Jess' SPM faction moved south to capture Kismayo from Morgan in May 1992, forcing Morgan and his supporters to flee to Kenya .  However, Morgan and the SNF took back the strategic town of Bardera in Gedo region from Aideed's forces in October 1992 and advanced towards Kismayo.  Aideed set up the Somali National Alliance (SNA) coalition, comprising his faction of the USC, Jess' SPM faction, a faction of the Rahanweyn-based Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and the Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM), a grouping of non-Darod clans south of Mogadishu . In response to Aideed's victories, Ali Mahdi strengthened his links with opponents of Aideed, notably Morgan, the SSDF, the rival SPM faction and the SNF, under the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) grouping. [1a]


United Nations Intervention 1992-1995


4.15 In January 1992 the UN imposed an embargo on the sale of arms to Somalia . The ICRC reported hundreds of thousands of people had been displaced by the conflict by the end of January 2002; thousands having crossed into Kenya .  Subsequent estimates suggest 300,000 people may have died of starvation in this period.  In April 1992 a UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was set up, initially to monitor the Mogadishu cease-fire that had been agreed the previous month.  Fighting continued elsewhere in Somalia .  In December 1992 multi-national forces were deployed throughout Somalia , excluding Somaliland , under the umbrella of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).  A principle aim of this mission was to ensure food deliveries. Under UNITAF pressure, Aideed and Ali Mahdi signed a reconciliation agreement in December 1992 to end the rivalry between USC factions. [1a]


4.16 Major political groups attended peace talks in Addis Ababa in March 1993.  Somaliland 's SNM attended as an observer only.  The delegates agreed to establish a Transitional National Council, representing all regions of Somalia and the factions attending the talks, with UN peacekeeping forces administering a cease-fire. As the Addis Ababa talks were closing in March 1993 the UN authorised the deployment of UNOSOM II, with forces from 30 countries. In May 1993 UNOSOM II replaced UNITAF to become the largest peacekeeping operation ever undertaken by the UN and the first to engage in peace enforcement without the consent of the parties in the relevant country. [1a]


4.17Existing political structures, responsible for the previous two years of anarchy, had been reinforced by UNITAF accepting politicians and faction 'warlords' as key negotiators rather than trying to widen the basis of political consultation. UNOSOM II took this a stage further by taking sides in the conflict and effectively declaring war on Aideed.  US advisers to UNOSOM II disliked Aideed's independent attitude towards the UN presence in Somalia .  During 1993 US forces, under direct US rather than UN command, carried out a series of attacks against Aideed's SNA in Mogadishu .  Increasingly violent operations, which sought to disarm the SNA and arrest Aideed, continued for several months, causing many casualties and provoking hostile reactions in Mogadishu . [1a]


4.18 In October 1993, an operation by US soldiers to seize Aideed's supporters in a heavily populated district of Mogadishu resulted in the deaths of 19 UNOSOM II troops and at least 200 Somalis. This prompted an immediate change in policy by the US , which henceforth advocated a political rather than military solution to the conflict with Aideed, and a decision to withdraw US forces from Somalia by March 1994. [1a]


4.19 Despite the presence of UN troops in the capital, General Morgan was able to recapture Kismayo from Aideed's ally Colonel Jess in March 1993. A regional peace conference for 'Jubaland' (south-western Somalia ) took place in Kismayo from May to August 1993 but failed to produce any binding agreement between the conflicting parties. Subsequent efforts in 1994 were similarly unsuccessful. [1a]


4.20 A further national reconciliation conference took place in Addis Ababa in December 1993 but was not successful in finding agreement between Aideed's SNA and the SSA grouping around Ali Mahdi. Talks continued in Nairobi in 1994 but were inconclusive.  Renewed conflict between Hawiye factions followed. Meanwhile, efforts by UNOSOM II to establish district and regional administrations were criticised by observers who claimed that council members were often imposed, or excluded (particularly those from the SNA), by UN officials.  In November 1994 the UN announced that UNOSOM II would withdraw from Somalia by the end March 1995.  Competition for control of installations that UNOSOM II had run became the focus of factional hostility.  Fighting broke out between the militias of Aideed and Ali Mahdi for control of the port and airport in February 1995.  The last UN forces left Somalia in March 1995. [1a]



Southern Somalia - developments since 1995


4.21 Major divisions within the Habr Gedir and SNA surfaced in June 1995 when Aideed's former aide, Osman Hassan Ali 'Ato', tried to oust him as SNA chairman. Aideed loyalists expelled Ali Ato and his supporters from the SNA.  During this month 15 pro-Aideed factions in southern Mogadishu convened a reconciliation conference and elected Aideed President of Somalia .  Ali Mahdi and Ali Ato denounced this move and militias loyal to them continued to clash with pro-Aideed factions. [1a]


4.22 In September 1995 Aideed's forces occupied Baidoa in the Rahanweyn-populated Bay region in south-western Somalia ousting the Rahanweyn-supported SDM. [1a][7] Aideed's occupying forces dismantled a local autonomous authority based on the Rahanweyn territories that had been established in the region by UNOSOM II. [7] Fighting between supporters of Aideed's and Ali Ato's further intensified in early 1996 resulting in Aideed's forces capturing Huddur, in neighbouring Bakool region, in January 1996. Sporadic fighting between Aideed's supporters and those of Ali Mahdi and Ali Ato continued from May to August 1996. Aideed was wounded during these clashes and died of his injuries in August 1996. His son Hussein, a former US marine, was chosen by the SNA to replace him and clashes with rivals quickly resumed.  There were clashes in Kismayo between rival factions within the SNF, fighting over the distribution of port revenues.  A cease-fire agreed in Nairobi in October 1996 between Ali Mahdi, Ali Ato and Hussein Aideed was broken within the month and fighting intensified in the months that followed. [1a]


4.23 Between December 1996 and January 1997 representatives of 26 Somali factions, notably excluding the SNA, held talks in Ethiopia under the auspices of Ethiopia and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a grouping of regional states. This resulted in the creation of a 41 member National Salvation Council (NSC) to act as an interim national government.  Hussein Aideed condemned the NSC and insisted that he was the legitimate President. [1a][1b]


4.24 International mediation efforts continued and representatives of several Somali factions met, under Egyptian and Arab League auspices, in Cairo in March 1997. In May 1997 Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed signed a reconciliation agreement in Cairo . However, Aideed made it clear that he remained opposed to the Ethiopian-sponsored peace initiative. [1a] At a further conference held in Cairo, 26 Somali faction leaders, including Aideed and Ali Mahdi, signed a peace agreement in December 1997.  A condition of this accord was that a national reconciliation conference be held in Baidoa in February 1998.  This was never held, not least because troops loyal to Aideed remained stationed in Baidoa. [1b] Ethiopia rejected the Cairo accord on the grounds that it failed to include all members of the NSC. [1a]


4.25As of mid 1997 a Nordic fact-finding report of a mission to Mogadishu noted that, "The city remained deeply divided, with four main Hawiye clan-based administrations. The leaders of the factions controlling these divisions are Ali Mahdi, USC/SSA, in northern Mogadishu and part of the Bermuda district of southern Mogadishu, Hussein Aideed, USC/SNA, in southern Mogadishu, Ali Ato, head of a breakaway faction of the USC/SNA, in a small part of southern Mogadishu, and Musa Sude, Deputy Chairman of the USC/SSA, in the Medina district of southern Mogadishu. Ali Ato, General Aideed's former financier, became loosely allied with Ali Mahdi following his split with Aideed in 1995 and is also a member of the SSA. His administration is not in conflict with those of Ali Mahdi or Musa Sude. There are also at least three enclaves dominated by various clan groupings but these are allied with one of the four main administrations." [35]


Attempts to reunify Mogadishu


4.26 Peace rallies took place in Mogadishu in early 1998; Hussein Aideed and other faction leaders reportedly participated in these.  People began to move freely around the city, across the "green lines" that had hitherto marked the boundaries between areas controlled by rival clan-factions. [9a] In August 1998 Mogadishu's principal faction leaders, including Ali Mahdi, Aideed and Mohamed Qanyareh Afrah, formed a new administration for Benadir region, covering Mogadishu and its environs. However, Ali Ato opposed this development and asked the international community not to recognise the new administration.  It was subsequently announced that Islamic (Shari'a) law would be applied in the new administration.  Efforts to reopen Mogadishu 's port failed as hostile militia fired at ships attempting to dock in the port in September 1998.  Attempts to establish a police force later in 1998 were also short lived, as in spite of a number of Arab states providing financial aid to the new administration, the salaries of the force were unpaid.  The 6,000 strong force comprising approximately half who were former militiamen and half who were newly recruited in 1999 subsequently was disbanded. [1b]


4.27 In June 1999 it was reported that Islamic militias operating under the auspices of self-appointed Islamic courts and financed by local businesses had closed down hundreds of checkpoints set up by warring factions, an exercise that was repeated in December 1999.  [1a][1b] These militias were also involved in providing security within the city. A further attempt to set up a new administration in December 1999 by Mogadishu's principal faction leaders, including Ali Mahdi, Aideed, Ali Ato and Qanyareh, all Hawiye, failed in the face of strong opposition from Islamic court militias. [1a]


Kismayo and Juba Regions


4.28 Kismayo was taken from General Morgan's forces in June 1999 by the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), a grouping of Marehan, Ogaden and Habr Gedir clans aiming to establish a regional administration for Lower Juba . [1a][7] The city witnessed regular fighting in late 1999, between forces of the Ayr sub-clan of the Habr Gedir and a group of Ogaden fighters, both of which belonged to the JVA. [1a]


4.29 In early August 2001 General Morgan's forces briefly re-occupied Kismayo but the JVA retook the city the following day with minimal effort. Later in August 2001 JVA forces moved inland to capture the town of Bu'aale in Middle Juba region, 200 km north of Kismayo, from General Morgan's forces. [7][10i][10k]


4.30 UN agencies were able to resume operations in Kismayo in 2001. Morgan would like to recapture Kismayo, his traditional power base, but the JVA has secured the roads surrounding the city to prevent his forces progressing. Following his removal from Kismayo, it is believed that Morgan is based mainly in Ethiopia . The JVA controls Kismayo and Jilib and in 2002 sent mainly Marehan forces to Bardera in Gedo region, as part of the conflict in Gedo between the Marehan clans (see also the following section on Gedo). [7]


Gedo Region


4.31 Gedo region has been subject to a number of armed incursions from Ethiopia since the mid-1990s. In August 1996 and January 1997 Ethiopian forces launched attacks in Gedo against alleged bases of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (Islamic Union Party), a radical Islamic group fighting to create an independent Somali homeland in the Ogaden district of Ethiopia. In March 1998 Ethiopian troops returned to Gedo to occupy several towns in the region following the capture of SNF-controlled El Wak by Al-Itihaad forces. [1b]


4.32 A peace pact signed in Gedo region in August 1998 between the SNF and Al-Itihaad soon collapsed. The SNF split into two warring factions, with each controlling three districts in Gedo and competing for control of Bardhere district. In April 1999 the leader of one of the factions was assassinated. [1a]


4.33 Following the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war in 1998, concern about the activities of Eritrean-supported Somali militias prompted Ethiopia to launch cross-border raids into Somalia against faction leaders and militias loyal to Hussein Aideed. [1a] In July 1999 Ethiopian forces based in Luuq moved further into Gedo, taking Garba Harre, the Gedo capital, and Burdhubo. [1a][10b] In August 1999 Ethiopian forces captured a number of Al-Itihaad fighters in Gedo. In September 1999 clashes took place in Garba Harre between an Ethiopian-backed SNF faction and the main SNF group. The main SNF group drove the Ethiopian-backed faction out, forcing it to retreat to Luuq. [1a]


4.34 Gedo was claimed as one of the regions of the South West State of Somalia , as declared by RRA leader Colonel Shaatigaduud in March 2002, but the SWS administration has no effective authority in Gedo. [7]


Bay and Bakool Regions


4.35 Colonel Hasan Muhammad Nur 'Shatigadud', of the Harin sub-clan of the Rahanweyn, set up the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) to fight for the restoration of Rahanweyn control of the area after Aideed's forces seized a large area of the Bay and Bakool region in September 1995. [1a][1b][7][8] The RRA captured Huddur from Aideed's forces in August 1996. [1a][8] The RRA, which clashed with Aideed's SNA forces throughout 1997, took control of Baidoa for a short time in October 1997 but the SNA recaptured the town. Fighting between the RRA and SNA continued throughout 1997 and 1998. The RRA captured Huddur in Bakool region from Aideed's SNA in October 1998, prompting the return to the town of many refugees. [1b][7] In December 1998 the RRA established an administration for Bakool in co-operation with traditional Elders. [20]


4.36 In June 1999, after months of fighting between the RRA and SNA, the RRA backed by a 3,000 man Ethiopian force, captured Baidoa from Aideed's forces. [1a][1b] This move was seen as part of a wider Ethiopian strategy of establishing a buffer zone inside Somalia in a line from Gedo, through Bay and Bakool to Hiran. The joint RRA-Ethiopian force conducted operations against Aideed's forces and fighters of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an Ethiopian guerrilla group opposed to the Ethiopian government, whose members were being trained in Somalia by the SNA. [1a] Aideed discontinued support to the OLF after reaching an agreement with the Ethiopians in October 1999. However, Ethiopia continued to support the RRA and made armed incursions in other areas of Somalia . [1a][1b]


4.37From Baidoa, the RRA moved on to take the town of Bur Acaba , north-west of Mogadishu , in June 1999. [10a] The RRA leader, Colonel Hassan Mohamed Nur 'Shaatigaduud', announced the RRA's intention of liberating all Rahanweyn-populated territory between the Juba and Shabelle rivers. [11b] In September 1999 the RRA, supported by the Ethiopians and the allied Digil Salvation Army (DSA), took the town of Dinsoor in the west of Bay region. By mid-2000 the RRA had consolidated its control of Bay and Bakool regions, leaving Aideed's forces in disarray. [1a]


4.38 The RRA established a regional administration for Bay region in December 1999, with a governor and senior RRA personnel taking positions in government. [1a]  

Arta Conference 2000 and formation of the TNG 

4.39 A peace conference chaired by Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh opened in May 2000 at Arta, Djibouti under the auspices of IGAD. [1a][1b][2a][8] Arta was the 13th major peace initiative for Somalia since the collapse of central government in 1991. [1a][8] It was the first peace initiative that set out to work around civil society rather than just the armed clan-factions. [8] 

4.40Nearly 2,000 delegates, representing a wide spectrum of Somali society, including clan Elders, religious leaders, NGOs, businessmen and intellectuals, attended the Arta conference, with the aim of drafting a power-sharing arrangement and a constitution, the Transitional National Charter, to see Somalia through a three-year transitional period. [1b][2a][8][37] Some leaders of armed clan-factions attended, most notably Ali Mahdi, but the Somaliland and Puntland authorities and faction leaders such as Hussein Aideed and Musa Sude stayed away from the conference. [8] 

4.41 In August 2000 the conference adopted the Transitional National Charter and selected the 245-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA). [1a][2a] The Charter, which effectively serves as a constitution, provides for freedom of expression and association and separated the executive, legislature and judiciary, guaranteeing the independence of the latter. [1b] 

4.42 The TNA is structured along clan lines and comprises equal numbers of members of the main Somali clan-families, the Dir (including the Isaaq), Hawiye, Darod and Digil-Mirifle (Rahanweyn) and reserved seats for representatives of minority groups and women. The seats for the clan-families are divided out amongst the various constituent clans and sub-clans. [1a][1b][8] 

4.43 In August 2000 the TNA elected Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, a member of the Hawiye Habr Gedir Ayr clan, as transitional President of Somalia. [1a][1b][2a][8] Abdiqassim had held several ministerial positions under Siad Barre. [1a] Abdiqassim received public backing from the UN, EU, Arab League and was supported locally by business interests, Ali Mahdi and the Islamic Shari'a courts, some of which pledged their militia forces to the new administration. [8]   

4.44 Ali Khalif Galayadh, a businessman and prominent member of the northern Darod Dulbahante clan, was named as Prime Minister in October 2000. [1a][2a][8] Like Abdiqassim, Galayadh had also served as a Minister under Siad Barre. [1a] Later in October 2000, Galayadh announced the formation of the 32-member Transitional National Government (TNG). [1a] 

4.45 Abdiqassim made his first visit to Somalia in his new capacity as interim President when he visited Baidoa, in RRA-controlled Bay region, in early September 2000.  Thousands of people attended a rally in Baidoa to welcome him.  He made a surprise visit to Mogadishu later in September 2000 and met with no resistance from the clan-faction leaders, such as Hussein Aideed, that had threatened to oppose any such visit to the capital. [8][14a] 

4.46 In December 2000 Hossein Haji Bod, a North Mogadishu 'warlord' and former deputy of Ali Mahdi previously opposed to the TNG, declared his support for Abdiqassim's transitional administration. Bod pledged the support of his militia to the TNG. [14c] 

Formation of SRRC 

4.47 In March 2001 faction leaders, backed by Ethiopia, opposed to the TNG established the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) at a meeting in Addis Ababa. The SRRC has a presidential council, consisting of five co-chairmen who it was agreed would each fill the position of chairman on a rotating basis.  Hussein Aideed was chosen as the SRRC's first chairman, with a mandate for six months. [10e] 

TNG vote of no confidence of 2001 

4.48 On 28 October 2001 the TNG of Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galayadh was voted out of office after it failed to defeat a no-confidence vote in the TNA. 174 members of the 245-seat TNA voted on the motion, with 141 supporting the TNG's dismissal. MPs who accused the Prime Minister of mismanagement and failing to bring peace to Mogadishu and Somalia as a whole tabled the motion. [10p][14e][15c] 

4.49 The no-confidence vote took place on the eve of peace talks due to commence in Kenya at the beginning of November 2001 between President Abdiqassim and opponents of his administration, including members of the SRRC. President Abdiqassim remained in office as the interim president, as did the TNG, under acting Prime Minister Osman Jamma Ali, on a caretaker basis pending the appointment of a new administration. [10p][14e][15c] Abdiqassim appointed Hassan Abshir Farah, a former Puntland interior minister, as Prime Minister in November 2001. [14f] 

Eldoret Peace Conference 2002 

4.50 In January 2002 IGAD heads of state met in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, to discuss peace and reconciliation in Somalia.  Following this meeting, which was attended by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner, hopes were raised that IGAD, the EU and the United States were going to finally solve the Somali situation by completing the peace process started in Arta in 2000. It was hoped they could bring about reconciliation between the TNG, the factions opposed to it, and regional administrations such as Puntland and Somaliland. [10z]

4.51 In a follow-up to the January summit, regional ministers met in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, in February 2002 and agreed to set up a technical committee to prepare for a Somali reconciliation conference.  Originally this was planned to commence in the second half of April 2002.  However, the conference, which was to have brought together the TNG and other political groups was repeatedly postponed, as the necessary mechanisms were not in place. [10z]

4.52 An IGAD-sponsored national reconciliation conference on Somalia finally commenced in the Kenyan town of Eldoret on 15 October 2002. [3d][10w][11z] The conference represented the fourteenth attempt to bring peace to the collapsed state. [6c] Most faction leaders attended the talks; delegates included the TNG Prime Minister Hasan Abshir Farah, Puntland leader Abdullahi Yusuf, Hussein Aideed, Musa Sude, Omar Mohamoud Mohamed 'Finish', Osman Ali Ato and other representatives of the SRRC; all IGAD members' states were also represented. [3d][10w][11x] It was reported that the talks had attracted more "important Somali players" than any previous peace conference. [11f] 

4.53 More than 19 faction leaders and 400 delegates participated in the talks (of these 362 were official delegates). [11c][11d]  However, the TNG president refused to attend unless he was accorded head of state status as opposed to that of a faction leader.  The TNG Prime Minister instead represented him. [11c] The breakaway self-declared Somaliland Republic also refused to attend the talks. [6c][11c] Reportedly, donors organising the conference had put no pressure on Somaliland to participate; in contrast European diplomats threatened sanctions against any warlords who did not participate. [11c]  

4.54 There were two adjournments during the opening two weeks, first when clan and military differences showed as faction leaders demanded a greater share in any new democratic government, then when some clan leaders claimed they were under-represented at the talks.  Meanwhile faction leaders pushed for the exclusion of the civil society, women and professionals from the talks. [11c] However, an early positive development saw 22 military, political, civil society and clan leaders, including a reported 17 faction leaders, sign the Eldoret Declaration on 27 October 2002. [3b][6c][11c][11f] The declaration included an undertaking of signatories to create federal governance in Somalia; endorsed the principle of decentralisation; a provision for all hostilities to cease and guaranteed the security of humanitarian and development personnel and installations. [3b] However, this ceasefire element has subsequently been violated on several occasions. [3b][11f]  

4.55 Disputes over seat allocations for the conference continued to cause deadlock.  Some Somali political groups complained they were being marginalised and alleged the distribution of seats was unfairly biased towards the SRCC.  IGAD proposed a formula to increase the number of delegates to 400. Faction leader, Ali Mahdi Mohamed quit the talks in November 2002 stating the peace conference was going nowhere. [11d] Meanwhile moves to get the second phase of talks underway started; this involved the creation of six committees to put forward recommendations on key issues. The issues identified for discussion included federalism and producing a provisional Federal Charter; demobilisation; disarmament and reintegration; land and property rights; regional and international relations and conflict resolution and reconciliation. [6c][10ad][11d][11e] The second phase of the talks had originally been expected to take place in Rome with a reduced delegation of 75 to be selected from those present at Eldoret, however talks remained in Eldoret with a far higher number of delegates. [11c][11f] 

4.56 With the second phase of talks underway it was reported in December 2002 that 23 factions had agreed to a federal transitional parliament comprising 450 seats be formed at the conclusion of the conference. With numbers present at the conference having thus far been in the region of 1,000 it was announced by Kenya's special envoy, and Chairmen of the conference, Elijah Mwangale, that for financial reasons delegates would be limited to around 300. [11e] When the conference opened there had been reports of a brisk trade in bogus credentials, the number of official delegates participating in the second phase was reported to be 361. [10bc][11f] The excess attendees were offered financial assistance to return home.  Mwangale indicated a small number of people were necessary to discuss in detail the structure of the new government to be formed. [11e]  

4.57 Other developments during December 2002 saw the signing of an agreement between the TNG and five faction leaders - Qanyareh, Musa Sude, Aideed, Ali Ato, and Omar 'Finish' - who pledged to ensure security in the capital. The faction leaders also signed a separate agreement to make efforts to open both the air and sea port in Mogadishu. [3b] Also in December 2002 the African Union named Mohamed Ali Foum as its first envoy to Somalia. [11e] 

4.58 In January 2003 the new Kenyan Government replaced Mwangale with Bethwell Kiplagat, a move intended to inject new momentum into the reconciliation process.  This appointment was strongly welcomed by the Somalis. [3b][11f] In his new role Kiplagat has held consultative meetings with the six committees (see above) to discuss their agendas.  Meanwhile leaders have requested time to consult and reach an agreement regarding the issue of ownership of the conference. Meanwhile, arguments over representation ensued; one civil society representative stated he had been beaten up after he and other representatives, including women, stormed a meeting of warlords.  However, on 25 January 2003 it was reported that civil society groups had agreed to have 16 delegates with warlords having 284. [11f] 

Change of venue and other peace related initiatives 2003 

4.59 In February 2003 the talks were adjourned in order that they could move from Eldoret to Mbagathi College in Nairobi, this represented a further attempt to cut costs. [6d][26] Prior to the process recommencing in its new location there were threats from several factions, including the TNG to withdraw. [26] The TNG did continue its participation in the process but joined a number of other factions in staying away from the initial meeting in the new venue. [10ac][11g][26]  

4.60 There were reports that TNG, in common with a number of other factions, were unhappy about Ethiopian "interference" in the conference and expressed the view that Kenya should be the sole facilitator of the talks.  During February 2003 the TNG also accused Ethiopia of "working tirelessly to marginalise or undermine the TNG and some factions while favouring others".  Ethiopia's Prime Minister had earlier admitted sending troops into Somalia to attack members of the Islamist Al-Itihaad group; he also claimed there were members of the group within the TNG.  Unsurprisingly, the TNG opposed in the strongest possible terms a proposal, originating from the US for Ethiopia to deploy forces to represent US forces within Somalia.  The TNG indicated any such move would cause "big trouble" in the region. [11g]  

4.61 Also in February 2003 a monitoring committee was set up to monitor the ceasefire accord between the warring Somali factions. This comprised the EU, AU, Arab League, IGAD and US.  The committee met on 27 February 2003 and discussed the possibility of sanctions against any faction that breach the ceasefire. [11g] In early March 2003 Kiplagat urged faction leaders whose groups have been violating the cease-fire agreement to respect the peace process. He warned that a team would soon be sent to Mogadishu to assess the situation and action would be taken against those flouting the cease-fire agreement, whether they were part of it or not. [26] 

4.62 At the end of March 2003 the TNG, faction leaders Qanyareh and Ali Ato, and members of the JVA and the RRA held a meeting in Mogadishu. [10ac] Participants maintained that this was not an alternative to the Nairobi talks but a consultative meeting to discuss ways of bringing peace to the capital. [3c][10ac] It was reported that progress was made in this respect as agreement was reached both for a new administration for Mogadishu and measures to bring peace. [10ac] Meanwhile at a joint press conference several groups attending the talks in Nairobi, including the SRCC represented by Hussein Aideed, denounced the Mogadishu initiative.  Some faction leaders claimed it was intended to undermine the Nairobi talks. [3c][10ac] 

4.63 In April 2003 it was reported that the IGAD technical committee responsible for steering the peace talks had established a Harmonisation Committee (HC) to co-ordinate the work of the peace conference's six working committees and come up with one report.  The SRCC reacted angrily to this development and called for IGAD to rescind its decision, and indicated it would not consider binding any opinions or recommendations submitted by the HC. The SRCC contend the task of harmonising differences should have been left to the Leaders' Committee. [10ad]  

4.64 In May 2003 organisers announced that the second phase of the talks were nearing a conclusion and that only a plenary session to discuss recommendations from the six committees remained outstanding.  Kiplagat expected to receive a set of recommendations that would pave the way for setting up new transitional institutions.  There were reports that the committee discussing the issue of federalism was unable to agree a single set of recommendations but had produced two reports, one advocating a unitary state and the other for a federal state.   Kiplagat stated that a consensus proposal based on middle ground was however emerging. [10al]  

4.65 An issue where agreement proved particularly difficult to reach a consensus was the size and mode of selection for members of a future interim parliament.  By mid June 2003, reportedly after days of bargaining, considerable differences remained between delegates' aligned to the SRRC and TNG supporters. [10ax] Kiplagat had previously imposed a deadline of 18 June 2003 for a new parliament to be in place.  On the eve of this date he acknowledged this would not be achieved.  However, he noted progress had been made in respect of several issues of contention and extended the deadline to the end of June 2003 to resolve remaining differences. [10ay] However, one week later there were warnings from the G8 alliance of factions that the talks risked collapse if a compromise was not found. [10bc] 

4.66 The SRRC favoured a 450-seat parliament with 361 delegates to the peace conference forming the basis.  The TNG and other donors to the conference rejected this position and argued that a parliament of 450 is not economically viable. The TNG also believe that the parliament should not be based on conference delegates but selected instead by traditional elders.  Additionally, some diplomats observing the talks expressed concern that a 450-member parliament would be too large and unwieldy to make decisions.  [10ax][10bc] The G8 groups proposed a 275-member parliament as a compromise. A speaker for the 41 civil society organisations represented at the conference also expressed serious concerns at a parliament of the size proposed by the SRRC and proposed instead a 171 member parliament with a cabinet not exceeding 13. [10bc]    

4.67 Meanwhile, during May and early June 2003 a 21-member AU and IGAD mission, sent by the conference to look at the security situation, undertook a 12 day fact-finding mission in Somalia.  Also comprising delegates from the Arab League, EU and Somali delegates attending the conference, the mission's purpose had been to prepare ground for the future deployment of AU military observers.  Additionally, the mission was intended to facilitate planning the deployment of peacekeeping troops in the event that the conference was to support such an initiative.  The mission had encouraged those who it met with within Somalia to abide by the cease-fire agreement.  According to the mission leader, there was a great desire for peace amongst the population.  However, even during the course of the mission, and unbeknown to the participants, the cease-fire was breached in the Middle Shabelle region. [10au] 

4.68 On 5 July 2003 delegates to the conference reportedly signed what was termed a "historic" agreement to set up a federal government.  This provided for a 351 seat Transitional Parliament with a four-year mandate.  Selection of parliamentarians was to be made by signatories to the Eldoret Declaration of 27 October 2002 (see section: Eldoret Peace Conference 2002) and politicians originally invited to the technical committee in consultation with traditional leaders.  However, the following day the agreement was denounced by some groups.  TNG President Abdiqassim rejected the agreement (signed by his Prime Minister), stating it would divide the country.  He maintained the previously expressed TNG concerns about the number of MPs and the method of their selection (see above).  However, TNG Prime Minister Abshir Farah stood by the agreement and in a press statement stated that it represented a compromise between two dramatically opposed positions.  Meanwhile the Mogadishu faction leader, Musa Sude, stated that the agreement had just been announced and he would not recognise it. [10bf] Abdiqassim and Musa Sude both withdrew from the talks in late July 2003 and early August 2003 respectively. [10bn]  

4.69By late July 2003 it was reported that consensus was emerging on the controversial issue of a charter.  Organisers expressed hope that the greatest measure of agreement could be achieved before the plenary session marking the end of stage two.  Some participants felt that the remaining stage of the conference would be most difficult as it involved the contentious issue of power sharing.  One delegate observed that every faction leader present would want a bigger share than they would probably get.  In anticipation of moving to stage three IGAD had commenced the process of transporting Somali traditional elders to the Nairobi venue.  According to organisers the intended role of these elders in the final stage of the process was to participate in the selection of future parliamentarians and to contribute to the reconciliation of various faction leaders.  [10bl] 

4.70In August 2003 Mogadishu faction leader Ali Ato also expressed his disappointment over the conduct of the peace talks in Nairobi.  Speaking from Mogadishu he commented that "It seems that certain Somali groups, supported by a foreign power, are being favoured to the detriment of others, and this will not lead to a successful outcome".  However, he denied he had walked out of the talks and stated he was in Mogadishu to consult with his people.  He expressed his intention to meet with those faction leaders who had left the talks, but stressed this was a consultative meeting not an alternative to the Kenya conference.  In addition to President Abdiqassim and Musa Sude, JVA leader Colonel Barre Shire Hiirale was also reported absent from the talks. [10bq] Abdiqassim had received from the Kenyan government a formal invitation for the TNG to return to the talks.  He had reportedly attached a number of conditions to any return, aside from the role of traditional elders in the selection of parliamentarians these included Somalis having overall control of the talks and the participation of a representative from the "northern regions" (a reference to Somaliland). [10bp]

Term of TNG mandate reaches its official end 

4.71 As the TNG mandate drew closer to its scheduled end in August 2003 there were increasing reports of significant differences between President Abdiqassim and his Prime Minister. [10aq][10bf] In May 2003 there were reports of a rift between TNG President and Prime Minister, these were played down as being "minor" and "resolved" by Prime Minister Hassan Abshir Farah who maintained the TNGs commitment to the peace talks.  However, there were widespread reports that the Prime Minister wished to dismiss three ministers seen as loyal to President Abdiqassim and that Abdiqassim had blocked this. [10aq] However, Abdiqassim's denouncement of the agreement his Prime Minister had signed at the peace talks on 5 July seemed to bring the pair's simmering differences to the fore. [10bf]  

4.72Following his withdrawal from the peace talks in late July 2003 Abdiqassim moved to sack his Prime Minister in August 2003. Within days of this announcement, Hassan Abshir Farah announced that the TNG mandate would expire on 13 August 2003 at the end of its three-year term.  A written statement issued in Nairobi in conjunction with parliament speaker, Abdallah Derow Isaak who was also sacked, stated that the TNG was "unconstitutional".  Referring to themselves as representatives of the TNG the pair stated that they were willing to hand over power to any duly constituted government emerging from the conference. The pair also accused Abdiqassim of trying to hang on to power and asserted that there was no quorum in the TNG parliament convened to sanction their dismissals.  For his part President Abdiqassim stated that the TNG would continue until new institutions were formed through free and fair elections. [10bo] The TNG continued to be recognised by the Kenyan Government who formally wrote to Abqiqassim requesting his return to the peace talks. [10bp]

"South West State of Somalia" (Bay and Bakool) 2002 - 2003  

4.73 In March 2002, the RRA set up a new regional administration, called the South West State of Somalia (SWS), in the Bay and Bakool regions that it controls. The decision to establish the SWS administration was taken at a meeting in Baidoa of the RRA's central committee and over 70 Elders from the Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn) clans. The meeting elected RRA chairman, Colonel Hassan Mohamed Nur 'Shaatigaduud', as President of the new regional state to serve for a four-year term. There was speculation that the establishment of the new autonomous state would lead to the demise of the SRRC, of which the RRA is a member. [10r][22a] The RRA Governor of Baidoa announced that the RRA would attend the peace talks due to take place in Nairobi as the new state but that they would, however, still be under the SRRC umbrella. [10r] 

4.74Colonel Shaatigaduud was inaugurated as President of the SWS in early April 2002. He announced the SWS objective of bringing the regions of Middle Juba and Lower Juba under its authority and stated that force could be used to achieve this. [7][28] However, reports suggested tension in his Baidoa, the principle town of the region, had been rising as a result of a deepening split within the senior ranks of the RRA.  This split originated from a power struggle between the RRA chairman, Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud, and his two deputies Shaykh Adan Madobe and Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade. [10z] 

4.75 Fighting between forces loyal to Colonel Shaatigaduud and those loyal to the two RRA Vice-Chairmen, Madobe and Habsade, broke out in July 2002. In early October 2002 forces loyal to the two vice-chairmen captured Baidoa from Shaatigaduud. After an initial spate of looting in Baidoa, aimed mostly at businesses of those seen as Shaatigaduud supporters, calm was restored to the town, with most of the militias removed from the town centre. The town of Bur Acaba also fell to the forces of Sheikh Adan and Habsade. Shaatigaduud's forces were reported to be regrouping north of Baidoa. [10v] On 24September 2002 the RRA in Burhakaba arrested 11 pro -TNG Elders and accused them of fomenting division and dissension within the Rahanweyn clan. [2a] By the end of 2002 control of Baidoa had reportedly changed between Shaatigaduud and his rivals three times. [10z] 

4.76 Fighting between the rival factions has continued into 2003 resulting in deteriorating security conditions Baidoa and its environs. [3b][11f] In January 2003 there were unconfirmed reports of a possible alliance between the Madobe/Habsade faction and the TNG, subsequent reports in late March 2003 suggested the faction had signed an agreement with Mogadishu faction leaders, the TNG and the JVA.  This aimed to bring peace to Mogadishu and establish a new administration for the capital. [10ac][10z] [11f] At the end of February 2003 control of Baidoa was reportedly in the hands of Shaatigaduud's rivals. [3b]       

"Puntland State of Somalia" (North-eastern Somalia) 1998 - 2003 

Position in north-eastern Somalia pre -1998 

4.77 North-eastern Somalia has been the most stable part of the country since the collapse of central government in 1991.  The Majerteen-dominated SSDF has controlled the three north-eastern regions of Bari, Nugal and northern Mudug since 1991 and developed and administrative system.  Apart from a conflict with Islamic fundamentalists in 1992 and isolated clashes with SNA forces in Galkayo in 1993 there had, in contrast to many other areas of the country, been a prolonged period without fighting in the north-east. [30a][31][32][33] 

Establishment of Puntland 

4.78 The autonomous "Puntland State of Somalia" was proclaimed in Garowe, north-eastern Somalia in July 1998 by the Majerteen (Darod) clan-dominated SSDF administration following a conference between the SSDF, the United Somali Party (USP), from the eastern regions of Somaliland, the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), from the eastern, Marehan-populated, part of Galgudud region in central Somalia and other community representatives. [1b][23a][24a] SSDF deputy leader Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was proclaimed State President. Mohamed Abdi Hashi, leader of the USP was declared Vice-President; a 9-member cabinet was established in August 1998 followed by a parliament. [1a][1b][23a] The new regional state received encouragement form factional leader General Morgan conditional support from Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu but Hussein Aideed accused Ethiopia of supporting Ahmed and encouraging the secession of Puntland from Somalia. [23a] 

4.79 The Mogadishu Times and 'Xog-Ogaal', both Mogadishu based newspapers, reported that the Somaliland Government criticised the establishment of Puntland and warned against threats to Somaliland's territorial integrity. In September 1998 Ethiopia reportedly donated military uniforms, light weapons and ammunition to the Puntland administration. [19a][25a] In December 1998 the Ethiopian Government appointed a special envoy to Puntland. It was reported in February 1999 that Ethiopia was supplying arms to the Puntland authorities. [18a][19b][25b] In March 1999 forces from Puntland attempted to take over a police station in the town of Las Anod (Laascanood) in Sool region, in eastern Somaliland. This raised tension between Puntland and Somaliland, both of which claim the region. Somaliland police maintained their hold on the station and the incident did not result in any casualties. There were further confrontations between Somaliland and Puntland over the Sool region in late 1999. [1a][19c] 

Constitutional Crisis in Puntland 2001- 2003 

4.80 Under the terms of the Puntland Charter, the mandate of the Puntland administration was due to expire at the end of June 2001. In February 2001, the administration prohibited all political activities until June 2001, to avert unrest and maintain law and order. Rather than undertake the presidential and parliamentary elections that were required under the Puntland Charter, Abdullahi Yusuf's administration sought a three-year extension of its term. In late June 2001 the Puntland House of Representatives approved the extension of the terms of office of itself and the executive for a further three years. However, this was declared unconstitutional by the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Puntland, Yusuf Haji Nur, who announced that, in accordance with the Puntland Charter, he was assuming office as the legal interim President of Puntland, pending the organisation of a conference. [1a][7] 

4.81 Abdullahi Yusuf announced the suspension of Yusuf Haji Nur from office and the House of Representatives ratified this decision, but Nur's position as Supreme Court Chairman was upheld by a meeting of titled Elders in July 2001. Following unsuccessful attempts by Elders and businessman to promote a peaceful settlement to the constitutional crisis, fighting broke out in Bossaso in early August 2001 and Abdullahi Yusuf retreated to Galkayo, his home town. [7] He announced that he remained the President, claiming Galkayo as an interim capital and blaming Islamic fundamentalists and the TNG for his difficulties. [7][18c] 

4.82 Yusuf Haji Nur announced a conference, as provided for in the Puntland Charter, to determine the future course of Puntland. The conference opened in Garowe in late August 2001 with over 400 participants from across Puntland. Abdullahi Yusuf declared the conference illegal and refused to participate. [7] In October 2001 the Speaker of the Puntland Parliament, Yusuf Haji Sa'id, an ally of Abdullahi Yusuf, announced that former Puntland MPs had begun a meeting in Galkayo to discuss the political situation in Puntland. Speaker Sa'id claimed that the conference in Garowe was not an all-inclusive meeting. [25d] 

4.83 It was reported in October 2001 that Abdullahi Yusuf was willing to step down from the Puntland presidency providing Muhammad Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke, son of the assassinated former Somali President Dr Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shirmarke, was nominated to be the new leader of Puntland. Delegates at the Garowe conference believed that Abdullahi Yusuf's apparent offer was intended to create confusion in the conference as Shirmarke had been barred from contesting the presidency. [18d] 

4.84 In October 2001, Yusuf Haji Nur denied reports that the terrorist group Al-Itihaad had camps or bases in Puntland. He stated that the reports were circulated by discredited Puntland politicians, meaning Abdullahi Yusuf, whose spokesman had claimed that Al-Itihaad was more active than ever before in its efforts to create an extremist Islamic state in Somalia. [10m] 

4.85 The Garowe conference, which had been suspended several times since it began in August 2001, resumed its deliberations in October 2001. [10q] In November 2001, traditional Elders elected Jama Ali Jama as the new President of Puntland.  Jama, a former military officer had links with the TNG, which alarmed Ethiopia, given its determination to remove the TNG. [1a][2a][7] Abdullahi Yusuf refused to accept the Elders' decision and in December 2001 he seized Garowe by force, reportedly with Ethiopian support. Jama fled to Bossaso. Yusuf and Jama both continue to claimed the Puntland presidency. [2a][7]  

4.86 During 2002 fighting erupted between forces loyal to Abdullahi Yusuf and those of his rival, Jama Ali Jama. [7][10z] In January 2002 Ethiopian troops again intervened in Puntland claiming Jama was harbouring Al-Itihaad militants, a charge he denied. [1a] Yusuf continued in his attempts to regain power of the region, in April he declared a state of emergency and suspended the 'Puntland' charter and in May 2002, with the support of Ethiopia, his forces captured Bossaso. [1a][7][10z] It was reported that by May 2002 Yusuf commanded sufficient recognition to attend the Somali peace talks as president of Puntland. [6b] However, although he won major battles and has the upper hand militarily and politically, divisions within his own (Majerteen) sub clan remains a problem. [6b][10z] Yusuf was reportedly putting his administration back in place in mid 2002, but with the exclusion of the Osman Mahmud clan who had supported Jama at all levels. [7] Forces loyal to Jama withdrew from Bossaso without a fight. [2a]  

4.87 During the remainder of 2002 there were reports of further clashes between the forces of Yusuf and Jama. [3a][3b] Both men continued to claim the presidency; there were also continued efforts to resolve the conflict throughout 2002.  [2a][7]  

4.88 On 10 May 2003 Yusuf and his opponents commenced a reconciliation conference that aimed to end the conflict between his administration and the "Puntland" Liberation Movement led by General Ade Muse Hirse, an ally of Jama. [3c] [10an] Following reports of positive progress between the two sides, the Yusuf administration quickly moved to reinstate the licence of the Somali Broadcasting Corporation, a move seen as part of the reconciliation effort. [10ak] The conference, held in Bosasso, involved 300 representatives from both sides.  [3c] On 17 May 2003, the two sides entered into a power sharing agreement; the deal was brokered by elders from the disputed region of Sanaag.  Though Jama was not part of the peace process, it was reported that he welcomed the agreement. [3c][10ak]