



## **PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : SOMALIA**

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## PROFILE SUMMARY

### Displaced Somalis in protection limbo

*Despite hopes raised by the peace deal and cease fire signed in October 2002, Somalis continue to flee a war unabated for over ten years. About 350,000 persons are internally displaced, about 5 percent of the Somali population. Most displaced are from southern minority groups and continue to suffer political and economic discrimination. In the peri-urban areas where they flee to, they receive little or no assistance and most survive through casual work and begging. Income is barely sufficient for one meal a day. Most displaced lack clan protection and social support, and de facto authorities throughout Somalia do not protect the displaced and often divert humanitarian assistance.*

Since the 1970s Somalia has drifted from one emergency to another, running the whole gamut of repression, civil war, invasion, fragmentation, drought and famine. Conflict in Somalia has centered on control of land, the livestock trade and aid. It is unusually hard to give meaningful figures for displacement in a country where 80 percent of the population traditionally led a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence, but it is estimated that at the height of fighting in 1992, up to 2 million people were displaced and up to half a million died (USCR 1998, p. 92; USCR 1995, p.75). By mid-2003, rough estimates indicated that more than 350,000 people remained or were newly displaced (UN November 2002, p.17).

### From dictatorship to warlordism

A military coup in 1969 installed a dictatorial regime, whose divide-and-rule policy succeeded in polarizing grievances into clan-based wars and eventually splintered its own support-base. It was finally overthrown in 1991, but the loose anti-government coalition quickly fell apart and proved incapable of changing pre-established war patterns. Since the early 1990s, various warlords have fought to establish hegemony over Somalia's most fertile lands – between the Jubba and the Shabelle rivers – and key ports such as Mogadishu. These fertile regions were traditionally inhabited by minorities who today account for most of the displaced population.

The US-led military operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to protect the delivery of relief supplies ended in fiasco and was finally abandoned in 1995. Though there were high hopes for a Transitional National Government (TNG), established in October 2000, the new government has found it increasingly difficult to assert control over the country, or to gain broad-based recognition. Since the past three years, clans and factions grouped under the umbrella of the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) have taken up arms against the TNG forces and allied militias, resulting in heightened fighting in the capital as well as in other parts of Southern Somalia.

The self-proclaimed Somaliland Republic in the north-west, has been the most successful in establishing peace and security, functioning systems of governance and brought a multi-party system in 2001. Despite these marked improvements, Somaliland does not enjoy international recognition.

In Puntland (north-eastern Somalia) the President's reluctance to hand over political power at the end of his term fuelled conflict.

Furthermore, Ethiopia has been recurrently accused of moving troops into Gedo and Bakool, and violating UN Security Council's arms embargo by providing ammunitions to factions opposed to the TNG (UNSC, 25 March 2003).

## Causes of displacement

Despite a hopeful peace process started at the end of 2002, an upsurge of inter-factional fighting made the October 2002 ceasefire almost meaningless, preventing people from cultivating their lands and forcing many Somalis to flee again. Conflicts have raged unabated in the cities of Mogadishu, Las Anod, and Baidoa, as well as in the Bari, Bay, Bakol, Gedo, Shabelle and Middle Juba regions (IRIN 15 May 2003).

In 2002, thousands people have been displaced and hundreds killed by fighting in Baidoa, as a result of rising power struggles between senior officials of the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) which controls much of the Bay and Bakool regions of southwestern Somalia (IRIN, 17 January 2003).

In addition to the conflict, Somalis have been affected by drought and other natural calamities, which have pushed many to move in search of water, food and medical assistance. Somalis have fled from war-induced famines and generalized violence for decades. Warlords have deliberately displaced people, looted and destroyed food stocks, mined watering places, grazing lands and major trading roads, and destroyed medical and administrative infrastructures in order to prevent people from another clan from sustaining a livelihood. The most ravaged regions have been in the South and in the main ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo, where the livestock trade is concentrated. Armed factions waged battles in order to claim clan sovereignty over their supposed 'native territories' forcing local populations either to become loyal to their invaders who levy taxes in exchange of 'protection', or to leave.

## Serious lack of protection

Since more than ten years, IDPs in Somalia remain some of the most vulnerable in the world, as no functioning government has provided them with civil and economic rights nor protection. International protection instruments such as the UN Guiding Principles for IDPs prove difficult to implement and enforce in the prevailing context of state collapse. These conditions also mean that IDPs are often not afforded protection by local or *de facto* authorities, in the absence of a functioning legal system.

Most IDPs come from minority groups such as the farming Bantu and Bajuni communities as well as the Rahanweyn clan, which have had a low social status in Somalia and have suffered a long history of discrimination, land dispossession and forced displacement. While protection, access to resources and political participation are granted through clan affiliation, displaced minorities, politically less organized, have been particularly exposed to serious human rights abuses (Menkhaus, November 2000, p.9). Sedentary farmers in Buuale who fled revenge killings in November 2002 had one fourth of their homes burnt down and food and properties looted (FEWS, 8 May 2003).

Particularly vulnerable are women and children who constitute three fourths of IDPs. Displaced women suffer both gender and ethnic discrimination which reinforce political marginalisation, lack of access to land –traditionally requiring the intermediary of a male kin – and lack of access to humanitarian assistance (UNCU, 30 July 2002).

## Patterns of displacement

Tracking displaced populations in Somalia is particularly difficult as virtually all Somalis have been displaced by violence at least once in their life. Furthermore, two thirds of Somalis live a nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle, traditionally moving with their herds to and from grazing lands and water sources. Wars and severe droughts have complicated and hampered these seasonal migrations, and since the 1990s families have increasingly moved to main towns in search of seasonal work and humanitarian assistance.

Scattered in overcrowded urban areas, IDPs mingle with other indigent groups and refugees who are returning in waves, especially to Somaliland, where they enjoy some degree of stability. Some 40,500 IDPs live in Somaliland and 15,000 have sheltered on the outskirts of Hargeisa and Burao, in planned and unplanned settlements. Out of the 30,500 IDPs in Puntland about 28,000 live in Bosasso (UN, November

2002,p.37; UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.1;18). The biggest concentration of displaced people is found in Mogadishu, where between 100,000 and 250,000 people live in about 200 squatter settlements and camps (UN November 2001). Since 1999, few planned IDP camps have remained elsewhere in the country, and the displaced are increasingly dispersed (UN November 2001).

## **Living conditions**

Renewed fighting and drought mean that conditions in the few existing camps are more crowded than ever, with associated high levels of disease. Cerebral malaria is the main killer in Somalia, reflecting the high levels of dislocation to zones where people are not immune to the different types of malaria parasites. Diarrhoea and dehydration are the second cause of death, reflecting the fact that less than a fourth of Somalis have access to safe drinking water and proper sanitation is lacking (MSF, 9 December 2002). As a result, yearly cholera outbreaks spread in main towns such as Mogadishu during the dry season. When available, water is often sold at prices unaffordable to the IDPs who have no choice but to drink water from contaminated streams. Various sources confirm that only one fifth of the Somali population has access to health services and counts on less than 15 qualified doctors per million people (MSF, 9 December 2002). Somalia has the highest rate of under-five mortality rate of the Horn of Africa (22,4 percent) and an alarming rate of 6 percent maternal mortality (UN, November 2002, p.150).

As concerns the nutrition status of IDPs, food security reports conducted during 2002 show overall malnutrition rates as high as 39 percent among displaced children in Mogadishu, compared to a national rate of 17 percent (FSAU, 31 August 2002; MSF, 9 December 2002). As one of the most crisis-prone zones, the southern and central regions of Somalia, despite their comparative fertility to the rest of Somalia, are home to the largest food insecure groups. After three consecutive years of drought, agriculture production recovered in March 2003. However, people in the North-west and in the South could not benefit from the improved rains due to violent conflicts therefore, they continue to be food vulnerable (UN, 3 June 2003, p.2-3).

IDPs living in peri-urban settlements of northern Somalia have very poor access to basic services and informal work opportunities; in some regions up to 93 percent of IDPs depend on begging to survive, barely sufficient to afford one meal per day (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p15,27). Unlike returnees and local residents, IDPs do not benefit from remittances from relatives abroad nor from kin support. In addition, the intermittent livestock import ban imposed by the Gulf States since 2000 as well as the closure of the Al-Barakaat Bank (main channel for remittances), following accusations of abetting terrorism, seriously reduced purchasing power and further increased job competition and discrimination against IDPs. Indeed northerners have not facilitated the integration of southern IDPs, as they often associate them with the crimes of the Barre 'southern' regime (Ibrahim, 15 August 2002, p.5).

## **Humanitarian assistance**

As there is no recognized central government to provide citizens with social services and protection, the delivery of humanitarian assistance is extremely difficult in Somalia. IDPs who lack clan protection are often denied access to humanitarian assistance. In 1993, the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was set up to coordinate rehabilitation and development activities. It includes under its umbrella the UN Country Team, the NGO Consortium and the Red Cross Movement. While the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for IDPs, there is no one single agency specifically focusing on IDPs, but they have been included into wider programmes. In order to find durable solutions to integrate and resettle IDPs as well as to develop special mechanisms to protect IDPs, the UN system launched the Joint Action and Recovery Plan for Somalia end 2002 (UN, 27 September 2002).

The Somali Red Crescent is the only humanitarian institution represented across the country since 1991, providing health care, disaster preparedness and relief. The NGO Action Contre la Faim has been the most active in assisting IDPs in Mogadishu, and was also one of the few still present in Mogadishu during the 2000 confrontations. Islamic organizations have also assisted IDP in Mogadishu.

## Problems of access

Insecurity has been so acute in southern Somalia that it has been difficult to systematically collect information about IDPs and to plan assistance or deliver it in time. The lack of a permanent international presence in the country is telling. UN staff are based in Nairobi and fly in on short missions. It is debatable how much such cross-border operations achieve in proportion to their cost. UNICEF is one of the few agencies who recently established an operational sub-office in Jowhar, (southern Somalia).

Humanitarian access has always been obstructed by unpredictable political dynamics and violence. In 2003, conflicts and loss of humanitarian space particularly affected the Bay, Middle Juba, Mudug and Lower Shabelle regions, as well as Mogadishu. The Sool, Sanaag, Middle Shabelle and Gedo regions also suffered limited access. The heaviest conflict has been around the once stable humanitarian base of Baidoa, which was off-limits for over 8 months due to fighting between RRA factions (UN, 3 June 2003, p.1-2; UNRC, 12 March 2003). Similarly, insecurity in Gedo has prevented food distribution to IDPs since October 2002, after they suffered the combined effects of three consecutive years of drought and the most violent conflict (ACC/SCN 41, 30 April 2003, p.6).

In Mogadishu and other seriously insecure regions, humanitarian workers are regularly kidnapped or even killed by militias, and the ambush and looting of humanitarian vehicles are common occurrences. As a result, many agencies are forced to pull out. In the absence of law and order, humanitarian agencies have often resorted to the protection of militias and gunmen.

With the considerable access problems and donor fatigue, only 26 percent funding for humanitarian assistance in 2003 was received by June 2003 and funding for Somalia has decreased by 90 percent over the last ten years (MSF, 9 December 2002). Although the people of Somalia are extraordinarily resilient, they have little chance of surviving with the low level of assistance currently allocated to the country.

(Updated June 2003)

# CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

## Background

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### **Conflict in Somalia began with Siad Barre's near extermination of the Isaak Clan late 1980s**

- Siad Barre military dictatorship installed in 1969 used clan divide and rule tactics in order to hold on to power
- Siad Barre was charged of genocide against the Isaaq clan in the northwestern Somalia (now Somaliland) in an attempt to control the livestock trade starting attacks in May 1988
- Violent struggles have ensued ever since a loose opposition coalition overthrew the regime in 1991
- By 1992 half a million people were killed and an estimated 1.5 million people were displaced inside northern Somalia

"Siad Barre seized power in 1969 and increasingly employed divisive clan politics to maintain power. Civil war, starvation, banditry, and brutality have wracked Somalia since the struggle to topple Barre began in the late 1980s. When Barre was deposed in January 1991, power was claimed and contested by heavily armed guerrilla movements and militias based on traditional ethnic and clan loyalties. Savage struggles for economic assets by the various factions led to anarchy and famine." (Freedom House 1999, "Overview")

"By 1988 full scale civil war broke out in Northwest, where Siyad Barre's force attacked the city of Hargeysa in a brutal campaign against the Isaaq clan that led to charges of genocide" (IGAD/UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.7).

"May 27, 1988 Civil war erupted when the SNM attacked Burao, one of the main towns in the north. On May 31, they attacked Hargeisa the provincial capital of the region and the second city in the country. Devastating the northern region, causing people to flee their homes and possessions into the neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya.

In 1991 the Somali State collapsed as the civil war engulfed the capital Mogadishu and the military regime of Mohamed Said Barre was forced from power.

In their 1992 report, Amnesty International described Somalia as a "human rights disaster", at the end of 1992 it was estimated that more than 500,000 people had died in the war and famine in Somalia, this included 300,000 children were children. Subsequently, some 1.5 million Somalis had fled the country, and more have since died.

No single factor can explain the causes of the war. The legacy of colonialism, contradictions between the centralized state and pastoral culture, unequal human development, lack of power and clan sharing, oppression, corruption were among the contributed factors to the armed conflict that has now divided Somalia." (Ibrahim F. 15 August 2002, p.1)

"Siad Barre's sustained military offensive crippled agricultural production, destroyed nearly all of the region's livestock, decimated northwest Somalia's businesses, places of worship, and water infrastructure, and uprooted almost the entire population of approximately 2.5 million people.

Fleeing war, mass executions, and torture, approximately 400,000 residents of northwest Somalia sought refuge in other countries.[...] An estimated 1.5 million additional people were displaced within northwest Somalia." (USCR, December 2001, p.15)

### **The fall of Barre regime in 1991 was followed by all out inter-clan war**

- With no central government authority, clan divisions have led to violence and lawlessness since early 1990s
- Somalia has always been divided along clan – rather than religious or ethnic – lines
- Absence of central government authority has left vacuum where violence and lawlessness prevail
- All government infrastructure has been destroyed
- The "black hole" of Somalia is said to attract criminals and subversives

"Clan loyalties are the basis for most civil organization in the vacuum left by the disappearance of central authority. Harsh Islamic law has returned a semblance of order to some areas, including parts of Mogadishu long plagued by lawlessness. Islamic courts are imposing sentences that include executions and amputations in accordance with Shari'a law. Right to free expression and association are ignored. Few autonomous civic or political groups can organize or operate safely. Several small newspapers and newsletters are published in Mogadishu, but the few independent journalists are under constant threat. International correspondents visit only at great risk. Radio stations are mainly operated by various factions, although the United Nations now sponsors new 'peace programming'. During the year, several journalists were arrested in Somaliland for criticizing the local government and suggesting that full press freedom does not exist." (Freedom House 1999, "Political rights and civil liberties")

"Virtually all the infrastructure of government - from buildings and communications facilities to furniture and office equipment - has been looted. All government archives and records, libraries, files and museums have been totally destroyed. In most of the country, there are no police, judiciary or civil service. Communications, apart from private satellite and cellular telephones and radio links, are non-existent. Electricity is not available on a public basis, but only to those who can afford generators. There is no postal service.

[...]

In both informal and formal discussions of the Security Council, member States have expressed concern about the increasingly evident effects of the lack of a functioning central government in Somalia. Somalia is being seen as a 'black hole' where the absence of law and order is attracting criminals and subversives. The Prime Minister of Yemen told my Representative that his Government was concerned about refugee flows from Somalia. He expressed fears that Somalia was being used as a transit-point for the trafficking of narcotic drugs and as a haven for terrorists. President Moi of Kenya called on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to repatriate tens of thousands of Somali refugees living in north-eastern Kenya. He accused the Somalis of abusing Kenyan hospitality by smuggling arms into the country. To worsen the situation, a Somali militia group disarmed a Kenyan platoon on 1 July 1999 and stole its equipment. Most of the stolen goods were returned after the Government of Kenya threatened punitive action against the perpetrators. A batch of fake Somali shillings, with an estimated value of \$4 million, arrived in Somalia on 9 and 10 April 1999, followed by a second batch, worth about \$5 million, on 8 June 1999. As a result, the value of the Somali shilling fell from about 7.5 shillings to the dollar to over 10,000 shillings to the dollar. There are now four different Somali shillings in circulation in Somalia.

As a country without a national government, Somalia remains unique. The functions that states perform, such as the provision of social services, including health and education, the regulation, for example, of the movement of goods and persons, control of the environment, airspace and coasts, and so on, as well as the representation of the Somali people in intergovernmental and international fora, are absent, notwithstanding

the fact that administrations in some parts of the country, notably in north-western Somalia ('Somaliland') and north-east Somalia ('Puntland'), have begun to provide some basic services to their people.

Somalia is different from other African societies in crisis, given its fundamentally homogeneous character. There is no major religious divide, ethnic division or dispute over the allocation of wealth derived from natural resources. Rather, Somalia is a polity in crisis. It is divided on clan lines, with each clan fearful of the incursions of others. The violence, where it is not simple banditry, is mainly defensive in nature. The crucial missing ingredient is trust. Without trust, there can be no peace or security in Somalia and no central government can be re-established." (UNSC 16 August 1999, paras. 61- 64)

"Somalia is an example where effective government and the accountability of political power are no longer coterminous with a defined national territory. The growth of regional problems across boundaries creates overlapping communities of fate: the fortunes and prospects of individual communities are increasingly bound together. One of the major relationships has been the weather – drought or flooding has had an enormous impact on the whole region." (UN November 1999, p. 6)

### **Minorities in Somalia: a history of segregation and land expropriation**

- Although minorities represent one third of Somalia's 7 million people their existence has been downplayed
- Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir and Gaboye minorities have faced prior and after the war discrimination and exclusion
- Minorities like the Bantu have had their lands confiscated
- Minorities like the Galgala, Gaboye and Yibir have been manipulated and armed against Barre's enemy clans as a result suffered retaliations when the regime fell
- Bantu people who live on fertile lands had two of their villages burned down in 2001 and fled to Hiran region
- Previous rival Habargedir and Maerhan clans have allied to control Kismayo
- Conflict between these two allied clans and General Morgan's forces in the Bay region continue
- In Jowhar security improved since 2000 when Mohamed Dheere from Wersengeli clan took control
- In Beletweyne since General Aideed's forces were ousted in 1996 security improved

"Until recently, many people perceived Somalia as a country with a population of 7,000,000 people who share one culture, one language and one religion. This was the impression given during previous regimes in order to sustain the illusion of homogeneity. One of the things that were deliberately downplayed was the existence of minority groups. Although the population of minority groups living in Somalia has not as yet been established, estimates indicate that they constitute one third of the total Somalia population; approximately 2,000,000 people. The minority groups include **Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir and Gaboye**. These groups continue to live in conditions of great poverty and suffer numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion.

The Socio economic problems faced by minority groups in Somalia existed prior to the armed conflict that continues in parts of Somalia following the overthrow of the dictator Siyad Barre in 1991, and the subsequent collapse of a Somalia national government. These problems have arisen as a result of cultural values that segregate and exclude the minority groups from dominant clan societies. These minority groups are considered inferior, without full rights, hence their low social, economic and political status. As a result of social segregation, economic deprivation and political manipulation minority groups were systematically excluded from mainstream government positions and the few minorities who held positions had no power to speak on behalf of their communities. Furthermore, as a result of their distinct ethnic identity, some

minorities, particular the Bantu and Bajuni have suffered systematic confiscation of their lands and properties. In other cases, minority groups have been politically manipulated to oppose certain dominant clans. This resulted in animosity between some minority groups and dominant clans. When the Somalia state collapsed, the minority clans suffered brutal reprisals.

Unlike other clans from dominant groups, minorities lack international support in the form of regular remittances. Recurrent insecurity caused by conflict creates an environment where minority groups are vulnerable and abnormally displaced from their homes. Notably, some minority groups who were abnormally displaced lost their lands, which were reallocated. Insecurity further affects the delivery of services to minority groups post-displacement in areas such as Kismayo, Jilib and Luuq. However, in areas like Hargeisa, Beletweyne, Jowhar and Ballad where security is not a big problem, minority groups \ receive very little assistance from aid agencies. Estimates indicate that about seventy per cent of the minorities who live in IDP camps or returnee settlements have difficulties in accessing adequate food, proper shelter and education.

In a country where there is no national Government that would be responsible for safeguarding and upholding the rights of minority groups, Somalia minorities are truly in a vulnerable position. Careful and thorough attention needs to be focused on the issues faced by vulnerable populations in order to develop concrete assistance strategies that will have a positive impact on the security and livelihoods of minority groups.

[...]

In 1975, large sections of Bantu agricultural lands in Jilib and Jamame were systematically appropriated by the Siyad Barre regime under the pretext of development projects through the Resources Sharing Policy of *Hawl iyo Hantiwadaag*. This is a Leninist and Marxist ideology that the regime adopted.

[...] Other Bantu lands in the same area were distributed as political rewards to Siyad Barre's supporters from the Marehan and Dhulbahante clans. All these violations resulted in the suffering of Bantu families in the Lower and Middle Juba riverine areas.

[...]

The situation of minority groups deteriorated when the armed conflict broke out in both Somaliland and south Somalia. Some minorities such as the Galgala, Gaboye and Yibir were perceived as enemies because of their working relationship with the Siyad Barre regime. They therefore suffered grievous human rights violations, which included extra judicial killings, appropriation of lands and properties, and forced displacement from their lands to IDP or refugee camps situated along the Somalia Ethiopia border.

The Galgala people in Mogadishu and Gedihir in Jowhar suffered brutal reprisals from the Abgal clan with whom they lived. These reprisals took place at the beginning of the 1991 war. During the last days of his rule, Siyad Barre misused the Galgala community by arming them against the Abgal. Following his defeat, the Abgal killed many Galgala and forced many others to abandon their houses. There are now nearly 5,000 Galgala IDPs in Kismayo and elsewhere. Important to note, as already mentioned, since the Galgala identify themselves with the Majerten sub clan, they have received minimal clan support from the Darod clan in Kismayo.

The Bantu did not participate in clan-based conflicts. Notwithstanding, they still suffered attacks and violations of their rights. In January 2001, heavily armed militia from the Wersengeli (Abgal clan) carried out a well organised attack on the Bantu (Shidle) farmers in Bananey and Barey villages in Jowhar, following a dispute over grazing land for cattle. According to unconfirmed reports from the Bantu farmers, ten Bantus were killed, all houses in the two villages were burnt down and farming equipment including two generators and three water pumps were looted. To date, no compensation has been given to the Bantu by the Abgal [...]. The Bantu (Makane) in Beletweyne suffered mistreatment and violation from the Hawadle, Galjele, Badi Adde and Jijele clans. Most of them were displaced from Beletweyne town to rural areas in Hiran region.

The Bajuni from Kismayo and Bajuni Islands were attacked by militiamen from Habargedir (Eir) and others during the initial periods of armed conflict. They suffered violations including confiscation of their lands and rape of the women. Most of them abandoned their homes and sought refuge in Kenya camps.

The Gaboye, Tumul and Yibir in Hargeisa and elsewhere in Somaliland suffered both during and after the armed conflict between Siyad Barre's army and the Somali National Movement of the Isak clan. These groups have similar physical characteristics as the Isak and it was difficult for Siyad Barre's army to differentiate between the Isak and other clans. When Siyad Barre was defeated, the Isak meted harsh punishments on the Gaboye, Tumul and Yibir because they were perceived to be Siyad Barre supporters." (UNCU/OCHA, 1 August 2002, p.2-3;4-6)

***Some clan alliances have improved security for some minorities:***

"The current condition of minority groups has changed as a result of changing social, economic and political environments in the various regions of Somalia. In Kismayo, for instance, previous rivals (Habargedir and Marehan) have now become allies and are now in control of Kismayo's social and political affairs. There is less insecurity between these clan groups, positively affecting the minorities. However, conflicts between these allies and General Morgan's forces that are currently in Bay region are expected. In general, security conditions have improved. Nevertheless, there are unconfirmed reports of rape of Bantu and Galgala women in IDP camps.

In Jowhar, security conditions have improved since 2000 when Mohamed Dheere from the Wersengeli clan took control of Jowhar and other parts of Middle Shabelle region. Nevertheless, the Bantu and other vulnerable groups in the area complain about taxes taken each month from every household. They report that most of the Bantu families are economically vulnerable and therefore unable to pay taxes. Each household is required to pay 15,000 Somali Shillings every month. Failure to remit the taxes on time results in arrest until the right amount is paid.

In Beletweyne, there appears to be power equilibrium between the Hawadle, Galjeel and Jilele. The town is divided into east and west sections. The eastern section is controlled by the Hawadle and the west by Galjeel. There has been no major fighting between the clans since 1996 when General Aideed's force was ousted jointly by the Hawadle, Galjeel and Jilele communities in Beletweyne. In spite of the seemingly placid environment, the Bantu (Makane) are still vulnerable.

In Somaliland, the security conditions are better than those of any other place in the south. There is a functioning administration, which has not received international recognition. Properties confiscated from minority groups during armed conflicts were returned. However, the minority groups report that they suffer discrimination because they do not benefit from social services and activities and remain unemployed." (UNCU/OCHA, 1 August 2002, p.6-7)

**Two approaches to political consolidation in Somalia (1991-2002)**

- 'Building-block' approach encourages formation of regional political structures towards a re-unification of Somalia 'Building-block' approach criticized for encouraging clanism and secessionism
- Second approach seeks to install a Somali central state entity within a federalized system
- De facto regional governments have been established since the fall of Barre regime (1991-2002)

"External encouragement to political consolidation since 1998, however, has taken two somewhat incompatible forms. One, the so-called 'building-block' approach, has sought to encourage the emergence of regional or trans-regional political authorities, as a first step towards a re-unified Somali state with a loose federal or confederal form of government. After UNOSOM's failure at state building, this approach

was initially embraced by neighboring countries, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the executive committee of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SCAB) in the late 1990s [...]. Its advocates consider it the path that can provide a more legitimate grass-roots and participatory form of governance to facilitate the task of rebuilding a war-torn society. Its critics contend that it has limited applicability in the south and that it encourages secessionism and clanism and is designed to meet foreign interests that want to keep Somalia weak and divided.

The second approach, which has regained the support of regional and international bodies, is based on reviving the Somali state through a process of national reconciliation and the formation of a national government, albeit within a federalized system." (UNDP Somalia 2001, pp.51)

"Somalia remains a highly militarised and divided society, with various de facto authorities continuing to control most parts of the country, as well as sections of Mogadishu." (UN, May 2002, p.3)

### **Self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland in 1991 still no international recognition (2003)**

- Somaliland proclaims independence in 1991 presided by Mohammed Ibrahim Egal
- After five years of sustained peace 97% of Somaliland voters approved a new constitution in May 2001, laying the basis for multiparty system
- In the aftermath of the passing away of President Egal of Somaliland, Dahir Riyale Kahin his deputy was sworn in
- Somaliland is suffering economic losses due to livestock ban since 2000
- 19 April 2002 new President of Somaliland Dahir Riyale Kahin from the Unity of Democrats Party (UDUB) was elected
- Opposition candidate Ahmad Muhammad Silanyo did not recognize the results of the election

"The overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 led to a *de facto* division of Somalia, with the self-proclamation of the northern Republic of Somaliland on 18 May 1991 as one of the results."(Africa South of the Sahara September 1996, pp. 842-45)

"The Republic of Somaliland has exercised de facto independence since May 1991. It is headed by President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal and based in Hargeisa, where resistance to the Said Barre dictatorship in the 1980s was most intense. Egal has said that a referendum on independence will not take place until a peace agreement covering the rest of the country has been reached. Somaliland is far more cohesive than the rest of the country, although reports of some human rights abuses persist." (Freedom House 1999, "Political rights")

"In 1991, when the central Government of Somalia collapsed, 'Somaliland' declared itself independent and sought separation from Somalia, citing the massive discrimination its people had suffered during the regime of Siad Barre. Although, the international community and the United Nations, which upholds the territorial integrity of Somalia, have not recognized the separate status of 'Somaliland', the international community has acknowledged with deep appreciation the good level of security and stability that 'Somaliland' has achieved over the years." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 22)

"Held on 31 May 2001, the Somaliland referendum was characterised by poor preparation, intimidating diaspora propaganda, and an admirable openness at the polling booths. The vote for independence was combined with the vote for a new constitution which brought in sweeping political changes by Somaliland President Muhammad Ibrahim Egal. The first article of the new constitution asserted the independent

status of Somaliland, and Article Nine removes the present clan-based system by laying the basis for a new multiparty system." (IRIN-CEA 10 July 2001, Part 1)

"Since 1991, a functional and modest state structure has been established, with a bicameral parliament, judiciary, police force, and municipal structures. The restoration of security has revitalized the economy and facilitated the rehabilitation of the damaged infrastructure and public services. In terms of volume of trade, Berbera port is flourishing, while Hargeisa has the only airport in Somalia that receives regular commercial passenger airlines from the Gulf States and other countries in the region. Revenue raised mainly from import duties has enabled the administration to oversee the formation of a police force, sectoral ministries and municipalities which provide a mechanism for the prioritisation of needs and planning, as well as basic education and health systems. An active local NGO sector, new business initiatives and an active media challenge the stereotypical description of Somalia as aid dependent." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.52)

"In May 2001, a resounding 97 percent of Somaliland voters approved a new constitution, affirming the self-declared nation's ten-year-old independence from Somalia.

[...]

Somaliland's five years of uninterrupted peace, on of its greatest achievements since declaring independence in 1991, currently presents the international community with a long-awaited opportunity to significantly assist many long-term Somali refugees in repatriating , reintegrating, and rebuilding their homeland." (USCR, December 2001, p.5)

"In the aftermath of the passing away of Mohammed Egal, the President of the Northwest zone of 'Somaliland,' residents of the zone have called for unity, consultative leadership, and consolidation of the nation's gains. The deputy president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, was immediately sworn in as interim President in accordance with the constitution, following an extra-ordinary session held by the three topmost councils in the zone."(UNICEF 12 June 2002)

"As the least conflict-prone, this zone receives most returning refugees from Ethiopia and Djibouti, many of whom face difficulties re-establishing sustainable livelihoods. Cooperative local authorities, and a recent smooth transition of political power, have allowed for significant humanitarian and development initiatives. However, 'Somaliland' continues to suffer economic losses as a result of the ongoing livestock ban. The Sool and Sanag regions are suffering from food insecurity and require assistance leading up to the next *Deyr* rainy season. Additionally, 'ownership' of these regions is a source of dispute between 'Somaliland' and 'Puntland'. (UN, November 2002, p.18)

« On 19 April, the Somaliland Election Commission (SEC) declared Kahin of the Unity of Democrats Party (UDUB) the winner of Somaliland's first multiparty presidential election, which was held five days earlier.

According to the SEC, Kahin obtained 205,595 votes (42.08 percent of the poll), as opposed to 205,515 (42.07 percent) for Silanyo, out of a total vote of 498,639 votes cast - a difference of just 80 votes.

The presidential candidate for the Kulmiye (Solidarity) Party, Ahmad Muhammad Silanyo - Kahin's main challenger - told IRIN at the time that his party "categorically rejected" the results of the elections." (IRIN, 12 May 2003)

***For full analyses of the Somaliland referendum and its political consequences, please refer to the IRIN-CEA reports on this issue: [Part I \[External Link\]](#) and [Part II \[External link\]](#).***

## **De facto regional government established in Puntland**

- Fierce internal power struggle exploded when former President Abdullahi Yusuf rejected the election of his successor President Jama Ali Jama (Nov 2001-end 2002)
- Economic situation of the arid Puntland region is adversely affected by lack of infrastructure and the livestock ban
- The Northeast region was less affected by conflict and several ports enjoyed economic expansion and Garowe was elected regional capital of Puntland in 1998
- Relations with Somaliland are strained over determining border areas notably Sool and Sanag regions

"In contrast with 'Somaliland', 'Puntland' does not consider itself a separate entity. Rather, it describes itself as a regional government of Somalia. In her report to the previous session of the Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1999/103), the independent expert reported on how 'Puntland' came into being in 1998. The 'Puntland' Constitutional Conference was held in Garowe, between 15 May and 30 July 1998. It was attended by 470 delegates from the Bari, Nugal, Sool and Sanaag regions, as well as hundreds of observers. None of the delegates were women. The conference ended by formulating a new 'social contract' as a basis for the restoration of effective State authority in these regions." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 28)

"The area described as the North-east of Somalia or 'Puntland' has the largest surface and the longest coastline in the country. It is an arid area with low potential for developing water resources or rain-fed agriculture. The majority of the largely nomadic population depends on the livestock trade and to a much lesser extent on fishing and dealing in frankincense. Relative peace and security have allowed an export-oriented economy to develop and the north-east is increasingly developing as a region of transition and recovery. Although a government was elected in September 1998, only the President, Vice President and nine ministers [had been appointed as of December 1998]. One of the first priorities of this Administration has been to establish proper security forces (police and prisons) and a judiciary system." (UN December 1998, p. 26)

"Formed in 1998, Puntland's administrative structures are still embryonic. Lacking the infrastructure and potential revenue sources of Somaliland the administration's impact on public services and the economy has been more limited. However, Puntland can boast active business and NGO sectors. The population of the region has increased greatly since the war as people originally from there fled the south. This has led to high levels of investment by Somalis in housing and businesses and reflects the public's confidence in the political and security situation.

Although relations with Somaliland are strained over border definitions and Puntland's southern border is intermittently insecure, the region has managed to avoid any major security threats for ten years. In June 2001, the administration's three-year term expired. The failure to agree upon a transfer of power led to a constitutional crisis, which has now threatened the region's security." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.51)

"For the first time in over six years, the peace that has existed in the zone was broken. This followed a decision by a meeting of elders to cancel the extension of the mandate of President Col. Abdullahi Yusuf's administration that had been given by Parliament, and install an interim President. Militias of groups opposed to Col. Yusuf's regime occupied the airport and seaport, effectively taking control. Col. Yusuf responded through force, and attacked the militias at the airport." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"The term of Puntland leader Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed came to an end in June. Under the Puntland Charter he was replaced temporarily by the President of the Supreme Court, Yusuf Haji Nur. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed refused to acknowledge his replacement, and supporters of both sides clashed in August in Bosasso, where around 40 people were killed. In November Jama Ali Jama was appointed by elders as the next leader, although this decision was again rejected by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Fighting between supporters of both sides broke out in November and December in Garowe, resulting in the deaths of at least 13 people." (AI, January 2002)

"Heavy fighting was reportedly raging near the village of Berta Boqorka, near the town of Qardho some 280 km northeast of Garowe, regional capital of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeastern Somalia, on Tuesday, according to local media sources.

Forces loyal to the region's former president, Col Abdullahi Yusuf, were reportedly engaged in fierce fighting with forces loyal to Puntland's current president, Jama Ali Jama" (IRIN, 7 May 2002)

"Meanwhile, in the Northeast, former president, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, rejected the outcome of the elections of 2001 where Jama Ali Jama was elected to lead Puntland. Colonel Yusuf has retreated with his forces from Garoowe (political capital) to Galkacyo and has created a separate southwestern state, declaring himself president. Colonel Yusuf has since recaptured Garoowe. Mr. Jama retreated to Bosasso (economic capital).. " (UN, May 2002, p.3)

"The Northeast region of Somalia was the only region that was spared from the severe levels of physical destruction wrought during the civil war [...]. The region's principal seaport, Bossaso, has also enjoyed a commercial boom, which has driven an impressive economic recovery in the region. A regional authority was established following a meeting of over 400 delegates in 1998. Garowe was selected as the regional capital, a president was elected and line ministries were appointed." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.3)

" 'Puntland' is home to pastoralists, IDPs, minorities and urban destitute, whose vulnerability has been compounded by ongoing instability and intermittent humanitarian access. The ongoing livestock ban continues to affect the economy, compounded by the negative effects of conflict and piracy on commercial activities. The failure of local authorities to settle leadership disputes peacefully has also divided the population and prolonged instability in this region." (UN, November 2002, pp.19)

"In the northeastern region of 'Puntland,' failure to peacefully settle a political and constitutional crisis led to conflict in May, resulting in the temporary evacuation of international United Nations (UN) and NGO staff. Serious fighting then broke out again in Gardo in July, resulting in a high number of casualties, including many civilian deaths." (UN, November 2002, p.3)

### **A faction of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) proclaims autonomy over the 'State of Southwestern Somalia' (SWS) in April 2002**

- The RRA sets up an autonomous administration over Bay and Bakool regions of south and central Somalia since 1999
- In March 2002 former colonel of Barre's secret police Mr. Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud was elected president of the 'State of Southwestern Somalia' with Baidoa as capital
- This move makes the RRA an established opposition party and might prove deleterious for the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC)
- Central and southern once Somalia breadbaskets, are the most affected by conflict, drought and lack of humanitarian access
- Conflicts were violent during 2002 in Bardera, Gedo, and Baidoa formerly stable
- Power clashes between senior ranks of the RRA over control of Bay and Bakool displaced thousands (2003)

"Since 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) has begun to establish an administration in the two southern regions of Bay and Bakool that have been chronically insecure for most of the past decade." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.34)

Better security since then has improved the food security situation and access for international aid agencies. Although the RRA participated in the Arta peace conference, some of the leaders withdrew their support soon after it was concluded. Since then the RRA has sought to consolidate its own regional administration. While certain civil structures have been established, the RRA has yet to transform itself into an effective civilian administration." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.53)

" This is the third regional administration to be set up in Somalia, following the establishment of Somaliland (northwestern Somalia) and Puntland (in the northeast).

The decision was reached at a meeting of the RRA central committee and over 70 elders from the Digil and Mirifle clans. The meeting, which had been in session in Baidoa, the capital of Bay Region, 240 km southwest of Mogadishu, since 22 March, elected Colonel Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud, the chairman of the RRA, as president on Sunday. "He was inaugurated in Baidoa today, and will serve an initial four year term," Qalinle told IRIN on Monday. Baidoa will be the capital of the new state.

Shatigadud was a colonel in the notorious secret police, the National Security Service (NSS) of the former dictator Muhammad Siyad Barre,

[...]

The move to establish the autonomous region now is seen by Somali observers as a way for the RRA "to come to the talks as an established administration as opposed to a faction". It may also sound the death knell of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) said one observer. The SRRC is grouping of southern factions opposed to the Transitional National Government." (IRIN, 1 April 2002)

"As one of the most crisis-prone zones, the southern and central regions of Somalia, despite their comparative fertility to the rest of Somalia, are home to the largest populations of vulnerable and food insecure groups. Intermittent bouts of factional as well as inter- and intra-clan armed conflicts, fuelled by external support, and combined with periodic drought and flooding perpetuate their vulnerability. The central regions tend to experience less conflict, as opposed to areas such as Gedo, Bay and Bakol regions where periodic insecurity often results in reduced humanitarian access. Before the conflict, these were the greatest food producing areas of Somalia." (UN, November 2002, p.19)

"As a result, the second quarter of the year [2002] was marked by considerable internal and cross border displacement. In February, for example, fighting broke out in Bardera between the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) and the SRRC. Then further north in Gedo, inter-clan fighting in May, which included the laying of landmines, hampered access to seriously drought-stricken pockets of the region. Finally, in Baidoa, a formerly stable humanitarian base, internal division within the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) erupted into heavy fighting in late July and early August. International staff have yet to return to the area." (UN, November 2002, p.3)

"Tension had been rising in the town as a result of a deepening split within the senior ranks of the RRA, which controls much of the Bay and Bakol regions of southwestern Somalia. The split originated from a power struggle between the RRA chairman, Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud, and his two deputies, Shaykh Adan Madobe and Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade. Baidoa, which changed hands at least three times between July and December, is now in the hands of Shatigadud's rivals. Hundreds were killed and thousands displaced by the fighting." (IRIN, 17 January 2003)

### **Transitional National Government (TNG) elected in August 2000 lacks credibility and has limited control over Mogadishu (2002)**

- The Transitional National Government (TNG) was established by the international community at the Arta peace talks (August 2000) and was dismissed by most Somali leaders as 'illegal' and 'unrepresentative'

- TNG headed by Abdulkassim Salat Hassan faces opposition by Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), Somaliland and Puntland
- Mogadishu is divided by five factions
- Some militias sometimes back the TNG out of strategic interest
- The Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) is the coalition opposed to the TNG
- The TNG in difficult economic position due to inability to raise taxes, the on and off closure of Mogadishu port and livestock ban
- Western donors have cut funding until signs of 'good governance'
- TNG resorts to private funding to pay its police

"The first quarter of 2001 has been characterised by the TNG's continued attempts of the TNG to establish its credibility in Mogadishu. It has met with very limited success. Attempts to impose its authority outside the capital have been unsuccessful. [...] A number of police stations were reopened in Mogadishu, together with the central prison, while security personnel were put through training courses. But the city remained divided with four well armed factions controlling significant areas. " (IFRC 8 May 2001)

"Since its establishment in Mogadishu seven months ago, the new Transitional National Government (TNG) has struggled to assert control over the Somali capital, demobilise thousands of armed militia, and deal with rampant inflation. Initially received with great optimism in Mogadishu, the TNG has faced continued opposition from Mogadishu-based faction leaders; the newly formed southern-based Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Committee (SRRC); the self-declared independent state of Somaliland, northwestern Somalia; and the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeastern Somalia. Opposition leaders have rejected the Djibouti-hosted Somali peace talks in Arta, which led to the election of the TNG in August 2000, and have dismissed the new government as 'illegal' and 'unrepresentative' – despite the fact the it has received international recognition." (IRIN-CEA 14 May 2001)

"After two weeks of talks in the southern Ethiopian town of Awasa, the Somali faction leaders and other opponents of the STG on Thursday set up a Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in order to prepare the way for yet another national reconciliation conference which, in theory, will lead to the establishment of a 'legitimate' and more representative government in Mogadishu." (AFP 23 March 2001)

" Efforts by the TNG to reach out to these groups have met with some limited success, and at least one major faction leader (Mohamed Qanyare) has now pledged to use his militia to support the TNG. While the TNG has been successful in improving security in the parts of Mogadishu that it controls, and continues to engage in constructive dialogue with other factions, control of the city remains divided among five small armies fuelled by emotionally intense personal, political and financial goals and objectives." (UNICEF 12 July 2001, sect. 1)

"A year after the arrival in Mogadishu of Abdulkassim Salat Hassan as head of Somalia's newly-established interim government, the Horn of Africa nation remains as anarchic as ever. [...]Salat's Transitional National Government (TNG) was set up with the approval of the international community following talks hosted by Djibouti last year.

While the new regime enjoys backing from the international community, it has yet to gain more than a toe-hold in Somalia itself, where most warlords and the two regions in the northwest and northeast reject its authority.

In some parts of central and southern Somalia, militias, who often shift alliances, currently back the TNG in exchange for 'logistical support', but without any tangible contribution to peace, experts say.

Warlords, who for a decade failed to agree on anything and whose warfare destroyed the country, have now ganged up, united in opposition to the TNG.

They met in Addis Ababa in March and launched a common front, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), bent on TNG's destruction by setting up what they term a more 'representative' government.

The police force, itself drawn from Mogadishu's numerous clan militias, cannot venture into areas controlled by warlords opposed to the TNG, including the southcentral regions of Bay and Bakol, where TNG and SRRC forces fought in July, leaving 200 people dead and hundreds wounded.

Few expatriate aid workers are permanently stationed in Somalia since the kidnapping in March of two UN staff by gunmen, who freed them in Mogadishu after week in captivity.

Even the business community in Mogadishu, believed to be solidly behind the TNG, has yet to give up its arsenal of arms.

[...]

TNG Foreign Minister Ismail Muhumed Hurre Buba is an arch-rival of Somaliland President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal.

TNG Water and Mineral Resources Minister Hassan Abshir Farah resigned as Puntland's interior minister after political disagreements with his leader Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.

More than 60 of the 245 transitional assembly members either hail from Somaliland or Puntland, who have on several occasions influenced the TNG to call for change in the two former northwest and northeast Somali regions.

Their calls have been compounded by a major power struggle in both Puntland and Somaliland in the past one month, the results of which could alter the political equation of the Horn of Africa nation." (AFP 31 August 2001)

"However, the hope of attracting substantial foreign aid has not materialized as most Western donors have adopted a 'wait and see' approach and made aid conditional on signs of 'effective government'. With Mogadishu port closed, lacking revenue from livestock exports, and unable to raise taxes, the TNG has had to depend on some friendly states and members of the Mogadishu business community to finance the police force, judiciary, demobilisation and rehabilitation." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.54)

"Security conditions varied enormously throughout Somalia during the year [2001]. While the TNG struggled to exert its authority and ward off attacks by armed factions, anarchy and violence worsened, compounding persistent drought and food insecurity throughout southern and central Somalia." (USCR, June 2002, pp.94-97)

" The President of the Transitional National Government (TNG), Abdikassim Salad Hassan and Prime Minister Hassan Abshir Farah maintain that the reconciliation process with regional administrations and faction leaders is a priority. The President has visited districts including Dusa Merab, El-buur, Brava and Merka in the South. However, opposition to the TNG continues to grow stronger." (UN, May 2002, p.3)

« Mogadishu is characterised by inter-factional conflicts and shifting political alliances. The TNG controls less than a quarter of Mogadishu. Even in the midst of economic devastation, the business community plays a key role in the sustenance of Mogadishu's economy and therefore seeks to avoid further losses. A strong civil society is another key asset. An estimated 150,000 IDPs live in inhumane conditions. Other vulnerable groups include minorities and urban destitute. National aid workers are frequently targeted for kidnapping." (UN, November 2002, pp.18-20)

“The Mogadishu-based Transitional National Government (TNG) – formed in 2000 following the Arta peace process as the hopeful basis for an inclusive national government – has had only limited success so far in establishing its authority beyond Mogadishu. Meanwhile, inter- and intra-clan conflict has continued sporadically in parts of southern and central Somalia, exacerbated to some extent by a polarization of political groupings between those supporting the TNG, and opposition factions loosely aligned under the umbrella of the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC). Serious clashes took place in or near Mogadishu, Jowhar, Kismayo, and Bardera.” (UN, November 2002, p.3)

*For detailed information on the political situation in the country, refer to the November 2000 paper of Ken Menkhaus [\[External link\]](#).*

### **Eritreans and Ethiopians both accused of being involved in Somali civil war (1996-2003)**

- Panel of Experts on Somalia reported to the security council that Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti and Egypt were involved in arms trade to Somali factions
- In 1996 hundred thousand people displaced by Ethiopian attacks in western Somalia
- Ethiopian troops accused to invade Gedo and Bakool violating state sovereignty and non-interference in a country's internal affairs
- Ethiopia accused of violating Security Council resolutions and providing arms to clans opposed to interim government
- Ethiopia and Eritrea have both been suspected of supporting clans in the Somali conflict for some time

“The Panel of Experts has found a clear pattern of violation of the arms embargo on Somalia. Weapons, equipment, training of militia and financial support to Somali factions have been given regularly by neighbouring States and others since the Security Council adopted resolution 733 (1992) on 23 January 1992. Weapons have also been purchased by Somali factions on the international arms market. These flagrant violations of the embargo continue today even as the Somali factions and their neighbours are participating in the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). They have signed the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process (Eldoret Declaration), in which they agreed to implement fully the arms embargo and facilitate international monitoring.

[...]

Ethiopia has played an overt military role in Somalia. Not only has Ethiopia been a major source of weapons for a number of Somali groups, Ethiopia has also invaded and occupied parts of Somalia. Ostensibly, and perhaps justifiably, the first direct military involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia, in 1996 and 1997, was in response to the activities of the Somali Islamic militant group al-Ittihad al-Islami, including terrorist attacks in Ethiopia. Since then the threat of al-Ittihad and its tenuous links to al-Qa`idah have been used as an excuse for Ethiopian involvement in Somali internal affairs rather than for legitimate national security concerns.

After the establishment of the Transitional National Government, Ethiopia helped to establish the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council, which is made up of factions hostile to the Transitional National Government and its allies. The Ethiopian military has provided training and limited amounts of arms, ammunition and other supplies to all members of the Council.

Eritrea has also been a major supplier of arms and ammunition to Somali groups. As the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea descended into a protracted and bloody stalemate, Somalia became a secondary battleground between the belligerents. Unfortunately, the hostility engendered by the war between Eritrea

and Ethiopia continues, and apparently continues to motivate Eritrean support for factions hostile to Ethiopia.

Yemen provided a small amount of military assistance to the Transitional National Government, soon after it was established at the Arta Conference in Djibouti.

[...]

Djibouti, according to reliable local and international sources, is also a significant trans-shipment point for weapons to Somalia, principally the Transitional National Government.

[...]

Egypt has acknowledged providing training and uniforms to the Transitional National Government police." (UNSC, 25 March 2003)

***Ethiopia in particular is accused of supporting clan factions opposed to new interim government:***

"In Western Somalia, several hundred thousand persons were temporarily uprooted [during 1996], when Ethiopian troops attacked an armed religious group based in Somalia. Most families displaced by the incident reportedly returned to their homes by September." (USCR 1997, p. 93)

"Briefing correspondents on the latest developments in Somalia, he said that in the last few weeks Ethiopian troops had continued to invade two major regions in south-western Somalia: Gedo and Bakool, capturing the capital of the Gedo region, Garbahaarrey, and a vibrant commercial centre near the Kenyan border -- Bulla Hawa. [...]

The invasion has caused many innocent civilian deaths and displacement of thousands of people, he continued. As a result of the fighting, Bulla Hawa had been burning yesterday. In Garbahaarrey, the Ethiopian troops had captured the leadership of the region, whose fate remained unknown. Ethiopian troops were also poised to attack the southern port city of Kismaayo.

Earlier, with Ethiopia's military assistance, a coup d'état had been staged in the north-east of the country, he said, where elected legitimate authorities were overthrown by force. Ethiopia also continued to flood Somalia with all sorts of weapons, including mortars, AK47s and anti-personnel mines. In the last 10 days, large weapons consignments had been shipped by Ethiopia "to its own favouring warlords" in Mogadishu and several other towns.

Ethiopia's aggression against Somalia had become a pattern in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions reaffirming Somalia's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both resolutions and presidential statements (the latest of 30 March) adopted by the Council urged in the strongest terms that neighbouring countries should not interfere in the internal affairs of Somalia. The Ethiopian regime was also in violation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 733 of the Security Council. The continued flow of arms into Somalia posed a threat not only to his country, but to the stability of the whole subregion of the Horn of Africa.

[...]

With regard to the national reconciliation process, Ethiopia continued to be the main obstacle to the achievement of peace and stability in Somalia, he said. It did not want to see a strong, vibrant and unified Somalia -- it wanted a "balkanized" Somalia of small fiefdoms it could dominate. He was asking Ethiopia to stop its aggression.

[...]

He also confirmed that the invasion was continuing at the time of the briefing. As it needed access to sea, Ethiopia was trying to capture Somalia's ports by force.

[...]

What form was the aggression taking? a correspondent asked. Mr. Hashi said that it was a military invasion, with Ethiopia's armed troops entering Somalia's territory.

[...]

Thus, a correspondent suggested, this was not a new, but a continuing, situation. Mr. Hashi responded that since 1996 Ethiopia had been repeatedly crossing the border, and its aggression had become a pattern.

[...]

While invading Somalia, Ethiopia could not be an honest broker in the reconciliation process. For that reason, it should be removed from the committee preparing the national reconciliation process.

[...]

The total number of people displaced by fighting in Somalia was actually unknown." (UNDIP, 17 May 2002)

"The interim Somali government had grown weary of keeping a low profile on Ethiopia's activities in Somalia, Galayr said. 'Ethiopia is obstinately and flagrantly continuing its interference in Somalia and is seeking to revive the civil war'." (IRIN-CEA 9 January 2001)

"Eritrea and Ethiopia were directly involved in the inter-factional fighting, with Ethiopia supplying troops, hardware and humanitarian support to the Rahenweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in Bay and Bakol. The RRA used its increased military power to contain the advances of Hussein Aideed's forces. Ethiopia also reportedly supported the Somali Salvation Democratic Front which had formed a government in the self-proclaimed Puntland State, and a faction of the United Somali Congress–Peace Movement. Eritrea and Yemen provided arms to the Somali National Alliance (SNA) militias of Hussein Aideed. Around 200 fighters from the Ethiopian armed opposition group the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), supported by Eritrea, were also involved in the Somali conflict on the side of the SNA. Hussein Aideed attended a series of meetings on peace and reconciliation with Ethiopian government officials in October [1999]. His forces subsequently disarmed a group of OLF fighters in their base in Mogadishu." (AI 2000, "Background")

"Mogadiscio est toujours divisée entre différentes factions, avec d'un côté une alliance de circonstance entre Aideed et Mahdi, visant à mettre en place une administration centrale dans la région, et de l'autre une opposition puissante. Les deux alliances sont soutenues respectivement par l'Erythrée et l'Éthiopie, et donc indirectement parties prenantes du conflit." (ACF 2000, "Contexte")

*For more details on the supply of ammunitions delivered by Ethiopia to factions opposed to the TNG see UN Security Council document (22 May 2002) [[External link](#)]*

## **IRIN-CEA chronology of the conflict in Somalia (1960-2000)**

"**NAIROBI, 1 September (IRIN)** - The following is a chronology of recent events in Somalia leading up to the establishment of a new interim administration which will govern the country for three years, pending elections:

**26 June 1960:** The former British Somaliland Protectorate gains independence

**1 July 1960:** The former Italian colony becomes independent. The former British (northwest) and Italian (south) colonies unite

**15 October 1969:** Democratically elected President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke is assassinated by one of his police bodyguards

**21 October 1969:** The army under Major-General Muhammad Siyad Barreh overthrows the civilian government, after parliament hits deadlock trying to select a new president. The army suspends the constitution, bans all 86 political parties, and promises to end corruption. Siyad Barreh heads the 25-member Supreme Revolutionary Council, consisting of army and police officers

**21 October 1970:** The army junta declares Somalia a socialist country and adopts "Scientific Socialism". This signals a shift towards Soviet backing, and security organs and intelligence networks are given greater powers

**21 October 1972:** A written script for the Somali language is established. A modified Roman alphabet is adopted as the official orthography for the Somali language

**1974:** Somalia becomes a member of the Arab League

**July 1977:** A low-level war of attrition between Somali-backed insurgents and the Ethiopian army becomes an all-out battle between Somalia and Ethiopia, when Somalia declares war on Ethiopia. The war goes down in history as the fiercest Cold War battle on the continent, played out in the Ethiopian Ogaden region

**13 November 1977:** Somalia expels about 6,000 of Russian, Cuban and other Soviet allies, after the Soviet Union switched sides and allied itself with the Ethiopia

**March 1978:** The Somali Government announces the withdrawal of its forces from the Ogaden

**8 April 1978:** After the defeat of the Somali army, a group of army officers try to topple the Siyad Barreh regime. The attempted coup is crushed and Siyad Barreh tightens his grip further. He begins a process of putting power into the hands of his relatives, and sub-clan, the Darod Marehan. He also empowers the related Dulbahante and Ogadeni sub-clans

**May 1988:** The Somali National Movement (SNM) mounts an offensive in the north of the country, as a result of the regime's brutal post-Ethiopian war policies. Siyad Barreh responds by bombing the area. Hundreds of thousands of civilians are displaced, and many killed. It is the first real challenge to Siyad Barreh's rule, and the beginning of the proliferation of armed opposition to the regime

**May 1990:** A manifesto is published in Mogadishu calling for an all inclusive national reconciliation convention to avert protracted civil war. It is signed by 144 people, including politicians, religious leaders, professionals and business people, representing all Somali clans

**December 1990:** Armed uprising erupts in Mogadishu.

**27 January 1991:** Siyad Barreh flees Mogadishu. Forces loyal to the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) capture the city

**28 January 1991:** The Manifesto Group of USC appoints an hotelier, Ali Mahdi Muhammad, as president. The military wing of USC, led by General Muhammad Farah Aydid, rejects the appointment

**17 November 1991:** Full-scale fighting starts between the two factions of the USC

**3 March 1991:** A ceasefire comes into effect between the warring factions in Mogadishu

**1991:** Fighting erupts in the northeast region between the Al-Ittihad Islamic fundamentalists and militia loyal to the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), lead by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad

**18 May 1991:** The former British Protectorate of Somaliland declares independence from the rest of Somalia, in the town of Burao

**July 1991:** A conference was held in Djibouti, in which Ali Mahdi in which was chosen as interim president

**April 1992:** The United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM I, begins work in Somalia

**December 1992:** UNITAF forces under American leadership land in Mogadishu

**February 1993:** A three month conference in Borama seeks a new leader for the self-declared state of Somaliland. Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, a former prime minister, is elected in May

**March 1993:** The next serious attempt at peace talks. An Ethiopian initiative evolves into a joint UN-Ethiopian sponsored reconciliation conference held in Addis Ababa

**4 May 1993:** UNITAF hands over to UNOSOM II

**5 June 1993:** 23 Pakistani peacekeepers are killed by Aydid loyalists

**12 July 1993:** American helicopter gunships kill over 50 unarmed Somalis holding a meeting in a private house in Mogadishu, increasing local hostility to the international intervention forces

**3 October 1993:** American-led forces looking for Aydid's senior aides are involved in a shoot-out, which leaves 18 Americans and hundreds of Somalis dead. The body of a dead American is dragged through the Mogadishu streets, and, caught on camera, sparks an international outcry

**August 1996:** Aydid dies of gunshot wounds sustained in operations against his former lieutenant, Osman Ali Atto. His son, a former American marine, Husayn Muhammad Aydid, is chosen by the clan to replace his father

**November 1996:** Ethiopian government-sponsored reconciliation conference brings most of the factions together. But it is boycotted by Aydid's son

**November 1997:** All faction leaders met in Cairo, with limited success, leaving Somalia without a national leader and Mogadishu still divided and insecure

**2 May, 2000:** On the initiative of the Djibouti government, the Somali National Peace Conference brings together more than 2,000 participants in Arta, Djibouti. It is the first conference where the warlords do not have control of the conference agenda

**26 August, 2000:** A 245-strong Transitional National Assembly, based on clan representation, elects Abdiqasim Salad Hasan as the new president of Somalia

**27 August, 2000:** President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan is sworn in an inauguration ceremony attended by the heads of governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, and the host country Djibouti, along with representatives from the UN, EU, Arab league, OAU, France, Italy, Kuwait, and Libya." (IRIN-CEA 1 September 2000, as found in UN Consolidated Appeal March 2001, Annex III, p. 128)

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## Causes of displacement

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### Mass displacement began with outbreak of civil war in 1988

- Hundreds of thousands displaced in northern Somalia after outbreak of civil war in 1988
- War moved into the streets of Mogadishu by late December 1990
- Some 400,000 persons said to be internally displaced by end of 1990

"The outbreak of civil war in northern Somalia in mid-1988, and the Somali government's brutal retaliation against civilians in northern Somalia . . . led more than 400,000 Somalis to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti and displaced hundreds of thousands of other Somalis within northern Somalia. Renewed fighting in northern Somalia led another 31,000 Somalis to flee to Djibouti. Other armed insurgent groups joined the battle against the government of President Siad Barre during 1990. Two of these groups, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) scored major successes against the government, bringing the war into the streets of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, by late December [1990]. At year's end, chaos prevailed in Mogadishu. Foreigners were evacuated, tens of thousands of the city's residents had fled, there was fighting in the streets between government and rebel forces, indiscriminate shooting, raping, and pillaging by armed persons, and the bodies of the dead littered the capital. USCR estimate[d] that by late 1990 there were a minimum of 400,000 internally displaced Somalis." (USCR 1991, p. 53)

*For a detailed survey evaluating the reasons why Somali families were forced to flee in the early phases of the conflict, see Robert Gersony's "Why Somalis Flee: Synthesis of Accounts of Conflict Experience in Northern Somalia by Somali Refugees, Displaced Persons and Others" produced for the US State Department in 1989 [\[External link\]](#).*

### Thousands forced to flee human rights abuses in Aideed-controlled areas during late 1990s

- Aideed's militia allegedly committed serious human rights abuses against people of Baidoa
- Individuals of Rahanwein minority were particularly at risk
- Due to abuses, Baidoa was called "city of death"

*The Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Secretary-General reported the following after her visit to the region in late 1999:*

"The independent expert visited Baidoa [Banadir region] on 17 and 18 November 1999. Aideed's militia had held this town, which was dubbed, during the peak of the Somali famine, 'the city of death', for the previous four years. During this period, the people of Baidoa and its surroundings left. Allegedly, individuals were massacred, women were raped, wells were destroyed, and villages were looted and burnt. Persons were allegedly detained without charge or trial, sometimes in containers. Their families were forced to pay to secure their release. As a result, the town, mainly inhabited by Rahanweins, was largely deserted. The Rahanwein are a minority group in Somalia, who have been widely discriminated against.

[...]

During the time Aideed's troops controlled the area, the village (Doynounay) [near Baidoa] was allegedly looted and burnt. The only building spared was said to have been the mosque.

[...]

Many serious violations allegedly took place in Doynounay. [T]he independent expert met a man who had allegedly survived a massacre. He told her that about 60 men from the village were rounded up and taken to Baidoa, where they were shot...During that time, women were allegedly raped, wells were destroyed and the village itself was burnt." (CHR 26 January 2000, pp. 20- 21)

### **Clan-based competition over resources main causes of displacement**

- Displacements particularly in the southern fertile areas aimed at grabbing fertile lands from other clans
- June 1999 Kismayo changed control, the JVA evicted General Morgan's troops and Majerten and Harti clans were displaced
- Juba Valley is not only fertile, has sea access with Kismayo but also proximity with Kenya is conducive to market opportunities
- Land appropriation is fierce around the Juba and Shabelle Rivers
- Competition for political power went hand in hand with grab of resources therefore minorities on fertile lands disproportionately suffered from killings, destruction discrimination, land alienation, obstruction of humanitarian relief, and forced displacement
- Siad Barre in his strategy of divide-and-rule armed the Galgala minority against the Abgal clan who retaliated against the latter when the regime fell
- IDPs from Galgala were displaced from Mogadishu and Middle Shabelle by the Abgal clan in 1991
- Bantu minorities were displaced from their lands in the Gosha area by Majerten and Habargedir militias who fought over control of resources 1991 and 1993
- Majerten and Habargedir militias nearly exterminated all Bantu

"Throughout the civil war, these three regions have seen some of the heaviest conflict in southern Somalia. Conflict relates to three central issues: control of the strategic and lucrative port town of Kismayo, control of valuable land well suited for agricultural development and pastoralism alike, and debates over which clan grouping has legitimate historical claims to these different territories.

The change of control in Kismayo in June 1999, considerably altered the regional strategic map. The eviction of militia commanded by General Said Hersi 'Morgan' by the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) has led to displacement of Majerten and Harti communities and re-ignited claims over the rightful ownership of 'occupied territories'. [...]

The Juba Valley regions are endowed with a wealth of natural resources. The region benefits from one of the highest rates of rainfall in Somalia (approximately 500mm to 700mm per annum). The rains, river and rich soil support a wide range of agricultural productivity. Wide-ranging pasture has led to the regions' high concentrations of livestock. The Kismayo seaport and the proximity of the Kenyan border provide market access. Further, both ocean and river fishing provide subsistence bounties and trade possibilities for a variety of groups.

However, the complex dynamic between drought and environmental degradation of other regions has constituted trend of population movement toward scarce river-fed areas, the increasing encroachment and competition between pastoral and agro-pastoral communities over resources which has led to violence. There is also a clear imbalance between those clan and sub-clan groups which have the socio-political access to economic resources, including international aid, and those which are marginalised and excluded." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p.24-5)

“This report realized that the very nature and consequence of the civil conflicts makes the issue of displacement highly complex. In fact communities have suffered multiple displacement especially in the south where population fleeing conflict and later moving northward for their economic livelihoods. Moreover, land appropriation takes place along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers where the dispossessed lost their farming land.

[...]

As a consequence of the armed conflict that began in 1991 when the revolt against the oppressive Siad Barre regime has turned into a competition between the dominant groups including politicians for power and economic resources including fertile land which was owned by minority groups. Therefore, they were seen as targets “enemies”, and suffered more than the general population. As a result, the minorities have disproportionately suffered wanton killings, destruction of their culture and identity, torture, ethnic and gender based discrimination, alienation from their lands, obstruction of humanitarian relief, and subsequently displaced from their lands to IDPs and refugees camps.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.2;6)

“Causes of displacement from places of origin vary within the different **IDP** communities in Kismayo. The Galgala **IDPs** for example were displaced from their houses in Mogadishu and Gedi-Hir in Middle Shabelle region in early 1991 by the Abgal clan with whom they share a territory. Said Barre regime armed the Galgala against the Abgal. When the regime collapsed, the Galgala faced brutal Abgal reprisal that led to displacement of thousands of Galgala from their lands.

The Bantu were forcibly displaced from their lands, in the Gosha area, by Majerten and Habargedir militias who fought over the control of resources and territories between 1991 and 1993. It has been reported by the displaced that Majerten and Habargedir militas ensured extermination of the Bantu, appropriation of the best of the lands, and obstruction of relief food to force the Bantu farmers to abandon their lands. As last resort many Bantu sought protection in Kismayo and other neighbouring villages, while others migrated to Mogadishu and other areas in Puntland and Somaliland.

The Werdai were displaced from their lands in Bu’ale and Afmadow area following attacks by the Ogaden while the Tuni were forcefully displaced from their lands in Sablale area by Habargedir militia who occupied their land during the armed conflict in 1992.

The Ormala and Ajuran were displaced from Bardera, Sakaw and Bu’ale area mainly by droughts. They sought humanitarian assistance in Kismayo and elsewhere after losing all their livestock.

Recent conflicts in 2000 between the Juba Valley Alliances (comprising mainly of Marehan and Habageder- Eyr) supported by the TNG and Majerten led by General Morgan in Lower and Middle Juba regions have led to displacement of dozens of families from their houses to Merka and Mogadishu. The majority of those who fled are families who had some resources to undertake their migration.

[...]

In December 2000, 11 villages including Barakamajindo, Adomow, Bandar, Moblen, Harawe, Qalaliyow, Libanga, Dambaley, Haji Tumul, Tanzani and Manane all in Jilib in district were burnt, crops and other properties were destroyed during this conflict. The conflict is believed to had been jointly fuelled by the Habargedir and Biyamal whose intention was to causes displacements of Bantu, and then appropriate their best agricultural lands. Though the Bantu (Jarer Weyne) community in the region armed themselves during the last three years in order to resist further occupation of their lands by other clans.

Almost all IDPs in Jilib have little prospects of returning to their lands soon until the situation back home improves. According to a Werdai elder, the Werdai IDPs can not return until their hostility with the Ogaden is addressed and solved.

[...]

About 2700 IDPs are estimated to be presently living in Qoryoley and its surrounding areas. Most of them are Garre, Tuni, Bantu, Biyamal, Rahaweyn and Galgale. The Garre and Jido IDPs were displaced from Alanfuto, Damanley, Jerow, and Abdi Ali villages in Kurtunwarey and Qoryoley districts by conflicts between Garre and Jido militias who fought over the control of these villages between 1998 and 2000. The Bantu and Biyamal were displaced mainly from Jilib and Jamame area in the Lower and Middle Jubba

regions by conflicts between United Somali Congress (USC) led by General Aided and a coalition of Majerten, Marehan, Dhulbahante and Ogaden forces led by General Morgan. They fought over the control of territories and resources. Though the Bantu and Biyamal have not participated in the hostilities, because of their vulnerability, and most importantly for their resources, they became prime targets for attacks by the fighting clan militia. In Somalia, ethnicity and economic pursuit form the major components of the armed conflict, with agriculture and livestock being the major targets.

The Galgale IDPs were displaced from Mogadishu and Gedihir by the Abgal with whom they lived together. During the last days of his rule, Siad Barre armed Galgale militia against the Abgal. When Siad was defeated in 1991, the Galgale faced brutal reprisal from the Abgal and were forced to abandon their lands. The Habargedir militias who were controlling Bay and Bakol regions from 1995-99 displaced the Rahaweyn mainly from Burhakaba and Baidoa. They were subjected to severe human rights violations that forced them to abandon their lands." (UNCU 30 July 2002, pp. 25;30; 33-4

### **Intensification of inter-factional conflicts in Southern Somalia main causes of death and displacement (2002)**

- Violent conflict erupted in early 2002 between the SRRC and the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) have displaced 6000 people from Gedo
- Conflict flare up in April 2002 in Gedo has displaced 15,000 families to Bay and Bakool as well as across the border with Kenya and the Gu rains were missed
- Hundreds of people continue to die in Mogadishu from violent armed confrontations between TNG forces and their allied militias and opposition forces
- Violence banditry and kidnappings are recurrent in Mogadishu
- An upsurge in inter-clan fighting forced 10,000 to flee Bulo Hawo, Kismayo and elsewhere in Middle and Lower Juba
- Fighting between JVA and Morgan forces in Lower Juba killed 2000 and displaced hundred of families in (2001)
- Conflict over main port cities has killed and displaced thousands of people
- Conflicts rose in Baidoa's RRA's headquarters due to disagreements over the establishment of the self-declared autonomous region of the South West State of Somalia (2002)
- Hundreds families fled conflict in Middle Shabelle to Hiran region

#### ***Gedo:***

"The most significant conflict during this reporting period took place in Gedo region in April, involving pro Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) and pro Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) militia. These clashes have resulted in the death of innocent civilians and have left many injured. Approximately 6,000 people from Bulo Hawa have been displaced as a direct result of the conflict." (UN, May 2002, p.2)

"However, the second influx from Belet Hawa town has remained in at location on the outskirts of Mandera known as BP1 (border Post 1) a few hundred metres inside Kenya. [...] Reports suggest that many of the refugees at BP1 are formerly internally displaced people from within Somalia who had been trying to make a living in Belet Hawa and who have no ties with the Mandera community. Even before these former IDPs arrived in Mandera, their nutritional status is likely to have been extremely poor." (FSAU, Food Security, June 2002)

"Thousands of people have fled, or are fleeing, their homes in the Gedo region of southwestern Somalia because of fighting between rival groups, local sources told IRIN on Thursday.

They have been streaming out of the border towns of Bulo Hawa, and Lugh, despite the onset of the main Gu season rains." (IRIN 25 April 2002)

"Families were leaving Bardhere town and the surrounding villages to the east, which bore the brunt of the fighting, and were moving in response to reports of renewed fighting and a fear that "the fighting will go on for some time [...]."

Humanitarian sources told IRIN that people were also leaving the town of Baidoa, about 200 km northwest of Mogadishu, for fear that the fighting might spread from Bardhere. "We have had reports of families coming from Baidoa to Buur Hakaba [about 80 km to the southeast of Baidoa] in the last two days," (IRIN, 20 February 2002)

***Mogadishu:***

"The general security situation in Mogadishu was tense and unstable. The main seaport and airport facilities remain closed. The Somalia Transitional National Government (TNG) started collecting taxes in Mogadishu. Banditry and acts of violence were reported." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"The security situation in Mogadishu deteriorated with an increase in kidnappings, and an upsurge in armed conflict between the Somalia Transitional National Government (TNG) and opposition groups. Militia loyal to Mohamed Dhere attacked the residence of TNG Interior Minister, Mr. Dahir Dayah. The attack caused significant casualties including death, injuries and destruction of property. Fighting broke out between TNG forces and opposition militias in North Mogadishu resulting in over 30 deaths and 60 injuries." (UNICEF, 12 June 2002)

***Bulo Hawo:***

"Heavy fighting in Bulo Hawo in April claimed the lives of over eighty militia and an unconfirmed number of civilian casualties. Up to 10,000 persons fled across the border to Mandera, Kenya. Although IDPs are now slowly returning to Bulo Hawo, the area remains tense and prolonged displacement may have an impact on food security." (UNICEF 12 July 2001, sect. 1)

***Middle and Lower Juba:***

"The JVA and Morgan have clashed in the nearby Lower Juba since July 27, leaving some 200 people dead and displaced hundreds of families, militia and medical sources said.

'Already dozens of families left and more others who can afford to get food during the voyage would go to Mogadishu and the port town of Merka,' said another Jilib resident, Asha Ibrahim." (AFP 3 September 2001)

***Kismayo:***

"Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced by the recent fight for control of the southern port town of Kismaio between the rebel forces and those pro-government troops." (Xinhua 28 August 2001)

"The forces that captured Kismayo are made up of Morgan's Somali Patriotic Movement, drawn from the Darod clan, the Rahanwein Resistance Army, and the South Somali National Movement." (AFP 6 August 2001)

***Baidoa:***

"The RRA [Rahanweyn Resistance Army] referred to the situation of the internally displaced persons from Lower Shabelle region who are coming to Baidoa. The harsh conditions in the town make their absorption difficult. The RRA also emphasized that the Rahanwein in Lower Shabelle are still living under oppressive conditions." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 21)

“Tension had been rising in Baidoa, the headquarters of the RRA, due to a deepening split between Shatigadud and his deputies over the establishment of the self-declared autonomous region of the South West State of Somalia (SWS). Shatigadud was declared SWS president in late March.” (IRIN, 4 July 2002)

***Mahaday:***

"Heavy fighting once again resumed on Tuesday afternoon in Middle Shabelle region between the forces of the transitional national government (TNG) of Somalia and those of warlord Mohamed Omar Habeb best known as Mohamed Dhere.

[...]

Because of Tuesday's fighting, there have been hundreds of families who fled their villages [mainly Mahaday].

Many of these internally displaced people have reached Jalalaqsi district of Hiran region not very far away from where the fighting started.

[...]

Mohamed Dhere has accused the government of destabilizing Middle Shabelle region, while the government accused Warlord Mohamed Dhere of trying to force the people in Middle Shabelle region to support him forcefully and pay taxes." (Xinhua, 18 June 2002)

***Galkayo:***

"About 40 people have been killed and 60 wounded in inter-clan fighting in the Mudug region of central Somalia, sources in the regional capital Galkayo told IRIN on Wednesday.

The fighting was concentrated in and around the village of Afbarwaqo, some 200 km east of Galkayo, but has now died down.

According to a local elder, Muhammad Salad Du'ale, the fighting - which broke out two weeks ago - occurred between the Sa'd sub-clan of the main Habar Gedir clan, and the Dir clan. It was sparked off by revenge killings for the deaths of eight fishermen near Afbarwaqo, but the ensuing escalation of the violence was also attributable to the scarcity of water and grazing in the area, Du'ale said.

[...]

The violence has reportedly displaced hundreds of families, who have sought refuge in areas where "there is not a single well or water point", Sheko Harir said. "Those are the ones who need immediate help." " (IRIN, 30 January 2002)

**Cruel combination of conflict and climatic extremes cause repeated displacements in Somalia**

- Clan conflict persisted in the face of a complete collapse of government structures
- Bay and Bakool have been the two worst hit regions by the combined effect of conflict and drought
- Rival militias in Bay and Bakool carried a scorched-earth policy deliberately destroying all infrastructure, looting crops and wanton killing
- Major flooding killed 2000 and displaced 230,000 people in 1997
- Violence forced 50,000 persons to flee their homes in first half of 1999
- People too exhausted to seek humanitarian assistance in towns were eating dead animals to survive drought in 1999
- 6,000 persons displaced by flooding of Shabelle River in 2000
- Drought severely affected families in central and southern Somalia during 2000

"As political confrontation and civil war degenerated into clan conflict, the remnants of government structures collapsed. What remained of Somalia's physical, economic and social infrastructure was largely destroyed. In 1991-92, the heavily populated inter-riverine areas (between the Juba and Shabelle river valleys) were very vulnerable. With crop failures and the escalation of the conflict combined with drought and flood, thousands of people became destitute. Famine resulted in mass population displacement, and widespread loss of life." (UN December 1998, p. 4)

"Bay and Bakool regions lie between the two main rivers of southern Somalia, the Juba to the west and the Shabelle to the south and east. Each consists of five districts; Bay: Baidoa, Bardale, Burhakaba, Dinsor, Qansahdeere, and Bakool: Al Barde, Hudur, Rabdhure, Tieglo and Wajid.

These two regions have been the worst hit during a decade of armed conflict. During this time, rival militia carried out a 'scorched earth' policy with deliberate destruction of infrastructure, theft of crops and livestock, underground grain pits and seed stocks, killing and destruction of towns and villages as well as laying of mines. Baidoa, known as the "city of death", was at the epicenter of the famine in 1992, during which thousands of person died. From 1991 hundreds of people were affected by armed conflicts of the civil war, lawlessness and subsequent displacement from many towns and villages of southern Somalia arrived in Baidoa to seek protection and assistance. However, most of them fled Baidoa due to a combination of insecurity and droughts resulted from the occupation of Bay region by various clans or power groups where the last one being the forces led by General Mohamed Farah 'Aideed' in 1995. During these times of occupation, its alleged that women were raped, water points destroyed and villages burnt to the ground." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p.27)

***Major flooding in 1997-1998 was particularly devastating to Somali populations:***

"[F]loods inundated much of southern Somalia's fertile land in late 1997, killing approximately 2,000 people. The floods destroyed food stocks, decimated 60,000 hectares of planted crop land, displaced 230,000 people, and left a total of one million affected." (USAID 1998 Annual Summary, para. 2)

"Heavy flooding during late 1997 and early 1998 affected an estimated 600,000 people and exacerbated harsh humanitarian conditions in southern areas of Somalia. More than 2,000 people died and up to 200,000 became temporarily homeless because of the floods. The floods destroyed crops – the harvest was one-third smaller than the previous year – and ruined about 40 tons of grain in storage.

The floods particularly harmed populations already displaced by the country's warfare. Heavy rains washed away makeshift huts housing displaced families in Mogadishu. Other displaced families in the capital continued to live in abandoned government buildings, schools, factories, and houses left empty by the country's decade of instability." (USCR 1999, p.88)

***In the year 1999:***

"A deadly combination of warfare, drought, and food shortages pushed tens of thousands of people from their homes during the year [1999], joining hundreds of thousands of Somalis uprooted in previous years.

[...]

Violence in southwestern Somalia forced at least 50,000 persons to flee their homes in the first half of 1999, including about 20,000 who fled to Kenya and 10,000 who reportedly crossed into Ethiopia. Thousands of other families reportedly fled to Mogadishu from war-racked and drought-ridden southern regions during the year, while thousands of Mogadishu-area residents temporarily fled their homes when heavy fighting erupted in Mogadishu." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

"It is likely that the stress in the rural areas is extensive. Many poor rural people are said to be too weak to come to the urban centres in search of food. The UN-EUE field officer was told that in some cases people migrating to town had died along the way, and he observed first-hand people eating the meat from animals that had died from weakness or disease." (UNDP-EUE 14 December 1999, pp.1,4)

***In the year 2000:***

"Some 900 families or about 6,000 people have been displaced by flooding in central Somalia after the Shabelle River burst its banks, a local official said Monday [in May 2000]." (AFP 22 May 2000)

"The impact of this drought is having major effects on up to 1,200,000 people, including 300,000 children under 5 years, in the districts of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran and Middle Shabelle in Southern and Central Somalia, and the area will remain at risk up to the next harvest following the next Dyer season (January 2001). Women, children and other vulnerable people in Bakool are now starting to move in search of water, food, and basic health services." (UNICEF 20 June 2000, para. 2)

## **Peace efforts**

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### **Peace efforts in Somalia hailed as successes despite 10 years of failure**

- International community responded to conflict and famine in Somalia with UN peacekeeping operation (1992-1995)
- UN deployed troops in 1992 despite threatening stance posed by Somali faction leaders
- UNOSOM troops experienced ambushes and suffered casualties in 1993
- All UNOSOM forces were pulled out by 1995
- Mediators' 'quick fix' approach to peace in Somalia has led to consecutive failures

"Most previous Somali peace initiatives have been touted by their authors (and many participants) as successes, even when evidence of failure had become inescapable – much like the old medical saw that "the operation succeeded but the patient died". In 1991, the announcement of a new government at the "Djibouti II" conference triggered the most vicious fighting Mogadishu has ever seen. The UN and the U.S. trumpeted the 1993 Addis Ababa accords as the first step in a bold international experiment in "nation building", only to find themselves at war with the late General Aydiid. UN Special Envoy Lansana Kouyate's breezy assertion after the May 1994 Nairobi talks that "the warlords are now peacelords" was followed by new fighting in the Jubba Valley, Merka, Mogadishu, and Beled Weyne. The Arta Conference continues to be heralded as successful peacebuilding despite the collapse of two regional administrations and eruption of some of the worst violence in years.

Many positive words have been spoken about the current process, but there is a real risk that it will go down the same road. Already jostling for position between factions before and during the conference has involved serious fighting in Mogadishu, Baydhowa, Puntland, Gedo, and the Juba Valley. February's clashes in Mogadishu are in part due to the rearrangement of factional coalitions during the conference, and more serious fighting could yet follow. The reality – that poor peace agreements actually make the situation worse – is one that all parties to the talks, Somali and foreign alike, should bear in mind as they consider their next moves. " (ICG, 6 March 2003)

"The international response to the armed conflict and the displacement situation was slowed by insecurity due to marauding factions and rampant banditry. Massive infusions of relief aid during the period from August through November 1992 helped to mitigate the impact of famine, but could not eliminate its causes (UN December 1998, p. 4). The continued violence prompted the formation of a UN peacekeeping force known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Soon after their deployment the leaders of some of the contending Somali factions began to take an aggressive, threatening stance toward the United Nations."(UN 1996, p. 9)

"Extensive television coverage of famine and civil strife that took approximately 300,000 lives in 1991 and 1992 prompted an American-led international intervention in Somalia. The armed humanitarian mission in

late 1992 quelled clan combat long enough to stop the famine, but ended in urban guerrilla warfare against Somali militias.

The last international forces withdrew in March 1995 after the casualty count reached the thousands. Approximately 100 peacekeepers, including 20 American soldiers, were killed. The \$4 billion United Nations intervention had little lasting impact. Today, neighboring countries and others as far afield as Libya and Egypt are reportedly backing competing warlords." (Freedom House 1999, "Overview")

"In June 1993 Hussein Aïdeed's militia attacked Pakistani UNOSOM peace-keepers in South Mogadishu. Sporadic clashes between UNOSOM II forces and Aïdeed's militia continued until October 1993 when a small US force was ambushed, suffering heavy casualties. The United States withdrew its forces, and by March 1995 all remaining UNOSOM forces had left." (UN December 1998, p. 4)

### **Arta Djibouti peace process resulted in creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) (August 2000)**

- Transitional National Assembly elects interim president at peace talks
- International community supports process and president

#### ***The Djibouti peace process:***

"The peace process, which focuses on civil society groups rather than on faction leaders, was initiated last September [2000] by President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti. The peace conference started with a civil society technical symposium on 21 March [2000] in Djibouti and is scheduled to end on 15 July." (UNHCHR 10 July 2000, para. 5)

"A major Somali peace conference – the thirteenth peace effort since 1991 – got underway in neighboring Djibouti, attended by some 900 official Somali conferees and more than 1,000 other Somali observers. The gathering, known as the 'Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference,' was still underway at the end of July [2000]." (USCR 28 August 2000, para. 12)

"The three months have been dominated by the conference in Arta, Djibouti, hosted by the Djibouti government. Several thousand Somalis from all walks of life, many of them living in exile, succeeded in electing a clan-based 245 member parliament after four months of deliberations." (IFRC 18 October 2000, para. 4)

#### ***Creation of Transitional National Assembly and election of Somali President:***

"After 10 years of civil war, Somali parliamentarians of the Transitional National Assembly at the Djibouti Peace talks held in the town of Arta elected Dr Abd-al Qasim Salad Hasan as President on the morning of 26 August 2000." (UNICEF 7 September 2000, para. 1)

"In contrast to the anarchy and civil war that had prevailed in Somalia for the past 10 years, the recent creation of the National Assembly ushered in a new era for peace and stability and constituted the first step of restoring order and central authority in the country, the President of Somalia told the fifty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly this morning, as it continued its general debate.

The spontaneous reaction of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, he said, demonstrated vividly that they wanted to leave years of civil war behind and open a new era of peace, tranquility, good governance, restoration of the rule of law and national unity. He called upon the warlords to review their positions, hear the voice of reason and respect the legitimate aspirations of the Somali people to achieve national unity, social and economic development, and durable peace." (UNGA 15 September 2000, paras. 2 and 3)

#### ***International community supports Somali assembly and newly-elected President:***

"On 16 August [2000], the UN Security Council met in informal consultations after which the current President of the Council gave a statement welcoming the Somali parliament and called on all political forces in Somalia to join the ongoing peace process." (UNCU 18 August 2000, para. 2)

"The European Union is willing to enter into dialogue with the new Somali authorities and, once they have established their authority, to support their efforts to rebuild the country, while continuing to give its backing to recovery measures in all areas of Somalia where stable conditions exist.

The European Union calls on the authorities of Somaliland and Puntland to establish constructive relations with the institutions which have emerged from the Arta process. It also urges the future transitional government to establish a constructive dialogue as soon as possible with the aforementioned authorities for the purpose of re-establishing national unity in peace and with respect for the elements of stability achieved." (EU 8 September 2000, paras. 1-3)

"Despite significant challenges, the Arta peace process still represents the most viable basis for peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. In a 28 March Presidential Statement, the UN Security Council reiterated its support to the process and urged the TNG and all local authorities "to make every effort to complete, without preconditions, the peace and reconciliation process through dialogue and involvement of all parties." The Council also pledged to tackle illicit trade of weapons and ammunition in Somalia, which has continued to fuel the conflict.

[...]A technical team comprising the frontline States – Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya - was established to convene the proposed National Reconciliation Conference for Somalia, initially scheduled to take place in April. This conference has been postponed to a later date." (UN, May 2002, p.3)

*For a detailed analysis of the Arta peace process, see November 2000 report by Ken Menkhaus [\[External link\]](#).*

### **Secret peace talks underway in Puntland (2003)**

- Since June 2001 when Abdullahi Yusuf presidential term ended he claimed Puntland's parliament had extended his mandate, claim rejected by the elders
- The elders named Yusuf Haji Nur acting president before electing Jama Ali Jama as president
- Abdullahi Yusuf recaptured Bosaso from Jama Ali Jama in May 2002

"Abdishakur Mire Adan said the talks - being held in the commercial capital Bosaso - between his administration and "the armed opposition" led by General Ade Muse Hirsi were "going very well".

[...]

Controversy over Puntland's leadership has been increasingly vocal since June 2001, when Abdullahi Yusuf, whose presidential term ended then, claimed that the region's parliament had extended his mandate.

A number of Puntland traditional elders meeting in the regional capital, Garowe, in July 2001 rejected his claim, and named Yusuf Haji Nur, Puntland's former chief justice, as "acting president" until the election of a new administration. The elders then convened a general congress in August and, on 14 November 2001, elected Jama Ali Jama as president for a three-year term in the hope that this would end the leadership wrangle. Abdullahi Yusuf recaptured Bosaso from Jama Ali Jama in May 2002.

The recent talks have been shrouded in secrecy, with neither side issuing details of the proceedings. A source close to Ade Muse told IRIN that it was too early to issue any statements. "We are still talking and discussing issues," he said. "Nothing has been finalised, so we cannot issue official statements." (IRIN, 8 May 2003)

## **The Somali National Reconciliation Conference under the auspices of IGAD (October 2002-June 2003)**

- The IGAD peace process gathering 24 key faction leaders, the TNG and representatives of civil society
- The first stage includes a cease-fire agreement
- The second stage includes work on issues of federalism, demobilization, land and property disputes, economic planning, conflict resolution and international relations
- The third stage should plan the formation of an interim government
- The independent expert on Somalia of the UNHCR recommends ‘smart sanctions’ for Somali warlords who prove to be actively blocking peace efforts
- UN supports IGAD peace efforts aiming at broad-based government maintaining territorial integrity as the less worst option (2002)
- Peace talks initiated on 15 October 2002 are not progressing and increasingly key leaders are defecting
- Cease fire signed on 27 October has been blatantly violated
- The peace process was in June 2003 in its third and critical stage of agreeing upon the formation of an assembly and an interim government

“Transitional National Government (TNG) in the capital, and the resurgence of activity on the part of faction leaders, with attendant violence, shifting alliances and volatility. In October, a peace conference was held under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). The conference brought together 24 faction leaders, TNG and representatives of civil society organizations. For the first time, all armed factions agreed to participate in the peace talks. However, “Somaliland’s” administration decided to abstain. The conference was divided into three phases with the first devoted to agenda-setting and the signing of a declaration on the cessation of hostilities during the talks, the second to committee work on key issues (federalism, demobilization, land and property disputes, economic planning, conflict resolution and international relations) and the third to the formation of an interim government. At the time of the writing of this report, all factions had signed a truce declaration and the conference was in its second phase, which was scheduled to last for a period of four to six weeks.

[...]

The independent expert welcomes the IGAD-sponsored peace process and urges the international community to lend its support to and express its interest in this process. The independent expert notes with particular interest the EU Council of Ministers’ decision during its 2447th meeting on 22 July 2002, in which it, inter alia, called for the imposition of “smart sanctions” on faction leaders who prove to be actively blocking peace efforts in Somalia. He calls upon the Commission on Human Rights to recommend to the Secretary-General and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) the undertaking of a study on the applicability to Somali warlords of sanctions, such as the freezing of their foreign assets, the imposition of travel bans, stripping them of their foreign passports, the imposition of business boycotts and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to enforce the Security Council mandated arms embargo on Somalia.” (UNCHR, 31 December 2002pp.3;7)

“Muhammad Qanyare Afrah, one of the most important faction leaders in Mogadishu, speaking on-behalf of his counterparts Usman Hasan Ali Ato, Umar Mahmud Finish, and Mawlid Ma’ane, said they had "serious reservations" about the way the conveners were preparing for the conference, including the fact that the faction leaders had not been consulted.

“In the absence of other major initiatives, external support for peace has focused on the efforts of the IGAD, which aims to create a broad-based, all-inclusive government while maintaining the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Somalia.

However, as the preparations for the IGAD reconciliation conference got underway, tension and conflict increased considerably in some areas. The simultaneous need for, and aversion to, a central government in Somalia have been further exploited by actors who have a stake in the outcome. This includes those Somalis and individuals of other nationalities profiting from the war economy, who have proven reluctant to accept the compromises that come with peace.” (UN, November 2002, p.14)

« The talks, which opened on 15 October 2002, have been held up by wrangling over the allocation of seats to drafting committees and to the plenary sessions.

Musyoka, who symbolically tabled the committees' reports, accused some factions of "blatantly" violating the cessation of hostilities agreement signed by the Somali parties on 27 October last year. Under the terms of the agreement, the Somali groups undertook to suspend all hostilities for the duration of the peace conference.

Since then there have been multiple violations, with fighting breaking out in the capital, Mogadishu, the towns of Las Anod in the northeast and Baidoa in the southwest, and in the Bari, Bay, Bakol, Gedo and Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle and Middle Juba regions.” (IRIN, 15 May 2003)

“Meanwhile, many Somali leaders remain engaged in the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, taking place under the auspices of IGAD. The talks that began in Eldoret, Kenya in October last year were this year moved to Mbagathi, outside Nairobi and placed under the new leadership of Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat. But the lack of significant progress at the talks – which are increasingly taking place in the absence of key leaders - has been paralleled in the first half of the year by ongoing insecurity, which continues to have a significant impact on UN operations in Somalia.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.1)

“The scenarios developed in the CAP for the most part remain valid. Levels of stability in Puntland are, however, better than expected, and the UN will, therefore, continue to advocate for increased activities in the region.

The outcome of the Mbagathi process continues to be the single largest determinant of the future humanitarian and development operating environment in Somalia and is currently at a critical stage as Phase III – the formation of an assembly and interim government – gets underway. If it produces a broad-based national government supported by the international community, Somalia may enjoy a better political and economic environment. If, on the other hand, no significant results are produced, the political, security and humanitarian situation may further deteriorate in some areas. Even if no large-scale conflicts occur requiring humanitarian response beyond the resources appealed for in the current CAP, the prospects for the wider peace and stability needed to move the country out of chronic emergency will remain thwarted.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.9)

***In order to have an in-depth analysis of the Somali peace negotiations see ‘Negotiating a blueprint for peace in Somalia’ (ICG, 6 March 2003): [[External Link](#)] also ‘Salvaging Somalia's chance for peace’ (ICG, 9 December 2002): [[External Link](#)]***

***In order to read the ‘Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process’ (UNSC, 13 December 2002), click here [[External Link](#)]***

# POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

## Global figures

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### **An estimated 350, 000 persons said to be displaced in Somalia (2003)**

- UN estimates that 350,000 out of the 7 million Somali population are displaced
- UN estimates 150,000 IDPs in Mogadishu, the town recording the highest concentration of displaced people
- UNCU estimates about 40,500 IDPs in Somaliland, 30,500 in Puntland and 86,000 in southern and central Somalia excluding Mogadishu
- Children and women make up 75% of the IDP population
- Accurate estimates of IDPs in Somalia are hard to establish due to intermingling of permanent and temporary displaced as well as unsettled returnees from neighboring countries
- In 1992, at the peak of conflict USCR estimated as many as 2 million Somali displaced
- In northwestern Somalia up to 1.5 million people were displaced due to Siad Barre's war according to USCR

“Throughout Somalia, an estimated 350,000 of the country's 7,000,000 inhabitants are internally displaced persons (IDPs) who, as a result of protracted conflict and insecurity, have experienced impoverishment, often combined with drought, which induces mass population displacement.

[...]

Notably, IDPs constitute nearly half of the estimated 750,000 Somalis who live in a state of chronic humanitarian need.” (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002,p.1)

“Approximately 350,000 IDPs live away from their homes throughout the country, with the highest concentration of 150,000 in Mogadishu.

[...]

Additionally, the large number of seasonal, economic and thus temporary IDPs, mixed with the mass of more permanent IDPs, compounds the difficulties of providing assistance difficult in a manner, which does not encourage urban migration.” (UN, November 2002, p.17)

« IDP caseload in northwest Somalia (Somaliland) is approximately 40,500 persons (UNCU study 2000)

IDP caseload in northeast Somalia (Puntland) is approximately 30,500 persons (UNCU study 2000)

IDP caseload in southern and central Somalia, excluding Mogadishu, is approximately 86,000 persons (UNCU study 2002).

[...]

“This study provides an overview on the situation of IDPs in Somalia that they are dispossessed of significant proportional of their assets due to conflict and natural disaster such as successive droughts and floods. About 75% of IDPs are women and children who moved abnormally from areas of their habitual residence and are staying in camps and “camp-like” situation and are in need of assistance and protection.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.1)

"In this case, the vulnerable population would likely fall to near 400,000 people - roughly the same number as the caseload of internally displaced persons (IDPs)." (UN November 2001, p. 5)

"In Somalia, an estimated 350,000 of the country's 7 million inhabitants are internally displaced. This figure includes some 40-50,000 Somalis displaced in 1999. During the war to oust the Siad Barre regime, political violence, banditry and lawlessness produced famine conditions and induced mass population displacement. While there was a gradual return of IDPs to their locations of origin between 1993 and 1995, continuing violence, food insecurity and water shortages have exacerbated their living conditions." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"The very complexity of the issue of displacement is rooted in the problematic associated with its definition. At a general level the issue is fairly clear-cut. That is, those clans from south and central Somalia such as the Rahewein, Ajjuran, Kale Jele, Shekhash, Biyo Mal Ahmed, Jarso, Ma'alin Weyne, Harin, and Ashraf fall under the conventional category of displaced persons. These are displaced communities that fled their home territories due to civil conflict and severe drought conditions, or both, and have found themselves in northern towns throughout northwest and northeast Somalia.


At another, more complex level, there are the "returnees" or those clans and sub-clans that over the last decade have been displaced or made refugees as many as two or three times and are only now returning to their ethnic home towns and villages. At a general level returnees are referred to as those from "Kilika Shanad" or Zone 5 designating them by the region in Ethiopia where they resided as refugees during the civil conflicts of 1988 and 1994.

[...]

As for those southerners displaced to the north these are simplistically referred to as "Gudhu" or "foreign speakers" since their Somali dialect can be easily differentiated from that spoken by Somalis in the Northwest. "Ghudhu" is thus a linguistic designation, which, far more than racial or cultural distinctions, distinguishes displaced persons arriving from central and southern Somalia." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p7)

***Estimates of internally displaced people 1992-2003:***

Year	Estimated number of IDPs	Source
End 2002	350,000	(USCR 2003)
End 2001	400,000	(USCR 2002, p.6)
End 2000	300,000	(USCR 2001, p.6)
End 1999	350,000	(USCR 2000, p.6)
End 1998	250,000	(USCR 1999, pp. 87-88)
End 1997	200,000	(USCR 1998, p. 92)
End 1996	250,000	(USCR 1997, p. 92)
End 1995	300,000	(USCR 1996, p. 66)
End 1994	500,000	(USCR 1995, p. 74)
End 1992	2,000,000	(USCR 1998, p.92)



"At the peak of Somalia's upheaval in 1992, more than 800,000 Somalis were refugees in neighboring countries, and as many as 2 million people were internally displaced. Large numbers gradually returned to their home areas during 1993-95, despite sporadic violence and new population flight in some regions. Only 5,000 repatriated in 1996." (USCR 1998, p. 92)

**Somaliland:**

"By 1988 full scale civil war broke out in Northwest, where Siyad Barre's force attacked the city of Hargeysa in a brutal campaign against the Isaaq clan that led to charges of genocide" (IGAD/UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.7)

"Siad Barre's sustained military offensive crippled agricultural production, destroyed nearly all of the region's livestock, decimated northwest Somalia's businesses, places of worship, and water infrastructure, and uprooted almost the entire population of approximately 2.5 million people. Fleeing war, mass executions, and torture, approximately 400,000 residents of northwest Somalia sought refuge in other countries.[...] An estimated 1.5 million additional people were displaced within northwest Somalia." (USCR, December 2001, p.15)

"It is virtually impossible to estimate the number of IDP while it seems that most of the population has been displaced at one time or another during the past ten years of conflict. There are many different categories of IDP in Somalia. These include people who moved from one part of the country to another due to civil conflict and/or fear of persecution; economic migrants who had little option but to move to urban centres in order to survive; pastoralists permanently displaced by drought; returnees who have not been able to return to their traditional areas of origin; demobilised soldiers; widows and orphans." (IGAD/UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.12)

## Geographical distribution

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### Majority of displaced persons reside in and around Mogadishu (2002)

- Between 100,000 and 230,000 displaced persons said to live in and around Mogadishu
- Thousands of newly displaced reached Mogadishu in early 2000
- Internally displaced reportedly make up 20 to 25% of Mogadishu population

"More than 200,000 displaced persons continued to live in some 200 Mogadishu-area camps and squatter settlements at year's end [2001]. Thousands of others remained internally displaced in relatively peaceful Somaliland, including newly uprooted civilians who had fled violence in southern Somalia." (USCR, 2002, p.94-97)

"Several thousand people fled into Mogadishu, further crowding the city with displaced families. About 230,000 displaced persons lived in some 200 Mogadishu-area camps and squatter settlements as the year ended [2000]." (USCR 2001, p. 105)

"More than 350,000 people are internally displaced and tend to live off subsistence wages for unskilled day labour, including over 100,000 in Mogadishu." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"During the first half of the year [2000], thousands of newly displaced Somalis descended on the capital, Mogadishu; gunfights in Mogadishu and at other locations left hundreds dead; a local aid worker was killed and two international relief workers were kidnapped; and floods damaged two displacement camps and killed thousands of livestock." (USCR 28 August 2000, para. 2)

Estimates on the number of camps in and around Mogadishu vary: according to the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, there are 138 camps in Mogadishu, north and south, in which 30 per cent of the population are refugees, while the non-governmental organization Action Contre la Faim estimates that 234,000 displaced Somalis live in 201 camps in Mogadishu (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999), whereas another source indicates the number of IDPs in Mogadishu is almost 250,000 in about 150 camps in open areas, comprising approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the population of Mogadishu. (FEWS Network 26 February 1999)

### **IDPs in South and Central Somalia (2003)**

- There are about 87,770 IDPs in south and central Somalia excluding Mogadishu
- In April 2002 conflict in Gedo displaced up to 15,000 people
- About 60,000 IDPs live in Kismayo
- Approximately 15,000 IDPs among whom 8,000 from Bantu and 5,000 from Galgala origins live in Kismayo
- Some 300-400 IDP families have congregated in Rabdure town, Bakool since April 2001
- 70% of these IDPs are Somalis who had taken refuge in Ethiopia in early 1990s

"Currently approximately estimates from recently survey revealed that there are as high as 87,770 IDPs mainly settled in major towns and villages in this portion of the country. This figure excludes Mogadishu IDP population which is estimated 150,000." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002)

"In April 2002, situation in Gedo drastically deteriorated due to intra-Marehan clan conflict, which flared up and caused the displacement of around 15,000 persons either across the Kenya border or throughout the region away from armed conflict area." (UNCU/OCHA 30 July 2002,p25)

#### ***Kismayo:***

“About 60,000 of the estimated Kismayo District population of 88,000 (WHO NIDs figures, Oct 2002) live in Kismayo town. Among the residents are many internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have settled in over twenty camps [...] within Kismayo town since 1992/93. These IDPs fled some high potential areas of Mareley, Sanguni, Mugambo, Jowhar, Mahaday, Brava and Bay Region due to insecurity.” FSAU Nutrition Update, 31 December 2002)

“The portal town of Kismayo, which is the largest town in the Juba valley region, accommodates the largest **IDP** population in the region. Approximatey 15,000 **IDPs** the majority of whom are Bantu (8,000 persons), Galgala (5,000 persons), Tuni, Werdai, Ajuran and Ormala ethnic minority groups. The majority of IDPs are women and children.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.25)

***Bakool:***

"For poor and very poor agro-pastoralist families in Bakool region, a 25-40% food energy deficit is expected over the one-year period from July 2001 to June 2002. However, some areas and populations within these areas are more vulnerable than others due to disproportionately low rains and/or influx of IDPs. Rabdure District in Bakool Region is one such area. Within a three-kilometre radius of Rabdure town, 300-400 families have settled within the past two months. The majority of the these IDPs, at least 70%, are Somalis who had settled in Barey and Kumbul areas of Ethiopia due to insecurity in early 1990s but have returned to Somalia since April 2001 due to increased tension between them and the Ethiopian communities. These people had their origins in Rabdure and so may not be absorbed in other villages outside that area. The remainder of the IDPs have come from within Bakool Region (Wajid district and the surrounding villages of Rabdure town) with their movement being triggered by rumours of food distribution. It was reported that this latter group initially came in large numbers but have been moving out towards Elberde in search of pasture while some returned to their homes when they realised that there was no general food distribution. This trend may continue." (FSAU 16 August 2001, Bakool Update)

**Over 38,000 IDPs live in and around major towns in northwestern and northeastern Somalia (2002)**

- 15,000 IDPs live around Hargeisa and Burao (2002)
- The Northwest host about 11,000 IDPs, mainly in urban centers notably Hargeisa has four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house
- Burao town as a major trading center hosts very large numbers of IDPs and several camps are located in the district

***Northwest Somalia:***

“In addition, it is estimated that over 38,000 IDPs live in and around major towns in northwestern and northeastern regions” (UN, November 2002, p.96)

“[T]here are approximately 15,000 IDPs in the north-western towns of Hargeisa and Burao.” (UN, November 2002,p.37)

"Within Somalia there is also a significant population of IDPs whose situation needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. There are an estimated 11,000 IDPs living in Northwest Somalia,[...] primarily in Hargeysa and other urban centres." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.4)

***Hargeysa District:***

"In and around Hargeisa, there are now four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house area." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Hargeysa town is the biggest agglomeration in the Northwest and concentrates public administration, private sector and international community interventions. Urban growth started before the war with the

migration of the rural population. Since the end of the hostilities Hargeysa has undertaken significant reconstruction and rehabilitation activities and is the destination for a large number of refugees and IDPs.

Hargeysa town hosts about 60% of the returnee population, most of whom are spontaneous returnees of 1991-1997. In addition, a considerable number of refugees remaining in the Ethiopian camps (Camaboker, Rabasso, Daror) are choosing Hargeysa as their zone of repatriation." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, pp.22-23)

***Burao District:***

"Burao town is an important livestock trade centre, with a considerable concentration of urban population. There are also a significant number of rural populations in the district. Strongly affected by the past conflict, both urban and rural zones have to cope with the presence of a very large number of IDPs (several camps of IDP are located in the district). It also has received many spontaneous returnees during the past years.

Burao district will be a significant destination of the repatriation movement as a large number of refugees remaining in the Daror camp in Ethiopia have selected this district." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p 23)

**IDPs in Northeast Somalia: Puntland**

- About 28,000 IDPs live in Bosasso outskirts
- The Northeast has no infrastructure to absorb an indeterminable numbers of IDPs from southern Somalia as well as influx of returnees
- Bossaso and Galkayo towns host about 33,000 IDPs in camps
- IDPs were said to make up 30% of Bossaso's population in 2001 and in 2000 there were an estimated 165,000 IDPs

***Bosasso:***

"There are approximately 28,000 (twenty-eight thousand) displaced persons living in five sections in the outskirts of Bosassi town. The largest IDP population has settled in the eastern section of Bosasso." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.18)

"Due to its relatively unscathed status the Northeast has been the destination for many of Somalia's IDPs, particularly from the war-ravaged south. It is impossible to quantify the precise numbers of IDPs who have moved to this region since many of them have integrated into communities where they have family ties. However, it is clear that there has been a considerable influx of population into the region, which does not have the infrastructure to cope with such a population increase." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.3)

In addition to this, an estimated 33,000 IDPs are living in camps on the outskirts of Bossaso and Gal kayo [...] in Northeast Somalia, with minimal infrastructure and economic livelihood opportunities." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.4)

The total population of Bossaso District is estimated at 250,000 persons. Bossaso town suffered a moderate level of physical destruction and has to cope with poverty and environmental problems. Strongly affected by a large influx of IDPs (including an estimated 28,000 in settlements around the town [...]) the district has a limited absorption capacity because of its weak urban services. After the war Bossaso became the most important port of the Northeast, which is a unique employment source." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p 23)

"In Bossaso, for instance, IDPs are estimated to make up 30% of the population. IDPs often come from the minority groups (Bantu) and clans with low status in the community." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Bossaso town suffered a moderate level of physical destruction and has to cope with poverty and environmental problems. Strongly affected by influx of IDP estimated at 165,000 and returnees (close to 8,000), the district has a limited absorption capacity because of its weak urban services. After the war Bossaso became the most important port of the Northeast, which is a unique employment source." (UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.34)

"Tens of thousands of people remained internally displaced in relatively calm Somaliland and Puntland, according to aid agencies. Thousands of residents from southern Somalia fled to northern areas, particularly to Puntland, hoping to escape Somalia by boat to Yemen. Hundreds drowned in overcrowded boats en route to Yemen. Another 7,000 reached Yemen during the year." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

## **Disaggregated data**

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### **Recent returnees from Ethiopia who are unable to regain homes now make up portion of IDP population (2001-2002)**

- Southern IDPs in Somaliland are considered 'refugee' by local authorities who declared independence and IDPs by international organizations
- Southern IDPs in Somaliland intermingle with returnees unable to reintegrate (2002)
- IDPs in Somaliland from southern origin are called 'refugees' by local authorities and 'displaced' by humanitarian agencies
- Refugee returnees become IDPs as very little opportunities exist for returning to their areas of origin or to reintegrate due to mines, ongoing conflict, loss of assets
- An estimated one out of ten households considers itself to be IDPs out of a total of 8,600
- Half households from Southern Somalia consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs
- Among the 1,700 families living in Daami 35% are from southern Somalia
- In Stadium among 5,000 residents, about 1/5 consider themselves IDPs although they are primarily Somalis from Somaliland or Ethiopia

"There is also another problem as Somaliland has stated that it is an independent state the government sees these people as refugees and the responsibility of UNHCR. But since Somaliland is not recognised the IDP's are therefore internally displaced within their own country, hence they are the responsibility of the state. This has brought untold hardship on the IDP's.

For that reason, it is essential to have better understanding of the problems faced by IDP's, in an attempt to enable the safe and fair existence of IDP's within the host community" (Ibrahim F., 15 August 2002, p.2)

"In a country that has to deal with the consequences of large numbers of people who are displaced, the distinction between internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees has little relevance. In the case of Somalia, refugees as well as IDPs may be reluctant to return to their home areas since they remain replete with mines. Many former refugees are now IDPs since on-going conflict often prevents them from accessing their regions of origin. Equally significantly, demobilised militia, who may still retain their arms, have little incentive to return to their original towns or villages." (UNDP, June 2002, p.5)

"Humanitarian sources in Hargeysa said people living in the [resettlement] camps had 'come from a variety of circumstances, and a variety of places'. Some were spontaneous returnees from Ethiopia who had been living in poor, makeshift accommodation for years, while others had returned through formal, assisted repatriation programmes by UNHCR. There are also small groups of displaced people from southern Somalia – who are known as 'refugees' by the Somaliland authorities, but considered 'displaced' by international humanitarian agencies. "These are the 'invisibles'," a local source said of the southerners.

[...]

Humanitarian sources told IRIN that most returnees had congregated in the Somaliland capital rather than returning to their original home areas. Various reasons had been suggested for the phenomenon, including loss of livestock and homes, the need for cash-based employment, dislocation and habitual dependency, the source said." (IRIN-CEA 22 August 2001)

"In and around Hargeisa, there are now four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house area." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Categories of people include returned refugees, IDPs, and immigrants." (Clark, June 2002, p.20)

"Two thirds of the households living in these eight areas consider themselves to be returned refugees, while one in seven considers itself to be immigrant. One in 10 households considers itself internally displaced." (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

***Population profile:***

"-The total population in the 8 areas was estimated at 8,600 households, or 57,000 people.

-Households in the survey ranged in size from 2 to 18 members, with a median of 6 members.

[...]

-20% of households in the areas reported that they are female-headed.

[...]

-One half the population living in these areas is under age 15, while almost two thirds are under age 20 years." (Clark, June 2002. p.5)

"-The middle half of all area residents (25th to 75th percentiles) have lived in their settlement area for between 2 and 4 years. The duration of residence in the area did not correlate significantly with a household's current wealth.

- Over all 8 areas, 60% of households were in Ethiopian refugee camps immediately before arriving at the Hargeisa returnee settlement areas; 8% were from Southern Somalia, and 16% reported they moved there from elsewhere in Hargeisa. The remaining households reported that they had been in Ethiopia though not in a camp (9%), elsewhere in Somaliland (4%), or elsewhere abroad (2%).

- 80% of the residents are originally from Somaliland before the wars, 9% from Southern Somalia, and 8% are non-Somali Ethiopians. 3% are Somali Ethiopians.

- Daami area contains most of the Southern Somalis, and Daami and Sheikh Nur share the non-Somali Ethiopian population. The settlement areas are in general ethnically organized, and minority ethnicities tend to group together within the areas.

-One half of those families from Southern Somalia consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs. Overall, 1 in 7 families living in the returnee settlements considers itself to be an immigrant household.

- 80% of those living in the areas plan to remain there, insh'allah.

- Of those families who consider themselves returned refugees and who returned after 1997, 51% reported receiving assistance from UNHCR." (Clark, June 2002. p.6-7)

"In summary, most of those originally from Somaliland consider themselves returned refugees, while those considering themselves immigrants are split between Southern Somalis and Ethiopians, both Somali and non-Somali. Southern Somalis often consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs. Virtually all the non-Somali Ethiopians consider themselves immigrants." (Clark, June 2002, p.28)

***Daami:***

"The population of Daami encompasses Southern Somali IDPs and immigrants, Ethiopian immigrants, and minority clans, all in relatively large proportions. The Southern Somali IDPs and immigrants are primarily from Baidoa, Wajid, Beletweine, and Mogudishu, and settled in Daami in 1994 after fleeing the conflict in the South. This population is mostly of the [xxx] subclan; most had their possessions in the south looted or stolen before moving north (Medani, 2000). [...] The [other ] Somalis living in the area [...] consider themselves returned refugees, while the Southern Somalis split between considering themselves immigrants and IDPs\*.

[...]

This assessment estimates the population living in Daami neighborhood at 1,700 families, or roughly 10,000 people, making it the second largest returnee settlement area in this survey." (Clark, June 2002, p.21-2)

"In all areas, a majority of households say they are originally from Somaliland; this number is lowest in Daami, with a high percentage of families from Southern Somalia (35%) and non- Somali Ethiopian households (14%)." (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"In Daami, all those from Ethiopia considered themselves immigrants, while 24 of the 35 families from Southern Somalia considered themselves not IDPs but immigrants." (Clark, June 2002 p.28)

***Stadium:***

"Stadium is the most central of the eight returnee settlement areas in this assessment, located on the south bank of the river next to the old Hargeisa football stadium. The land belongs to the government, which insists that the settlement there will not be a permanent one and is currently engaged in a strategy to relocate the population to permanent sites.

[...]

About 1/5 of residents consider themselves IDPs even though they are primarily Somalis originally from Somaliland or Ethiopia.

Stadium is geographically quite small (approximately 17 hectares), but is very densely populated. This assessment estimates the population at about 750 households with 5,000 people." (Clark, June 2002, p.23)

"The residents in Stadium stand out because more than 1/5 of respondents originally from Somaliland consider themselves IDPs." (Clark, June 2002 p.28)

***\*Note that on request of the government, names of clans have been removed.***

# PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

## General

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### **IDPs tend to flee northwards where some degree of peace and stability subsist (2002)**

- Security is better in Somaliland, Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle
- Somaliland hosts the highest number of IDPs
- Urban-rural patterns of displacement as IDPs fled to their 'clan-areas' considerably expanded smaller regional towns during the 1990s
- This trend was further exacerbated by the lack of decentralisation of humanitarian assistance

"At the same time, this reporting period has seen modest improvements in the security situation in some regions including "Somaliland", Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle. Cooperation of local authorities in these regions towards maintaining peace and stability has resulted in the increased ability of humanitarian agencies to expand programmes. The Northwest/"Somaliland" hosts the highest number of IDPs who tend to flee northwards to escape drought, poverty and conflict. It also hosts the largest number of refugee returnees. It is imperative that humanitarian and development work continue as "peace dividends" in these more peaceful parts of Somalia." (UN, May 2002, p.2)

"For a time during the war this process was reverse as people fled the main towns and moved to areas that their clans came from. Consequently, the populations of previously small regional towns such as Beletweyne, Galkaiyo, Qardo or Baidoa, and rural villages such as Jeriban, rose dramatically. The population of Bosasso is estimated to have increased from 10,000 to 60,000 since 1991, as people fled fighting in Mogadishu, the Lower Juba and the interriverine areas. [...]Smaller towns are experiencing similar trends, which present a challenge for urban planning. The concentration of aid agencies in urban centers such as Hargeisa, and a lack of clear policies by the administrations on investment in rural areas, exacerbate this trend." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.58)

### **People tend to take refuge in main towns (2002)**

- Causes of IDP movement intermingle with transhumance and war
- Since 1999 displacements have been temporary caused by intermittent insecurity mostly in Mogadishu, Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba, Lower and Middle Shabelle regions Lack of monitoring mechanisms and insecurity normal and abnormal movements are difficult to distinguish
- Today 60% Somalis are nomadic compared to estimates as high as 80% in pre-war Somalia due to loss of livestock
- Even prior to conflict, people traveled great distances in search of food, pasture and water
- Over last years, there has been continuous movement of people from rural to urban centers

"The regions [Juba Valley] contain a patchwork of different clans, sub-clans and minority groups. Population figures of the regions are difficult to estimate. A pre-war census established 500,000 inhabitants as the baseline. However, the area's history of large-scale displaced movement and seasonal migration patterns and recent urbanization, have rendered that figure uncertain at best.

[...]

However, the civil war prompted the latest and probably the largest migration in Juba Valley area's history. Hundreds of thousands of Darods fled clan violence in Mogadishu by moving south. The IDPs primarily fled into Kismayo, but also into other areas of the west bank of the river and settled in the urban centers. Most of these urban Darods had never lived anywhere but Mogadishu, but the historic concentrations of Darod clans in the areas was seen as providing a safe haven." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p.25)

"About 60% of Somali population live in nomadic lifestyle. Movements of people in search of food, water and pasture in times of stress as part of the normal livelihood and living conditions of nomadic population. Furthermore, considerable movement from the rural areas into the urban centers took place since mid 1980s. In this normal movement, the majority of the populations are young moving to urban centers in search of economic opportunities and assistance. They normally return to their areas for cultivation or when the situation in their areas improves. Also in Bay and Bakool regions seasonal movement is the major pattern of livelihood where most of the male rural farmers leave their areas after the harvest to the urban centers searching for labour opportunities and other sources of income. However, the trend of population movement has changed from normal/voluntary movement to abnormal since the collapse of the central government in 1991 and the spread of violent conflicts across the country.

Since 1999 no major population movements have taken place in Somalia, that said, small and temporary incidents of displacement have occurred due to intermittent insecurity in Mogadishu, Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba, Lower and Middle Shabelle regions. Due to the effect of the armed conflict coupled with lack of systematic monitoring procedures of population movements, it has become difficult to distinguish normal from abnormal movements and to identify IDPs. This is attributed to the fact there is no agency with wide field coverage mandated to identify IDPs and assess their status." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.1 )

"Another key factor is the declining numbers of transhumant pastoralists who form the majority – 60 per cent – of the Somalia population. This percentage was estimated higher in pre-civil war Somalia even in the wake of the numbers of people who moved from rural to urban areas. This movement is part of the global phenomenon, "*urban drift*" or "*urbanization*", which illustrates *pastoral dropout* as the movement of young people search of economic opportunities and improved living conditions. In comparison, transhumant movement of people and household assets is related to the seasonal search for food, water and pastures as a normal way of living in arid and semi-arid environments." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p V)

"Quantifying displacement is extremely difficult in Somalia given the prevalence of nomadic and semi-nomadic social structures. Even prior to the collapse of the central state, populations travelled great distances in search of food, pasture and water during times of stress. The protracted nature of displacement offers its own analytical challenges, particularly given the recurrence of multiple 'waves' and directions of displacement.

Displacement trends are also changing. With the decreasing volume and regularity of food relief distributions, 'food camps' no longer exist. Households now move from drought- and conflict-stricken areas toward riverine and urban areas, returning when situations improve. Populations communicate over long distances to ascertain better knowledge of localised conditions before deciding on their direction of movement. Many long-term IDPs have dispersed in large towns. They are destitute populations living in shanty camps and abandoned buildings in peripheral urban areas." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"The Somalis are largely nomadic, roaming throughout the Horn of Africa. They live in small, temporary hamlets that are dismantled and loaded on to camels for quick and easy migration. Because of this nomadic way of life, social units tend to be small and self-sufficient...

Roughly 80% of the Somali population is 'pastoral nomadic' and only 20% can be described as urban agricultural. ." (Jama 13 December 2000 in Humanitarian Affairs Review, Nomadic culture)

"More than two-thirds of Somalia's populace are nomadic or semi-nomadic. During the dry season the nomads concentrate in villages near water sources; when the rains begin they disperse with their herds. Traditionally, nomadism is the most desirable life-style. Somalis constitute the vast majority of the population. Cultural divisions between pastoral nomads (the *Samaal*) and sedentary cultivators and herdsmen (the *Saab*) have been weakened by large migrations from the countryside into towns, but most Somalis maintain a strong loyalty to one of many clans and sub-clans." (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, 1993, p. 4)

### **Families moving early to water and grazing sites as result of failed rains (July-September 2001)**

- Various indications that pastoral families have moved their animals to better grazing areas earlier than usually
- Nearly one million people affected by drought in 2001
- Many families moving in search of employment and better grazing pastures

"An inter-agency co-ordination meeting in Baidoa discussed the drought situation in the zone resulting from poor Gu rains and its effect on vulnerable communities in Bay and Bakool regions. Reports from partners in these areas indicate estimates of 50-90 per cent population migration from villages seriously affected by the drought into larger towns within the district in search of water and food. Farming communities are worst affected because of successive crop failure." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"The dry weather has also seriously affected the grazing and fodder conditions for livestock. Many families have already begun to take their animals elsewhere in search of better grazing while others have left the area seeking alternative means of survival. Migration is normal in this region, but this year it has started far too early." (WFP 22 August 2001)

"Nearly a million Somalis are affected by drought in large areas of their country, a minister in the new transitional government said on Sunday [15 July 2001].

[...]

Thousands of rural families had been forced to move from their homes in search of food and water, he said." (Reuters 15 July 2001)

"There are also some indications of the beginnings of population movement...That is a standard coping mechanism. When people see the rains have failed and they are not going to have much of a harvest, and they have livestock to feed, they try to move to areas where they can graze their animals or get employment. And they move considerable distances. Water is another trigger, and the water supplies throughout the south are very low indeed.

It's mainly the pastoral population who are taking their animals for better grazing, as well as people simply looking for employment. " (IRIN-CEA 9 July 2001)

### **Somali families move and split up in order to reach resources (1999-2000)**

- Families in 'Puntland' sometimes split up so that at least some benefit from refugee assistance
- More than two-third of Somalis are nomadic or semi-nomadic
- Somalis have repeatedly moved to Mogadishu seeking relatives and opportunities

"The independent expert in her report to the Commission in 1998 (E/CN.4/1998/96) reported about the situation of the internally displaced. She said that Bosasso hosted tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, who constituted about one third of the city's population. She reported that many internally displaced preferred that part of their family became refugees by crossing the Gulf of Aden by boat to Yemen in order to be eligible for refugee status and to be assisted by UNHCR, or that they continued to Saudi Arabia." (CHR, 26 January 2000, p. 32)

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

# PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

## Physical security

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### Internally displaced women and girls lack protection (2003)

- IDP families who lack clan protection are often victim of crime and discrimination upon access to humanitarian assistance
- Displaced women head of households are often subject to sexual violence, abduction forced marriage, human trafficking and prostitution
- Displaced women suffer both ethnic and gender discriminations
- Rape and sexual abuse are common in internally displaced persons camps and women are often raped and abducted while collecting firewood
- Rape of IDP women within their community is often triggered by the lack of income men have to pay for dowry
- Women raped often suffer from social exclusion in addition to psychological traumas

“Approximately 350,000 IDPs live away from their homes throughout the country, with the highest concentration of 150,000 in Mogadishu. Some are nearly as established as their urban poor neighbours and benefit from clan support and protection. But for many, their income received from irregular, cheap casual labour barely covers their food needs and, isolated from their own relatives, they often face difficulties accessing clan support systems and receiving remittances. Moreover, they lack full protection and can be subjected to an array of human rights violations, particularly in Mogadishu where IDPs, predominantly women and children, are robbed of any commercial assets, including aid; forced into prostitution; trafficked as brides; and forcibly recruited by militia leaders. The prevalence of the sexual abuse of women and children, if not addressed, will remain a major area of concern. While UN agencies and NGOs have provided limited assistance to IDP communities, insecurity in areas such as Mogadishu and the Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Gedo regions has regularly hindered their efforts. As a result, aid agencies are exploring new ways to work effectively through local partners.” (UN, November 2002, p.17)

« Rape is a security threat to every woman in the district. IDPs women are the most vulnerable of all. Reports indicated that those who venture out of the villages to collect firewood are at high risk. In May 2001, two IDPs girls were reported to have been gang raped in the bush while they collect firewood for their survival. Apart from physical injuries and personal trauma, rape victims suffer social stigma within their communities. Rape in the Somali tradition is considered as shame. Any girl who is raped is considered as unclean, and suffers abuses and social exclusion from their own communities.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.34)

“Cases of women raped by men from their own Rahaweyn community have been reported. This has been attributed to the social and economic problems facing the IDPs. IDP men have no resources and good income to pay dowry as a fee for marriage. This was not a problem in Somalia before the civil war. The extended family or relatives were supporting young men in raising the dowry. However, now in a situation of displacement, it is difficult for an IDP man to do so. As a result, rape, elopement and the abduction became the alternative solution for young IDP men. Another type of gender violence that comes from the community is forced marriage. Women with no husband are usually vulnerable to discrimination and humiliation by men. To protect them, families force their girls to marry one from their relatives. This has also created other serious problems such as continued domestic violence.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.55)

“Rape against women and teenage girls are common and widespread in the IDP camps. It is used as a military strategy to terrorize and demoralize the enemy. The Galgala IDPs reported that gunmen raped most of their women and girls. One of the Galgala elders in Nuh Mohamud camp in Kismayo reported that gunmen raped about 20 Galgala women within two months in the year 2000. The elders also reported that an 18 years old girl was abducted while she was in the bush to collect firewood. The girl was later freed after she was used as a sexual slave for three months.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.26)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making and access to resources. Violence against women and girls, resulting either from tradition or the civil war, includes the almost universal practice of female genital mutilation and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups." (UNICEF 2000, paras. 7 and 8)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in Somali society, where the rights of women in both the private and public spheres are seriously undermined. Rape, which was uncommon in Somalia before the war, has become a weapon of war for the militia and bandits, as well as in camps for displaced persons and returnees. Women belonging to minority groups, such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn, are particularly subject to these crimes." (CHR 18 February 1999, para. 74)

### **Displaced children lack protection (2003)**

- Displaced children of single-headed families often contribute to household survival therefore miss school and are denied from other child rights
- Displaced children often from southern minority groups are forced to seek volatile protection joining urban gangs
- Most of IDPs children work and as a consequence miss school and loose their community network
- IDPs children are economically exploited and have jobs hazardous to their health
- Children displaced from minority groups such as Bantus and Ogadenis particularly suffer from deprivation and abuse
- IDP children are often sexually abused
- IDP children in single-headed families often end up on the streets and increase in the use of alcohol and hashish has been reported
- Displaced children who live on the streets and in orphanages often end up forcibly recruited by militias

“The long duration of the Somalia conflict has increased the vulnerability of internally displaced and abandoned children, minorities and women. The latter have been particularly affected by gender-based violence and the fact that many women are often heads of households or otherwise find themselves as the main breadwinner of the family. As a result, children have to take on household chores and other support functions, which contributes to low school enrolment rates for girls and denies them the enjoyment of crucial child rights. Food insecurity has also increased their workload and early marriages abound as well. Weak political and economic infrastructures have limited their access to power and resources, while limited respect for good governance and the rule of law – especially in the southern and central regions of Somalia -- have created a culture of impunity in which human rights violations go unpunished. In the absence of functioning judicial systems, victims are unable to hold governing authorities accountable.” (UN, November 2002, p.16)

“These children are very vulnerable and support themselves by begging on the streets, in which case they are always involved in car accidents; they are run-over and mostly die from their injuries. As one child explained *“we are unable to complain or report accidents because we fear retaliation”*. Another child explained, *“The only way we can survive is by joining gangs for protection”*. Gang rivalry is another problem, which is challenging the survival of the Bantu children. Fights are very dangerous and sometimes lead to the death of the youngest and weakest child.” (Ibrahim F. 15 August 2002, p.5)

“To supplement household income, parents allow their children to be part of the household income, and work from an early age of 13 or less. Indeed, the parents do not consider their children’s involvement in the household income as a threat to their children’s social and physical well being, but they consider it as a task, which has an economic importance for the household. Most of the IDPs children workers have already lost their community network, and suffer dramatic effect on their health and future. Children undertake marginal jobs such as carrying goods, delivering water, and farming in return of marginal wages or some food. It appears that the IDPs children will continue to suffer from economic exploitation and from work that is hazardous to their health, and to their future, until solution is found for the Somali crises.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.38)

"All children in Somalia can be considered as being in 'especially difficult circumstances' but, there are subgroups who have special social problems and needs – and have a right to – special care, protection and, in some cases, social reintegration over and above the basic survival and development needs of children in general.

There are tens of thousands of displaced children, youth and women living in camp conditions in extreme poverty; many thousands of children living on the streets; hundreds of children live in orphanages; large numbers of physically and mentally disabled and handicapped children; and, unknown numbers of children attached to militia groups.

While many benefit from some forms of support from the traditional clan assistance mechanisms, some, mostly minority groups such as Bantus and Ogadenis, who are generally marginalised by the Somali society, are particularly vulnerable, and often suffer from deprivation and abuse." (UN March 2001, p. 76)

"Human rights defenders reported to the independent expert that there are many cases of sexual abuse of women and children, particularly among the internally displaced population. The situation with regard to internal displacement is making the number of street children rise. Although most of these children are 'Somalilanders', there are also other groups, including Ethiopians. An increase in the use of alcohol and hashish among children has also been cited." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 26)

### **Displaced people from minority groups seriously lack protection (2002)**

- IDP camp of 400 families was burnt down in Bosasso in September 2002
- Southern IDPs in the north considered as ‘criminals’
- IDPs from minority groups (Bantu, Ogadenis and Rahanweyn) lack political representation therefore are denied basic rights including access to humanitarian assistance marginalized, discriminated and often the targets of attacks
- Most of the IDPs who fled to the north come from minority subclans such as Rahaween, Bantu, Ajuran, Jarso, Madhiban and Ashraf.
- In the North they lack protection and political representation
- Persecutions against Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities forced them to flee
- Minorities are subject to human rights abuses, exploitation, displacement and land dispossession by militias and bandits

- IDPs like the Galgala were prevented from buying animals and houses
- Lack of competent central authority hampers implementation of international protection instruments like the Guiding Principles on Internal displacement

“An IDP camp on the outskirts of Bossaso with about 400 families was totally destroyed by fire at the beginning of September. Humanitarian organisations have expressed their concern at the lack of permanent settlement for IDPs in the Puntland. IDPs themselves have cited insecurity of land tenure as one of their major problems.” (ACC/SCN 39, 31 October 2002p.15)

“Links were also made to the minority status of many IDPs, who were reported to be driven from their lands and disproportionately victimized by dominant groups following the outbreak of civil war in 1991. It is further noted that refugees benefit from significantly more protection than IDPs insofar as refugees fall under the authority of UNHCR, and some authorities, such as in “Somaliland”, recognize the rights of returnees. Other international instruments of protection are rendered ineffective, given the predominance of faction leaders and weak administrations.

[...]

It was especially noted that IDPs were viewed as criminals and a burden to society, which created tensions in the community and significant discrimination against them.” (UNCHR, 31 December 2002,p.15;19)

“Personal security of IDPs, as members of minority groups, remain at stake because most of them continue to suffer discrimination and denial of basic rights by local authorities and some of the local communities. Women suffer most because of both gender and ethnic discrimination, therefore, they have very limited access to resources. Moreover, women in the IDP camps suffered some cases of rape, abduction and forced marriage. A woman who is subjected to rape face entrenched social attitude and tradition that hamper their family relation in the long run.

[...]

IDPs in the north are originally from the sub clans from the south such as Rahaween, Bantu, Ajuran, Jarso, Madhiban and Ashraf. They lack the political power and protection of the dominant sub clans of the north and they are vulnerable to personal insecurity, access to income generating opportunities and political representation. Application of the Guiding Principles in such a complex situation in an absence of reliable governance system has not been tried. All these situations pose unique problems for research and analysis.

Also the report reflects the importance of clan and sub clan affiliations which are determinant in understanding the plight of IDPs across the Somali regions. It appears there is a direct correlation between minorities and displacement in Somalia. Most of those who are dispossessed and displaced whether in the north or the south are from minority groups e.g. Bantu. This social structure also influences effective and targeted delivery of humanitarian assistance to IDPs and minorities.

[...]

For the protection of IDPs, there are international instruments and particularly the UN Guiding Principles, which specifically and comprehensively address the rights of IDPs. However, in Somalia, a collapsed state, with no competent central government, the key problem is implementation and enforcement of the international instruments and principles. The country is divided into armed fiefdoms ruled by clan militia that do not respect or adhere to the rule of law.

UN agencies and NGOs representing the main humanitarian actors, they have limited influence on clan militia and their leaders to respect the protection instruments. However, it yet appears that constructive engagement in collaboration with the civil society in the form of non-governmental organizations, as they can contribute invaluable experiences, local knowledge and insights, is only way forward to propomting local protection mechansims.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp1;6)

“The security of each Somali individual or clan is mainly influenced by the position of the individual person or clan in the Somali’s social structure. Those who have no clan lineage and particularly the

minority groups are the most vulnerable ones. Because of their position as minorities, the IDPs from the Bantu and Galgala suffer a wide range of human rights violations which include discrimination and economic exploitation by the Habrgedir and Marehan Militia who are now in control of the city. On the ground that they are affiliated with the Majerten, the Galgala suffered more than even the Bantu IDPs because they are considered as part of the enemy. As a consequence many Galagala were summarily executed during the conflicts between the Majerten and Habargedir, and between Majerten and Marehan in Kismayo. Because of fear of persecution, many Galagala IDPs fled Kismayo to Kenya, while others remained as IDPs.

[...]

The Bantu IDP, being ethnically different from the rest, suffer discrimination and exclusion from all social and economic activities in the city. Some Bantu elders in the camps claimed that they were denied even access to relief food. They claim that during General Morgan's period, before aid agencies ceased their humanitarian operation in Kismayo, relief food intended for them was diverted to other communities in Kismayo or elsewhere or to the markets for sale. They also claim that they are denied access to profitable work such carpentry, driving etc.

Since they are also less dominant in Kismaio town, the Ajuran, Ormala, Tuni and Werdai are also treated as the Bantu and Galgala IDPs. They are discriminated, marginalized and persecuted. In April 2001, a young Werdaï IDP boy selling second hand cloths was stabbed to death by a Marehan man in a robber attack at the market. No any form of legal action against this has been taken by either the Marehan elders or local authorities.

[...]

Over 99% of the Bantu live in absolute poverty and have no access to their basic needs. Periodic attacks and robbery of food has further deteriorated the situation of Bantu and their IDPs.

[...]

The Galgala IDPs complain that their traditional symbol on their animals for identification was erased by the Abgal, with an intention to appropriate the Galgala livestock. The Galgala IDPs also suffer discrimination. They allegedly claim that some members of the IDP community were denied to buy animals and houses in Adale. They were also denied integration into the main population." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.25-6;39; 47)

"Non-discrimination is a fundamental principle embodied in the first paragraph of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Although Somali society appears to be homogeneous, there are several minority groups in the country. These minorities have been the main victims of the famine and the civil war. The Bantu minority lives along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle rivers, which constitute the life lines of Somalia. The Rahanweyn minority lives between these two rivers, in Bay and Bakool. While the Bantus are largely unarmed, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army is armed to some extent, although insignificantly compared to the other groups. Other minorities live in the coastal areas.

The Bantus, who are thought to descend from slaves brought to Somalia from other east African countries in the eleventh century, are considered a low-status ethnic group. They frequently suffer discriminatory practices and violence. For instance, the Bantus in the Hiran region require permission to go to Belet Weyne, the main town of the region. They have their own market and they are not allowed to mix with the rest of the population. They are brought into town for hard labour. They have less access to education and fewer economic opportunities than other Somalis. Their villages have been burnt, and Bantu women have been raped. During the civil war, the Bantu population has been systematically pushed off their land towards the river by militias or bandits. They are now so close to the river that they face a real risk of their settlements being washed away during floods.

[...]

The Rahanweyn minority lives on fertile agricultural land and is more advanced in agriculture. It too has been subjected to dispossession and displacement." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 77-80)

"In Somaliland and Puntland, there are problems of discrimination against minorities and internally displaced persons. (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 5)

## **IDPs in absence of functioning state are first victims of human rights abuses (2002)**

- Civilian people continue to be deliberate targets of attacks as militias in Somalia do not recognize any rule of law be international or customary
- Widespread abuses by armed militias and clan-based factions particularly in Mogadishu during May, July and October 2001
- Islamic courts do not meet standards of fair trial and judicial competence Freedom of expression limited with peaceful demonstrator shot dead and political opponent imprisoned
- Women children and minorities are primary victims

“Although there are international instruments and UN guidelines for the protection of IDPs and civilians in conflict, in most parts of Somalia the implementation and enforcement of international laws and principles is weak as the conditions of a collapsed state prevail. These conditions also mean that IDPs are often not afforded protection by authorities in the absence of a functioning legal system in many areas. Thus, IDPs in Somalia are especially vulnerable as a result of their ambiguous status with the various *de facto* authorities across most of the country.” (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p3)

“Though the IDPs are not combatants, they are treated as enemies during conflicts. In Somalia clan militia do not fight decent wars. Because reasons for fighting as understood by many may not be only political, but span a broad spectrum from competition for economic and natural resources to attempted genocide or even unrestrained lawlessness. The warring militia are not prepared to acknowledge any existing rule be a traditional or an international one. For example article 3 of the 1948 Geneva Convention; article 38 of the CRC, and the Birimageydo customary law all protect non-combatants. However, they are less applicable in today’s conflicts in Somalia. To the clan militia, it is not relevant, whether the people they harm are IDPs or not. Since they belong to the same groups as the enemy, they are seen to have no rights to exist.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.36-7)

"Fighting between rival clans and factions continued throughout 2001. Hundreds of civilians were killed in outbreaks during which indiscriminate force was used. Incidents took place mainly in the Mogadishu area and in the south and reportedly also involved Ethiopian troops supporting the Rahanwein Resistance Army. Scores of civilians were indiscriminately killed during fighting between rival clans and factions in May and July in Mogadishu. In October, 30 people were killed in Mogadishu in fighting between government forces and militia linked to political factions. There were killings and reprisal killings of clan opponents, expulsions of members of other clans, cases of kidnapping as well as detention, and torture or ill-treatment of prisoners. Women and minorities were particularly vulnerable to abuses. None of the factions respected the principles of international humanitarian law which regulate the conduct of armed conflict and protect civilians.

In November, 18 students were reportedly shot dead by armed factions at their school near Buulo Barde in Hiran region.

In March gunmen in Mogadishu abducted four UN staff members and three from the non-governmental organization *Médecins sans frontières*. All were released unharmed several days later.

### **Rule of law**

A process to gradually bring Islamic courts, established by faction leaders, into the national judicial system began in Mogadishu. However, there was concern that they did not meet recognized standards of fair trial and judicial competence. Several death sentences were imposed by such courts, which were reportedly immediately carried out. Concern continued that judicial administrations and police forces in Somaliland and Puntland displayed inconsistent respect for legal rights. Reports persisted by human rights defenders in

Somaliland of arbitrary detentions, unfair trials, poor prison conditions and cases of torture and unlawful killing by police.

### **Freedom of expression**

Freedom of expression was very limited in all areas of the country, with little tolerance by government authorities or armed factions of criticism by individuals or the media. Scores of journalists and others were arrested and detained without charge for days or weeks. Many were prisoners of conscience. Human rights groups continued to urge the government and factions to respect human rights.

In February, Safiyo Abdi Haji Garweyne, an 18-year-old woman, was killed and others injured when police reportedly opened fire on a crowd protesting at the arrest of a number of people following a peaceful demonstration in Bosasso, Puntland.

Suleiman Mohamed Gaal, a former Somaliland presidential candidate, was arrested in May in Hargeisa, Somaliland, and held for two weeks. He was accused of supporting the TNG. He remained on bail without charge at the end of 2001." (AI, January 2002)

### **Most Somalis ensure personal security by residing in clan "home areas" (November 2000)**

- Rule of law, guarantees of personal security and protection from human rights abuses vary from location to location
- Much of Somali countryside - especially Somaliland, Puntland and pockets of southern Somalia - are considered safe
- Politically weak groups such as the Bantu and Bajuni are least able to secure protection from extortion, rape and other abuses

"Notwithstanding the general perception of Somalia as 'anarchic', basic law and order is in fact the norm in most locations. Though hard data is not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the Somali countryside – especially Somaliland, Puntland, and pockets of southern Somalia – is safer for local residents than is the case in neighbouring countries. There are, to be sure, shifting zones of very dangerous banditry and criminality in places like Jowhar, the lower Jubba valley, and parts of Mogadishu. It is also true that both Somali nationals and foreigners associated with an international organization or a profitable business are frequent targets of kidnapping for ransom, especially in Mogadishu. But it is important not to confuse the security problems of international aid agencies with security problems for average residents.

Public order, rule of law, and personal security throughout the country continue to be based on a combination of traditional mechanisms: kinship protection, or mutual obligations within blood-payment groups (*diya*); clan-based customary law (*xeer*) and mediation structures provided by elders or respected sheikhs; and protection of weaker social groups via the practice of *shedad*, or adoption into a stronger clan. [...]

In practice, rule of law, guarantees of personal security, and protection of human rights in Somalia vary from location to location and according to the social standing of the individual. Most Somalis ensure their personal security by residing in the 'home areas' of their clan, where they are assured full status and protection by their kin group. Ironically, for many Somali urbanites, this arrangement can lead to a situation in which they are simultaneously 'at home' in their clan's territory, but 'internally displaced', in that they are forced to live in areas far from their actual homes in the capital city. Somalis are increasingly able to both visit and live in cities outside their clan's traditional domain, but typically as a guest of more dominant clans, an arrangement which requires time and sometimes protection money to ensure. Politically weak social groups, such as the Bantu and Bajuni, are least able to secure protection from extortion, rape,

and other abuses by criminal elements of more powerful clans; they remain somewhat vulnerable no matter where they reside." (Menkhaus November 2000, p. 9)

## **Freedom of movement**

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### **IDPs freedom of movement hampered by militia roadblocks and extortion (2002)**

- In southern Somalia, IDPs and local residents are charged fees to pass militia roadblocks
- Roadblocks particularly threaten IDP's safety as their status of deprivation makes them less able to pay taxes unlawfully levied
- IDPs are also charged at water points to collect water from the river

"The personal security of IDPs in Qoryoley is at stake and it is affected by the security condition of the district, which the UN and other aid agencies have described as poor. The IDPs found themselves in situations where violence against the civilian population by armed men is pervasive and rampant. According to the IDPs, killings, rape, and extortion are some of the major security threats in the district and they are rampant in the villages of Gayawarow, Ayarto, Abdi Ali, and Afgoye Yare. The Habargedir militia set up roadblocks in these villages to charge local residents and also IDPs Sh.sh 500 every time they pass through the roadblocks. Similarly at water points, So.sh 500 are charged every body who wants to draw water from the River. Farmers are charged between So.sh 100,000- 500,000 for cultivating and irrigating their farms. The IDPs are the most vulnerable of all. Because they are poor, they can not afford to pay for extortion. As a consequence sometimes they are denied access to water or pass through the roadblocks. This affects not only their economic livelihoods, but also their freedom of movements and their rights to survive." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.34)

# SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

## General

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### Somalia ranks among the five least developed countries 2003

- 60% lived below the poverty line in 1990
- Only 17% of adult population is literate
- Only 14% children attend primary school
- 49% of Somali population has no access to sanitation services
- 77% of Somali population has no access to safe water sources
- 224 out of 1000 life births die before the age of five

“As a result, localised armed conflict and insecurity caused by inter- and intra-factional clan and political conflicts continue to be the main impediments to peace, reconciliation and sustainable recovery in Somalia, which after more than ten years of disorder, is characterised by some of the lowest human development indicators in the world. The country is ranked among the five least developed countries on earth by UNDP’s *2001 Human Development Report for Somalia*. In 1990, it was estimated that 60% of the population were living below the poverty line. With the deterioration of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it is most likely that the proportion of the population living in poverty remains at least as high as twelve years ago, if not higher. According to 2001 statistics, only 17% of the adult population are literate and only 14% of school-aged children attend primary school. It is estimated that some 49% of the population live without access to sanitation and 77% without access to safe water.[...] Out of every 1,000 infants born 224 die before they reach the age of five.[...] Human development indicators, while dismally low, have remained steady for the past several years, indicating the positive effect of humanitarian and development assistance in Somalia in keeping the situation stable.” (UN, November 2002, p.14)

## Food

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### Forced displacements and war cause recurrent hunger in Somalia (June 2003)

- Cereal production increased 80% in Somalia by March 2003
- Agriculture benefited two good rainy seasons except in the North-west and in the South due to violent conflicts
- Food vulnerable regions mainly due to insecurity are in the north Sool, Sanag and Bari, in the center Mudug and Galgadud and in the south Baidoa, Burhakaba, Buale, Julib, Luuq and Garbarharey regions
- In Gedo insecurity prevented IDPs to benefit from good rains and no food distribution has taken place since October 2002
- All sedentary villages in southwest Buale were burnt down, crops and tools looted and farmers fled

- IDPs in Buaale have no access to food due to high taxes levied by militias on imported food, loss of assets and limited presence of humanitarian agencies

“Overall cereal production reached a post-war high in March 2003, with an average 80% increase nationwide. This is attributed to two good rainy seasons, the Gu in 2002 and the recent Deyr, which have especially benefited rain-fed agriculture in the south of the country, but also improved, in most areas, conditions for livestock. This has generally reduced acute food security problems, with some exceptions in the north-west where this year’s Gu rains appear delayed and in areas in the south where conflict and the lack of access is affecting the ability of some farmers to harvest their crops. Areas of continuing vulnerability can be found in the northern Sool, Sanag and Bari regions, where successive dry seasons have created water and pasture shortages; the central Mudug and Galgadud regions, where limited rains and market access, combined with insecurity, have adversely affected livelihoods; and in the southern areas surrounding Baidoa and Burhakaba towns in Bay region, Buale and Jilib towns in the Lower and Middle Juba regions and Luuq and Garbarharey towns in Gedo region. In these areas, insecurity remains the primary obstacle to good harvest production. In Gedo, although the two most recent rains have been good, the effects of drought and insecurity have slowed recovery, especially for the poorest who remain vulnerable from three years of drought.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.2-3)

***Gedo:***

« Despite the good Deyr production, some groups remain highly vulnerable: the poor of the different food economy groups, the IDPs, the lowermiddle of the riverine areas and the middle of the agro-pastoralist group. In addition, insecurity still disturbs provision of humanitarian aid. No food distribution has been carried out in the area since October 2002.” (ACC/SCN 41, 30 April 2003, p.6)

***Buaale and Hagar:***

“Armed clan conflict that started in a form of revenge killings in the inland pastoral areas north of Hagar during November 2002 spilled over into a large area in Buaale and Hagar districts (see affected areas on the map). In the course of the fighting, many houses were burned particularly in Bulo Galool, Banta, Tatey, Kafinge, Qardhale and Anole - all sedentary farming villages along the Juba River - southwest of Buaale. Vulnerability assessment and baseline work recently carried out by FEWS NET and FSAU in March 2003 suggests that 15-25 percent of the houses in Buaale town were burned down. Moreover, properties and food stocks were looted. Houses, business, standing crops and underground granaries (*bakaar*) were destroyed or looted and civilian populations displaced. Because of insecurity extending more than five months now, people from Buaale town and surrounding villages migrated to Hagar, Afmadow, Salagle, Sakow and Jilib towns as IDPs far from their normal sources of food and income.

[...]

The short-term food security implication is that poor households and IDP groups will not have access to their normal income from seasonal land preparation wage labor. Due to the limited presence of aid agencies in the area, there have been no significant humanitarian interventions up till now. The IDPs put an additional burden on the resource-poor community hosting them. Food shortages and poor health and water access are worsening the situation. Imported food prices remain high due to the high exchange rate between the US dollar and Somali Shilling and high transport costs between Mogadishu and Hagar, inflated by many 'toll-collecting' militia checkpoints. Apart from Buaale town and Hagar, staple foods are generally available in the markets. But for poor displaced households without sufficient income that find themselves priced out of the markets, food accessibility is becoming a critical issue. Access to paid employment is also limited due to surplus labor in areas where households fled, especially Salagle and Sakow. Traditional self-employment activities, like the sale of water, fire wood, fodder, local construction materials, as well as fishing opportunities, have been greatly disrupted.” (FEWS, 8 May 2003)

**IDPs three times more at risk of malnutrition than resident populations (2003)**

- MSF findings that malnutrition rates reached 75.6% in some conflict areas in 1991-2 confirms man-made famine theories
- Lack of access to adequate quantity and quality of foods are causes of IDP malnutrition
- IDPs' nutritional status in Hargeisa has not improved since June 2001
- Global acute malnutrition at 15,3% and severe malnutrition 3,8% in Hargeisa IDP settlements
- 13.3% IDP children in Kismayo severely or moderately malnourished (Dec 2002)
- Most IDPs eat only once a day or two if they have access to clan support
- Access to IDP in Mogadishu has made nutrition assessments difficult to conduct
- 39% of IDP children in Mogadishu were malnourished and 7,1% severely malnourished
- Micro-nutrient deficiencies leading to increased mortality and morbidity rates particularly prevalent among under- five IDPs
- Malnutrition rates amongst the internally displaced in rural areas reportedly as high as 40% (2000)

“MSF's findings in 1991 and 1992 of consistently high global malnutrition rates among the war-displaced in Kismayo, Mogadishu, Kansardere and Baidoa - rates reaching highs of 75.6% - supports the thesis that conflict fuels hunger.” (MSF, 9 December 2002)

“The Sahil nutritional survey (see above) confirms **the high vulnerability of IDPs/returnees. They are three times more at risk of malnutrition than the resident population.**” (ACC/SCN 39, 31 October 2002, p.16)

#### ***Hargeisa:***

“Preliminary results of the nutrition survey undertaken in early February in *Hargeisa* indicate a disappointing lack of improvement in malnutrition rates among children under 5 years in the returnee/resettlement/ IDP areas in Hargeisa since the previous survey in June 2001. Global acute malnutrition rates now reach 15.3% (Weight for Height <2 Z-scores or oedema) including 3.8% severe malnutrition (W/H <3 Z-scores or oedema). Assessment of mortality was also undertaken and the rate appears to be high – data is undergoing further analysis. Low income, reduced access to water and essential services along with unsanitary living conditions are some of the factors leading to the continuing high malnutrition rates.” (FSAU, 10 April 2003,p1)

#### ***Kismayo:***

With the urban poor and IDP population purchasing most of their cereal needs, access to adequate quantities is often low. Some wild vegetables are available in the peri-urban and rural areas. Many adults in these households report consuming one meal a day with children generally having two meals. The meals mainly consist of *ugali* [...] mixed with *kable* [...] and *rasoo*[...*green vegetables*] and sometimes beans. Milk is occasionally purchased for children. The better off households in Kismayo have access to a wider variety of foods including meat, rice, beans, pasta, fruits and imported commodities. Many IDPs reside in dilapidated buildings with poor ventilation while others live in simple structures that fail to provide adequate shelter. Poor sanitation is an issue in most of the IDP camps and maintaining basic hygiene is a problem. Few IDP households have the potential for home gardening. Drinking water is sourced from the unprotected wells within town and the chlorination activities are not regular. In Kismayo town, three MCH centres are functioning, supported by Muslim Aid, SRCS and Direct Aid. Private pharmacies are also available. In early 2001, MSF ceased its support to the hospital due to insecurity.

Between 23rd and 24th November FSAU carried out a rapid assessment using measurement of Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) in four IDP camps of Kismayo town. MUAC measurements were taken on all children aged 6-59 months found in the camp at the time of the visit and were taken to the nearest 0.1 cm.

[...]

About 13.3% of the children screened in four IDP camps of Kismayo town could be considered either severely or moderately malnourished.[...] A further 23.2% were categorised as being *at risk* (MUAC between 12.5cm and 13.4cm). The younger children (6-23 months) appeared to be significantly worse off and more likely to be malnourished. Children in the older age groups appeared to be under-represented in the screening and on follow-up of this observation it was suggested that significant numbers of these children accompany their parents while searching for income or independently undertake casual labour activities such as shoe shining, and begging.

The IDP population in Kismayo town remains in a highly vulnerable situation. Access to food of adequate quantity and quality is low. The higher levels of malnutrition among younger children suggest that environment (water, sanitation and child care), in addition to exposure to and inadequate treatment of communicable diseases are equally significant in the overall nutritional outcome for the population. Ultimately, access to adequate income opportunities for these households is crucial." (FSAU Nutrition Update, 31 December 2002)

***Mogadishu:***

"Mogadishu hosts an estimated 230,000 Internally Displaced Persons and since the collapse of the Somalia Government in 1990 and the resultant conflicts, has remained one of the most insecure areas in Somalia. Consequently, access for delivery of humanitarian aid to Mogadishu has been a major challenge both to the local and international community. In general, it has been difficult to collect any qualitative information. Qualitative reports had indicated that the IDPs and the urban poor of Mogadishu were negatively affected following the closure of Barakat money exchange agency. The burning of Bakara market was further blow to Mogadishu residents as many had depended either directly or indirectly on the market.

Between 26th and 29th June 2002, FSAU conducted a rapid assessment using MUAC among all under five children present at the time of survey in five IDP camps in Mogadishu. Out of the 487 children screened, 39% were malnourished (MUAC measurement <12.5cm or oedema) while 7.1% were severely malnourished (a MUAC <11.0cm or oedema). A further 21% were at risk of malnutrition (MUAC 12.5 cm-13.4cm).

The population is reported to have very low purchasing power, as income opportunities are limited. Looting and thefts are also common throughout Mogadishu. People live in fear each day and there are a number of traumatised individuals especially among the poor town residents and IDPs. It is also reported that milk and other protein rich foods are unaffordable to the poor IDP residents. IDPs reside in shanties and abandoned buildings that are crowded and unsanitary. Childcare practices are therefore compromised within the camps while the incidences of common child illnesses like diarrhoea and respiratory infections are very high." (FSAU Nutrition Update, 31 August 2002)

***Causes for IDP poor nutritional status:***

"Except some few IDPs who have got access to clan assistance or profitable jobs are able to eat two meals a day. The rest eat only one meal in twenty-four hours. Under these conditions, children are the most vulnerable of all. Some children in the camps suffer from mild to chronic malnutrition, an effect that can leave serious implication on their health and social performance. " (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.27)

"Micro-nutrient deficiencies, notably Vitamin A, iron and iodine, remain prevalent in Somalia, leading to increased mortality and morbidity among women and children. Non-optimal child-care practices contribute to malnutrition among children-under-five even during normal times. The most vulnerable groups include IDPs, children from female-headed households and recent returnees." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.24)

"In October [2000], the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) rated Somalia as the 'world's hungriest country.' The FAO reported that Somalia lacked one-third of the daily food intake normally needed. UNICEF found that about 40 percent of Somalis were malnourished in rural areas and at sites for internally displaced populations." (USCR 2001, p. 105)

"Malnutrition of children under five years of age is a chronic problem in southern and central Somalia, notably among IDPs and other disadvantaged groups." (UNICEF 12 July 2001, sect. 2)

"Good health is inextricably linked to good nutrition. UNICEF has conducted nutrition surveys in southern and central Somalia finding an average global malnutrition rate of 23%, (average severe malnutrition rates of 5%). Rates vary across regions and among different population groups and can be as high as 40% in areas with high concentrations of displaced families. UNICEF will continue to support targeted feeding in addition to a focus on behavioural changes in caring and feeding practices of children." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper, p. 9)

"UNICEF's recent five nutrition surveys indicate that the average global malnutrition rates stand at 24.4% and the average severe malnutrition rates at 4.2%. The problem is worsened by the fact that around 30% of population are recent returnees and 20% of households are female-headed, making them more vulnerable. In rural areas and amongst IDP populations the malnutrition rate is around 40%." (UNICEF June 2000, sect. 2)

*For regular, detailed information on the situation of nutrition and food security in Somalia, please refer to the UN Somalia webpage at <http://www.unsomalia.org>*

### **Food security critical in 2002**

- 780,000 food-insecure people (12% of total population) due to prolonged drought, floods, conflict, lack of road-access, and the livestock ban increasing commodity prices
- Gedo is the worst hit region in terms of disease outbreaks, natural and man-made calamities, followed by Bari/Sanag, Awdal Bay, Bakool and Hiran regions
- Somalia has one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world at 23% and peaking at 40% in areas where IDPs live
- Sanaag and Sool regions of Somaliland highly food insecure due to drought
- In 2001 an estimated 800,000 people were in need of 70,000 tons of emergency food
- "An estimated 780,000 people (12% of total population) in Somalia currently require food assistance" (SCF-UK, January 2002).

"In spite of the protracted crisis in Somalia, there has been minimal focus on addressing the special needs of the internally displaced persons, approximately 320,000. Most have little hope of returning to their home areas and have clustered in settlements in safer locations and urban centres. UN agencies and NGOs are undertaking limited relief activities to support them, but there remains a dearth of basic amenities and protection assistance.(UN, May 2002, p.12)

" The scenarios for the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 2002 focus on the impact of food insecurity on a projected number of 750,000 people, who are expected to become vulnerable as a result of climatic changes in the Horn of Africa including drought and flooding, conflict, increased commodity prices, the ongoing livestock ban, flooding and lack of road access. These scenarios are likely to remain valid for the rest of the year. They are currently manifested in, among others, ongoing conflict in Gedo region, high rates of malnutrition in the worst hit areas, disease outbreaks and continuing population displacement." (UN, May 2002, p.1)

"This is especially prevalent in Gedo, which is the worst hit region Other affected regions include Bari/Sanag, Awdal Bay, Bakool and Hiran. The downturn in remittances and freezing of accounts of individuals following the closing of the offices of the Al-Barakaat Group has reduced household incomes." (UN, May 2002, p.2)

"Serious food shortages loomed during 2001 because of widespread crop failures caused by poor rainfall and pest infestations. In August, TNG officials pleaded for 60,000 tons of food to assist "Somalis at risk of starving." Somalia's nationwide malnutrition rate of 23 percent was one of the highest in the world, and malnutrition rates as high as 40 percent were recorded in areas with high concentrations of displaced families.

In overcrowded returnee resettlement areas in Hargeisa, the Somaliland capital, 15 percent of repatriated children suffered from malnutrition, many of whom were "likely to die," according to a UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) report. An estimated 800,000 Somalis—more than 10 percent of the population—required some 70,000 tons of emergency food assistance." (USCR, 2002, p.96-97)

"High levels of malnutrition are consistently found among displaced populations and marginalized groups who face discrimination in access to food, health, and water. Nutritionists also stress that the cumulative damage to personal health caused by a decade of war and malnutrition cannot be healed by a single year of improved food security.

[...]

The stabilization of the conflict and the gradual improvement in food production, means that for most people continuing high levels of need arise not from conditions of acute humanitarian crisis, but from long-term structural causes of poverty." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.73)

### **Gedo in state of complex emergency (1999-2002)**

- Escaping third consecutive year of drought herders forced to move out of the region in search of pasture and water leaving behind women, children, elderly and IDPs with very little resources
- 350,000 people in Gedo have lost their means of livelihood and populations are constantly on the move in search of food and protection
- Due to insecurity no animals have returned in Gedo and land lies fallow
- Gedo households were already 50% dependent on food aid for their minimum intake and distributions were suspended for a month due to insecurity
- Lack of access to milk and livestock exacerbated food insecurity due to lack of employment and crop failure
- Despite start of rains in April 2002 no animals have returned in Gedo and land lies fallow due to generalized war, mines and banditry in Gedo
- Considerable rise of malnutrition among IDPs in southern areas of Gedo, Bay and Bakool experiencing severe water shortages and deteriorating livestock conditions
- Understaffing and insecurity threatens supplementary feeding programmers for IDPs
- Considerable disruptions in food production due to conflict and third consecutive year of drought result in alarming malnutrition rates

"Selon Jon Cunliffe, chef de la mission Somalie d'Action contre la Faim, la situation humanitaire actuelle des populations du Gedo empire de jour en jour : " Dans cette région où les populations sont majoritairement agro-pastorales, la période actuelle correspond traditionnellement aux premières plantations de blé de l'année. Pour pallier le manque de nourriture en attendant les récoltes, les terres sont en partie utilisées pour le pâturages des animaux afin d'augmenter la production de lait. Or, aujourd'hui, du fait de l'insécurité, les terres restent en friche et on ne voit plus aucun animal dans la région. Les populations n'ont plus rien, elles se déplacent sans cesse pour fuir les zones d'affrontement et n'ont aucun moyen de se procurer de la nourriture. Si on ne leur apporte pas rapidement aide et protection, les plus

vulnérables -les femmes et les enfants en premier lieu- risquent de mourir de faim, si ce n'est d'épuisement ou du fait des combats ". (ACF, 10 Juin 2002)

"The drought also caused the outright failure of the few crops that were produced in the region. The latest fighting and insecurity has further stressed this critical situation by disrupting trade and exchange, by increasing the IDP caseload, and by preventing people from taking advantage of the modest rains through access to their herds of animals and through some agriculture. ***Prior to the outbreak of conflict, households were dependent on food aid for up to half of their daily needs and as no distributions have taken place within Gedo since the end of March and early April, food intake, especially women and children is below any acceptable minimum.*** The road from Baidoa/Mogadishu has been closed, affecting the price of both local and imported goods which have increased." (FSAU, Food Security, June 2002)

"The ' structural vulnerability' of Gedo region has created an ongoing situation of crisis which has been compounded by three years of successive poor rains and related drought conditions. Structural vulnerability has emerged over the the last three decades a result of a series of socio-political events causing a consistent influx of people and livestock resulting in an overcrowded and politically divided territory and fragmentation of the administration in addition to widespread insecurity. These events, in turn, have led to an increased pressure on degraded rangelands, undermined coping mechanisms, divisions within the community, sub-standard social facilities and an overall crisis in the production and exchange systems. All these elements have contributed to a deterioration in the civil and productive infrastructure and, as a consequence, to chronic depletion of livelihood assets and capacities to cope.

The situation in Gedo is often described as a ' complex emergency'. A ' complex emergency'is a highly destructive situation it radically increases the demands placed on a fragile, political, economic, environmental and social system while simultaneously destroying that very same system. (S. Lautze, 1997)" (FSAU Focus Gedo, February 2002)

"The whole population of Gedo is presently considered by the Food Security Assessment Unit Somalia and FEWS NET as vulnerable to food insecurity. [...] However, the priority areas are mainly located in the northern part of the region : Luuq, Dolo and Belet Hawa districts (northern districts consist of above 200,000 people of which roughly 55% are pastoralists, 20% are rain-fed agro-pastoralists, 15% are urban people and 10% are riverine people). The northern areas of Garbaharey district as well as Burdhubo have also been badly affected.

Prior to the most recent outbreak of insecurity in northern Gedo, (which recommenced in March 2002) several factors had already contributed to a critical food security situation which were sufficiently serious to cause low food intake and consequent malnutrition in parts of the population. (Over 30% global acute malnutrition rates were observed in children under 5)."

Three consecutive dry years, since *Gu* 1999, had seriously undermined crop and livestock production in northern Gedo. This situation worsened in May/June 2001 when herders from northern Gedo were forced to move most of their high-value cattle and camels to neighbouring regions and to Ethiopia to escape pasture and water shortages. Remaining household members were left with no access to their livestock and milk, both key income earners. To exacerbate this situation, the neighbouring Bay and Bakol regions underwent a bad crop failure during the *Gu* 2001 season. (The harvest was down by 90% in Bay in August 2001. Northern Gedo is usually heavily dependent on the sorghum belt's production for purchase and consumption).

The combination of inaccessible livestock production and low levels of rain-fed crop production in northern Gedo, low daily wage rates [...] lack of casual employment, reduced self-employment options (collection of bush products) and gradual decline in kinship support, created 'critical' food insecurity where households had few means of generating income for buying their basic food requirements.

[...]

As in other parts of southern Somalia, above normal *Gu* rains were received in Gedo in April 2002. Pasture conditions improved significantly leading to a revival of the rangeland carrying capacity (good rains combined with a low number of animals inside northern Gedo). Following the high mortality rates that had been recorded during the prolonged dry period, the situation of the few remaining animals improved slightly, starting from the end of April. However, households that remained in Gedo have not been able to take full advantage of the good *Gu* rains. Most of the northern Gedo pastoralists were prevented from returning due to the prevailing insecurity, limiting their potential to recover. Herders awaiting the end of fighting have not been re-united with their families. Drought related stress has severely diminished calving rates, limiting the supply of valuable milk. Insecurity also hampered both rain-fed and irrigated agriculture. Coping through domestic kinship ties or social support systems were already strained and have now almost stopped as the former helpers are in need of help themselves. Trading mechanisms are not functioning normally, which are essential for poor households to buy food in times of crisis. Insecurity has affected the flow of traded cereals into Gedo from other parts of the country due to banditry and the mining of strategic roads linking major towns. In spite of the very good *Deyr 01/02* harvest in the neighbouring Bay region, the inflow of cereals remained extremely limited. Most rain-fed farmers, especially those on the western side of the Juba river did not plant their crops as they fled their land when conflict broke out. Farmers who rely on irrigation from the major rivers— the Juba and Dawa also fled and those that remained cannot afford to buy fuel which has risen in price. Subsequently, small yields are expected from the coming *Gu* harvest in August." (FSAU Flash, June 2002).

"The most significant conflict during this reporting period took place in Gedo region in April [2002], involving pro Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) and pro Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) militia. These clashes have resulted in the death of innocent civilians and have left many injured. Approximately 6,000 people from Bulo Hawa have been displaced as a direct result of the conflict.." (UN, May 2002, p.2)

*For detailed account of the complex emergency in Gedo see 'FSAU Focus Gedo', February 2002*  
[\[External link\]](#)

## Health

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### **78% people have no access to health facilities and have alarming health status (2002)**

- Diarrhea-related diseases, respiratory infections and malaria account for more than half of all child deaths (2002)
- Somalia has among the highest incidence of TB in the world
- MSF estimates there are 15 qualified doctors per 1 million people in Somalia (Dec 2002)
- 1,191 cases of cholera and 63 deaths reported to WHO between 12 March 2002 and 22 April 2002
- Under five mortality rates of 210 per 1000 and maternal mortality rates at 1,600 per 100,000, amongst the highest in the world
- Infectious and communicable diseases are the major prevalent health risks particularly amongst displaced populations in peri-urban settlements
- Lack of safe water and sanitation leads to cholera outbreaks every dry season
- Somalis totally dependent on international community for delivery of health services as infrastructures were ravaged by war and no medical staff have been trained since 1991
- Displaced persons cannot afford health care treatment and drugs
- Displaced who are constantly on the move find themselves outside health coverage system

***General health indicators:***

“Diarrhoea-related diseases, respiratory infections and malaria continued to account for more than half of all child deaths in the country, while neonatal tetanus and other birth-related problems also contributed significantly to infant mortality. Although measles immunisation levels reached 40% in 2001, a record high for Somalia, outbreaks continued to cause many deaths in 2002. Polio also remained a continuing threat to children. Somalia remains amongst the countries with the highest incidence of tuberculosis in the world and meningitis and cholera are endemic in most areas.” (UN, November 2002, p.4)

"As of 22 April, WHO has received reports of 1 191 cases and 63 deaths (CFR, 5.3 %) in the country since the outbreak began on the 12 March 2002. Five out of 18 regions are affected: Banadir (Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle (Merka), Middle Shabelle (Jilib and Haranka), Hiraa (Belet Weyne) and Bari (Bossaso) regions." (WHO, 23 April 2002)

***Health care system:***

“Lack of adequate health care is one of the biggest problems facing Somalis today. A staggering 78% of the population has no access to health services. MSF has estimated that the country has less than 15 qualified doctors per million people. Trained healthcare professionals fled the country to safety during the 1990s. The only nurse training facilities are in Bosasso and Hargeisa - and the few health workers that remain tend to be based in the more secure urban centres. The whole of eastern Sanag, for instance, had only one doctor in 2001.

[...]

MSF's OPD/MCH in North Mogadishu is in the Yaqshid area, near the Green Line. Many of the patients here are Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from elsewhere in the country. It sees an astonishing 250-300 consultations per day, around 95,000 consultations per year - a reflection of the absence of other, affordable health services in the area. Immunisation of under-fives, pregnant women and women of child-bearing age (16-45), plus monitoring the nutritional status of under-5s, are automatically part of any treatment given to women and infants.” (MSF, 9 December 2002)

" The health care system, along with all state services, has collapsed. Most doctors have fled the country and, apart from staff working with NGOs, no doctors or nurses have been trained in Somalia since the outbreak of war. The only available public or free health care is via the few NGOs still working in the country." (MSF 13 December 2001)

"The health status of the Somali population as a whole reflects the years of crisis the country has experienced. Average life expectancy is 47 years of age, one of the lowest in the world, while the maternal and infant mortality rates are considered to be the highest in the world, with an infant under five mortality rate of 210 per 1000. [...]

The Somali health care system was never very comprehensive. Before the civil war health services and health professionals were concentrated in Mogadishu. The conflict destroyed most facilities, disrupted the supply of medicines, ended all training and broke down the already poor management systems, which were based on government ministries and departments. As with other social services, the health care system in Northwest and Northeast Somalia has had to be developed from scratch.

At the moment, the health system takes a more curative than preventive approach to health problems. To date there has been little emphasis on health education, and consequently the health system is characterised by late treatment seeking behaviour among patients, low prioritisation of health care expenditure among communities and a general reluctance to pay for health services at public facilities. "(IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p. 19)

"The civil war and the absence of a central government have wiped out the government health service. Health care is provided by NGOs and through market channels at a cost. IDPs are outside the system of health coverage and are constantly on the move, so cannot access health cards, or undergo any long-term

treatments. There are too few clinics to provide for the settled population, let alone the IDPs, who come and go." (Redding and Hansen 1998, p. 83)

### **Extremely poor health status of IDPs in most regions of Somalia (2002)**

- Health posts and assistance provided by MSF and UNICEF in Kismayo region jeopardized by persistent war between Majerteen and Marehan militias
- Cholera is endemic in Somalia especially during the dry season
- 250 children monthly accepted in ACF Therapeutic Feeding centers in Mogadishu
- In Gedo recording the worst health indicators in Somalia, basic health services are next to nonexistent and the only Hospital in Luuq has hardly any equipment and is dramatically understaffed (2001)

#### ***Kismayo:***

"Poor living conditions (limited access to adequate food, safe clean drinking water, and good shelter), and poor sanitation in the camps are the major causes of health problems facing IDPs. Reports from UNICEF supported MCH activities in Kismayo indicate that anaemia, malaria, worm infection diarrhoea and urinary tract infection is among the most common communicable diseases in the area. UNICEF and other aid agencies provide health care support to the population in Kismayo. However, due to insecurity it is difficult to provide adequate assistance to the vulnerable groups particularly the IDPs. Cholera outbreak normally takes place during dry seasons (from January up to March). During this period, there is an acute shortage of water in Kismayo especially in IDP camps, which leads also to poor sanitation and poor health. Most of the IDPs have no access to adequate water to clean their hand and utensils before food. This fosters the spread of epidemic diseases in the camps. Unconfirmed reports indicate that twenty people including seven IDPs died of cholera outbreak in February 2001.

Limited health care provisions are provided to the IDPs. After MSF withdraw from Kismayo hospital, the only hospital in city, has no adequate drugs and qualified medical personnel that address the high demand of medical care by Kismayo residents. There are about 6 MCH, 60 OPDs and 34 health posts assisted by UNICEF. However, their activities have been jeopardized by persisting insecurity and sporadic clashes between the Majerten and Marehan militia. Recent clashes between the Juba Valley Alliance and Majerten have further deteriorated the humanitarian activities in the area. There are a large number of private clinics and chemists in the city. However, because of poverty, IDPs can not afford to pay for drugs and health services." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.27)

#### ***Mogadishu:***

"In the capital, where 500,000 to 700,000 people live, including 150,000 displaced people, there are no safe drinking water provision systems, sanitation installations are drastically insufficient and health structures are almost entirely absent. A significant number of children are suffering from diarrhoea, the first cause of malnutrition in the town, to which can be added numerous cases of infections, such as measles or tuberculosis. More than 250 severely malnourished children are admitted each month to the two Therapeutic Feeding Centres run by Action Against Hunger in north and south Mogadishu, where the children receive intensive treatment and immunisation.

To add to this dramatic situation, cholera, an endemic disease, usually occurs from December to May and affects several thousand people each year.

Action Against Hunger is preparing to launch an anti-cholera programme amongst the most vulnerable to avoid the spread of the epidemic." (ACF, 21 December 2001)

#### ***Gedo:***

"There is little doubt that the health and overall welfare of the population of Gedo Region is already the worst in Somalia." (FSAU 20 September 2001, Southern Somalia)

« Dans les causes sous-jacentes à la malnutrition, qui ne cessent d'empirer année après année, il faut souligner la quasi inexistence de soins de santé primaire dans la région, une couverture vaccinale des plus faibles et un très faible approvisionnement en eau et en structures sanitaires ; éléments favorisant tous le développement des maladies. Sur Luuq, **des cas de choléra viennent ainsi d'être déclarés**, rendant la situation encore plus précaire. Les équipes d'Action contre la Faim assistent le personnel de l'hôpital de Luuq -seule structure médicale existante-, notamment au niveau de l'approvisionnement en eau, afin de pouvoir endiguer l'épidémie au plus vite." (ACF 26 July 2001)

### **IDPs in Hargeisa indicate the lowest health services compared to other displaced populations (June 2002)**

- Vaccination rates were lowest among Southern Somali
- Southern Somali women were less likely to receive prenatal care and had no access to a trained attendant
- Sheikh Nur only IDP settlement with operational public health facility (September 2001)
- Very low attendance to health facility due to unaffordable fees and unsuitable opening times
- The remaining IDP settlements in Hargeisa had no public health facilities

*Interagency assesment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia (Clark, June 2002, p.27)*

"- Southern Somalis and non-Somali Ethiopians were significantly less likely than Somalilanders or Somali Ethiopians to receive TT shots during pregnancy or to receive prenatal care.

[...]

- Measles vaccination coverage (12- to 23-month-olds) was 60%; the rate was lowest in Ayaha and Daami, and among Southern Somalis and non-Somali Ethiopians.

[...]

-Vaccination rates were lower among Southern Somalis than any other group." (Clark, June 2002, p.8)

"Not having a trained attendant was most common in Daami and Ayaha and among the Southern Somali population." (Clark, June 2002, p.58)

"The rate of under-5s receiving any vaccinations is significantly lower in Ayaha and Daami than in other returnee settlement areas, and vaccination card retention rate of those under-5s who received vaccinations is significantly lower in Daami and State House than in other areas. Southern Somali children under 5 years old and 12-23 months old were vaccinated at significantly lower rates than Somalilanders living in the areas." (Clark, June 2002, p.59)

"Generally the health services in the survey areas is poor. Only Sheikh Nur, the largest settlement, has an operating public health facility, which provides services including immunization, under five clinic, antenatal care and delivery. But even here attendance is very poor - less than fifteen people per day. The cost recovery approach adopted by the Ministry of Health and Labour may be one of the reasons why the poorest population groups sometimes cannot utilize the health services as the policy which should provide guidelines on exemption for very poor is not always regularly applied. Moreover, the public health facilities work only in the morning hours while most parents or caretakers are out of the daily bread. No outreach services other than immunization and Vitamin A distribution programmes has ever been developed for Sheikh Nur.

All the other survey areas have no public health service facilities. However, Mohamed Mooge has several private pharmacies. The construction of a health center there has been completed recently, with the assistance of UNHCR, but it is not operational yet due to some managerial and staffing issues. For the Stadiim and Fadumo Bihi settlements the nearby Iftin health center is accessible but the MCH hardly ever operates due to staffing issues. The State House and Daami communities are close enough to the Jig-jiga Yar and New Hargeisa health centers respectively." (UNICEF/MoH&L/FSAU, September 2001, p.6)

## **Water and sanitation**

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### **Most IDPs have no access to drinking water and sanitation facilities(2002)**

- Less than 25% Somalis have access to drinking water and 48.5% to sanitation
- In Boqolka IDP camp latrines built by UNICEF were closed to IDPs by ‘landowners’ on the argument that IDPs did not pay their fee
- In Hargeisa price of water was three times higher for IDPs than residents
- Some IDPs walk up to one hour to access the closest well
- Construction of latrines along the Juba River was disrupted by looting and insecurity
- In Southern Somalia most wells are unsuitable for drinking purposes, saline and most IDPs drink from the river contaminated by organic matters and waste
- Most IDPs are charged unaffordable prices for drinking water that they resort to drink contaminated water
- Limited access to safe water leads to serious health problems
- Out of 175 wells in Bay and Bakool, at least 101 have been voluntarily destroyed beyond repair during war

“The biggest reason for cholera outbreaks being endemic and recurrent now is the lack of safe drinking water and sanitation, with less than 25% of Somalis having access to potable water and 48.5% to sanitation (taking population groups and regions into account). The risk of acquiring water-borne diseases like dysentery, cholera, diarrhoea and Typhoid Fever are increasingly high as a result.” (MSF, 9 December 2002)

"Only 31% of the population have access to safe drinking water, with an important variation between urban areas (46%) and rural areas with (28%). Only 43 % of the population have access to adequate sanitation disposal, 39 % in rural areas and 69 % in urban areas." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.19)

“The expert visited the Boqolka Bush camp for IDPs on 30 August. The conditions were extremely poor, perhaps even to a degree unfit for human habitation, with inadequate or no access to water and sanitation facilities, shelter, education or protection from criminal activity. IDPs lived in dwellings of 2 metres by 2 metres for which rents were charged; toilets built by UNICEF were locked by the landowner, reportedly because of the inability of tenants to pay user fees.” (UNCHR, 31 December 2002,p.15)

#### ***Hargeisa:***

“In addition, the price of water [in the eight returnee/IDP settlement areas] was more than triple the price in areas where residents are settled, the incidence of disease was high and childcare was inadequate.” (ACC/SCN 41, April 2004)

#### ***Kismayo:***

“Access to adequate and clean water is very limited. IDPs use water from shallow and unprotected wells contaminated with organic matters. Some of the camps are far from the water points. For example, there is one hour walking distance between Nuh Mohamud camp and the nearest well. Water shortage in the IDP camps is acute during the dry seasons when the level in the wells falls down.

In terms of sanitation, congestion of the camps along with lack of latrines and proper waste disposal system results in poor sanitation condition in the camps. Sanitary activities in the area are constrained by insecurity. Latrines built in villages along the Juba River by UNICEF have already been destroyed and the concrete slabs were looted. Piles of garbage and human wastes disposed everywhere in the camps, causes nuisance and poor sanitation.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp26-27)

***Jilib:***

“IDPs access to safe drinking water is very limited. The town’s only drilled borehole is not functioning. There are 6 shallow wells, but they yield saline water, which is not suitable for drinking purpose. Both the IDPs and the local people use water drawn from the river for their drinking purposes, but the river is contaminated with organic matters washed out from the wastes thrown into the river by the local residents.

The general sanitation condition of Jilib is poor. The IDPs have no toilets. They use the empty rooms of the abandoned houses for defecation in open.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.31)

***Jalalqsi:***

“These IDPs have no access to adequate and clean drinking water. Water from wells is sold at So Sh 200 to 500 and prices are not affordable to the IDPs. Because of their economic difficulties, the IDPs collect water from the river as their drinking water. However, this water is contaminated and is not fit for human consumption.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.53)

***Mogadishu:***

"Where Mogadishu residents used to have clean running water at the turn of a shiny brass tap, they must now depend on hand-dug wells. Dirty water, hauled up from about 30 metres underground, sells at Somali shillings 2,000 (US \$0.20) per drum. People and animals use the same water supply. Among the devastated buildings, in the maze of broken streets, women with jerry cans join the goats and camels, and the queues of donkey carts. The wells are owned – but not maintained – by individuals. Aid agencies occasionally provided chlorine to treat the drinking water, but no one really monitored its use or distribution, health workers said.

Once the water system had collapsed, many people dug their own wells. The wells that used to provide the city with running water are now in the hands of militia. One set of wells is on the Afgoi road between Mogadishu and Afgoi town; the other to the north of the city, between Mogadishu and Balad. The wells are in total disrepair.

So far, efforts by the new interim government to start tackling the 10 year-old waste dump - once a beautiful coastal capital - have barely touched the tip. Mogadishu has lacked government structures and services for almost a decade. 'You can't clean up 10 years of piled-up rubbish without a complete campaign, with the right equipment,' said one Mogadishu resident. Sanitation workers and equipment are available, but have yet to be mobilised, signed up and funded. Since establishing itself in October, the new government is struggling with other priorities: funding, peace and reliable personnel. And in a city where money, militia and warlord-run mafias have ruled since 1991, even rubbish is 'owned', explained the resident. Gangs expect nothing less than a cut from sanitation projects." (IRIN-CEA 20 December 2000)

"As families flee conflict areas, the few safe water sources that do exist are being abandoned or destroyed. Wells, generators, pumps, and pipes have been destroyed or intentionally contaminated by warring factions. Out of 175 wells in Bay and Bakool, at least 101 have been destroyed beyond repair. " (US Fund for UNICEF 6 September 2000, "Water and sanitation")

"In largely arid Somalia, access to water is limited for human and animal consumption. Livestock, Somalia's main export, is the mainstay of the economy and is dependent upon rainfall for adequate pastures and upon ground water for watering. People require daily access to safe sources of water. In most areas however, community access to any water source is restricted, especially in the dry seasons, and access to safe water (typically from ground water sources) is available for only about 30 percent of the population, mostly in urban areas.

Poor access leads to higher prices (stretching poorer incomes to the limit) and greater distances in water collection (increasing the workload of women and girls). In turn, diarrhoeal diseases, cholera epidemics, and malnutrition of children are all directly or indirectly caused by limited access to safe water and poor personal and environmental hygiene practices.

Ground water constitutes the principal source of potable water in most areas of Somalia. Studies show that there is sufficient quantity of good quality ground water to cover the domestic needs of the whole population of Somalia. Though they are seasonal, rainwater catchments are a major water source. These reservoirs include: ware, an excavated reservoir, sometimes lined with plastic sheets, common in the south; bally, a depression in the ground which may be natural or artificial; maxiid, a hand-dug vertical pit; and berked, a cemented underground catchment mostly found in the central and northern regions." (UN November 1999, p.30)

## **Shelter and non-food items**

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### **Internally displaced live in meager make-shift housing (2002)**

- IDPs in Kismayo live under shacks which provide no protection against rain, wind and sun
- Displaced in Mogadishu congregate in make-shift camps
- Others live in abandoned government buildings, schools and factories
- Huts are made of scavenged paper, sticks, sacks and cloth
- Floods wash away IDP shacks together with mountains of trash

"IDPs in Kismayo live in the shelled houses and government offices or in huts made of sticks, pieces of plastics, and clothes that give no protection against rain water, wind and sun." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp26-27)

In Mogadishu, "an overwhelmingly poor but tenacious population has made homes amongst the shell-shattered houses and offices, or congregates in makeshift camps for the internally displaced. International development aid has effectively been suspended, and those displaced by war and hardship are left to a precarious hand-to-mouth existence." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

"Heavy rains in early July [2000] caused flash floods in Mogadishu, damaging buildings and washing away several hundred of the shanty structures in the displaced camps in the south of the city. The floods brought a tide of sewage through the shanty towns, raising concerns about the potential for the spread of disease." (IRIN 7 July 2000 in UN Sub-Commission on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31)

"The floods [of late 1997 and early 1998] particularly harmed populations already displaced by the country's warfare. Heavy rains washed away makeshift huts housing displaced families in Mogadishu. Other displaced families in the capital continued to live in abandoned government buildings, schools, factories, and houses left empty by the country's decade of instability." (USCR 1999, p. 88)

"Makeshift camps of displaced Somalis and refugees (primarily originating from Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s) have mushroomed in the city since the fall of Siad Barre's government in 1991. Most of the dome-shaped huts are made from paper, sticks, sacks and cloth scavenged from the growing mountains of rubbish, with barriers of scrap metal delineating different sections of the camps. Some camps receive rudimentary help from humanitarian agencies or Islamic organizations, but the vast majority of internally displaced people must rely on their own survival skills." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

# ACCESS TO EDUCATION

## General

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### Minimal access to education for the Somali population (2003)

- Primary enrolment increased 29% from 2001 to 2002
- In 2002 there was 30% more teachers than in 2001
- Adult literacy rate for Somalia's urban population is estimated at 35% compared to only 10% for rural and nomadic populations
- One out of six Somali children receive formal primary education (2003)
- The education sector received only 12% funding in CAP 2003
- Somalia's educational indicators rank it amongst the lowest in the world with 17,1% adult literacy and 13,6% primary school enrolment
- About 40% of all teachers are unqualified and many have not completed primary education
- Koranic school sustained by parental and community support have functioned throughout the conflict
- Informal education through radio or satellite school facilities would be a way to reach displaced and nomadic populations
- 90% of school facilities were destroyed by war and some school buildings were occupied by IDPs

« According to field data, the number of primary schools in Somalia increased by 29%, from 859 in the academic year 2000/2001 to 1,105 in 2001/2002. Moreover, Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) witnessed an upward trend from 13% (11% for girls and 15% for boys in 2000/1) to 17% (14% for girls and 19% for boys) in 2001/2. There was also a 30% increase in the number of teachers. Such encouraging developments served to underline the importance of sustained, coherent and community-focused promotion of formal and non-formal education, in particular targeting girls.” (UN, November 2002, p.5)

“For example the adult literacy rate for Somalia's urban population is estimated at 35% whereas the rate for rural and nomadic populations is only 10%. Similarly while 50% of the urban population have direct access to health services, the rate for the rural population is only 15%. Female adult literacy is estimated to be only 52% of the male rate, and the female primary school enrolment ratio similarly only 53% of the male rate. Few data are available for variation in development across Somalia's regions, but it is clear that levels of development remain vulnerable to concentrations of fighting and instability which continue to cause localised crises of food security, health and displacement.” (UN, 27 September 2002, pp.9-10)

“Equally important to the eventual survival, rehabilitation and development of the Somali state is education. Only one in six Somali children currently receive formal primary school education in any form, the current efforts of the UN and NGOs notwithstanding. In addition, an entire generation of young people has been deprived of their right to education over the past decade or more, with the result that the achievement of high rates of adult literacy in the 1970s and 1980s are a distant memory. To this end, the UN will in 2003 pay particularly close attention to the promotion of primary school education, with the aim of doubling the annual rate of increase in primary enrolment, and of increasing adult literacy and technical and vocational training opportunities. However, success in reaching these targets is dependent on a significant increase in resources. Existing programmes in the education sector have been only 12% funded through the CAP.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.8)

"The future of Somalia is bleak as long as its children continue to be denied of their fundamental right to basic education. Few children in Somalia today, particularly girls have access to basic education - opportunities to develop their capabilities or learn skills that will enable them to improve their lives and that of their society. There are increasing opportunities for investment in the education sector over the long run in particular in the northern region; however, most of Somalia's children remain today uneducated, illiterate and unskilled; its present youth constitutes a 'lost generation'.

On average, only about one in ten children of primary school age are enrolled, and only two thirds of them are boys. Of the youth aged 14-18 years, almost all are out of school and without access to education or other basic services. The few operational primary schools function mainly through community and parental support. All secondary education remains confined to highly urbanised areas.

The quality of education on offer is generally very poor. About 40 percent of all teachers are unqualified; many have not completed their own primary education. The absence of a central educational authority has led to a lack of consistency in educational standards, including acceptable curricula and textbooks. Much of the pre-war school infrastructure has been destroyed. Poor families, communities, and local authorities have insufficient funds to meet even the very basic expenses related to teachers' salaries and effective supervision. The absence of any learner assessment or certification system has rendered the appraisal of the quality of education impossible.

Koranic schools have continued to operate throughout the conflict, with the support of parents and communities. These schools do not offer opportunities for secular education and are primarily religious institutions imparting knowledge of the Koran. Pilot projects have been initiated for the inclusion of some elements of basic education in the daily teaching of selected Koranic schools and the results are awaited.

Private language schools are mushrooming in most towns and some rural communities teach informally, borrowing curricula and textbooks from other countries. Some language and vocational education schools are also integrating some primary subjects on an ad-hoc basis. There is, however, a near-total lack of early childhood education, alternate forms of primary education, and adult informal education in Somalia. The potential of reaching excluded communities, such as by way of satellite schools, informal education centres, and radio, is as yet untapped." (UN November 1999, p.32)

"The civil war dealt another devastating blow to the formal education system, which completely collapsed in 1990. Many teachers and pupils were displaced and forced to seek security in their clan areas or flee to refugee camps abroad. . . . The aftermath showed that about 90% of school buildings in the country were either completely or partially destroyed. In addition, many were occupied by internally displaced persons. Almost all educational materials and equipment were looted." (UNDP 1999, Chapter 3, "History of education in Somalia")

### **IDP children face multitude of obstacles to education (2002)**

- Low school attendance of IDP children due to illness
- IDP parents often prefer to send their children to get some income rather than to school
- Most IDP children are rejected from schools due to lack of room and local children given priority

"Even Koranic schools that have been set up in some camps, for example in Jenyo, Hanshi, and Aideytoi IDP camps [Kismayo region], the attendance of IDPs children is very low. This is due to the fact that IDPs children are sick most of the time. They cannot regularly attend the schools. More over IDP parents prefer to send their children to generate some income at the expense of their physical and social well being." (UNCU, 30 July 2002,p.27)

“Almost all the IDPs [in Bu’ale] children are illiterate and they have no access to education. There is only one primary education that receives UNICEF and World Vision support. However, because of the limited size of classrooms and lack of enough education facilities, there is no room for the IDP children. First priorities are given to children from local communities. There are several koranic schools and two private schools. However, because of economic constraints, very few IDPs children attend these schools. Instead of education, the IDP parents prefer to send their children to generate some income.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.30)

### **School enrolment status in Hargeisa: the lowest among IDPs populations due to begging and discrimination (June 2002)**

- On average only 13,8% of the Somali population receives primary education
- 74% of boys age 10 to 14 are enrolled in school compared to only 46% of girls
- Children of households from southern Somalia more likely to be working rather than at school
- Low enrolment among southern Somali IDPs explained by discrimination of minority clans and use of their children to beg

"Overall primary school enrolment is 13.8%, with enrolment rates of girls being slightly lower at 12.1%." (UNICEF, 11 February 2002)

*Interagency assesment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia*

"-Boys and girls are enrolled in schools at similar rates until age 10. Over age 10, girls' enrollment plateaus at below 60% before dropping off, while boys' enrollment climbs to 80% at age 13. For both sexes, a majority of those enrolled in school are enrolled in primary schools by age 10.

- Boys age 10 to 14 are enrolled in school at an aggregate rate of 74%, while girls in that age range are enrolled at an aggregate rate of 46%.

[...]

- Southern Somalis and non-Somali Ethiopians are enrolled in school at lower rates than Somalilanders, more so for girls than for boys.

- Children in households from Southern Somalia and Ethiopia (both Somali and non-Somali) are more likely to be working to bring income into the household than households originally from Somaliland." (Clark, June 2002, p.7)

"Ayaha and Daami are near the bottom for boys' and girls' enrollment across the board." (Clark, June 2002, 43)

"The Daami focus groups addressed this issue, saying that some of the difference was due to ostricization of minority communities and that Southern Somali and Oromo families use their children to beg and they are therefore not in school." (Clark, June 2002, 44)

"In Daami, social exclusion of minority groups was reported as another major reason that Returnee Settlement Area Assessment, June 2002 children were not in school." (Clark, June 2002, p.46)

"Daami's adult population is significantly less educated than any of the others" (Clark, June 2002, p.47)

# ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

## Self-reliance

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### Self-reliance in the Northwest: Somaliland

- The main impediment to integration of Southern IDPs in Somaliland is discrimination because Somalilanders associate them with the crimes of the 'southern' Barre regime
- IDPs in Somaliland, unlike returnees have no social networks or family to fall back on
- The majority of IDPs are agropastoralists or farmers who lack the skills to generate income in urban settings where most of flee to
- Most IDPs work as porters, domestic workers and casual laborers
- Women are the main bread winners they receive lower wages than men and it impairs their child-caring roles
- IDPs in Hargeisa and Bosasso depend on remittances to sustaining their livelihood
- However the closure of remittance company after September 11 left many IDPs without source of income
- In Southern and Central Somalia (GEDO, Lower and Middle Juba and Mogadishu IDPs have limited access to informal economy
- 50% of IDPs in Hargeisa are destitute compared to 7% of urban residents (2002)
- In Hargeisa competition for jobs on the informal market between IDPs and local residents is so fierce that the latter have organized to prevent IDPs from getting jobs
- At least 80% IDPs in the South live out of begging compared to 9% in Hargeisa
- In the Haryan and Ajjuran camps only 9% IDPs generate income from service and market-oriented jobs
- IDPs from Bay and Bakool who took refuge in Burao and Yirowe rely 93% on begging to survive because they lack merchant and pastoral skills to integrate in the lucrative informal economy

“The difference between the internally displaced persons and returnees is a very fundamental issue that needs to be clearly understood. *Returnees are returning to their former hometowns and cities and are therefore able to look towards their clan members or relatives for assistance and guidance. Where as the IDP's have travelled a long distance from their home cities and are unable to call on any clan member or relative for assistance. Their voices are not heard because they have no representatives in the parliament, ministries and other government institutions; thus there are no influential members who, they can turn to in their distress.*

[...]

“Unfortunately the IDP's are unable to access any of these employment or businesses opportunities, unlike the returnees who are able to access small income generating loans from UNHCR and a few INGO's and are able to look towards their clan elders for support and assistance.

[...]

Integration is impossible stated the community of the IDP camps, as we have two very distinctive characteristics that cannot be overlooked: a) distinctive face features and b) different dialogue from the Somalilanders, which will not assist them to integrate.

They are also associated with the previous crimes that have been alleged to have taken place in Somaliland.” (Ibrahim F., 15 August 2002, p.2;4-5)

“The majority of IDPs have been living in poor shelter in camps or in destroyed houses as in Mogadishu for about 10 year. They have limited access to food, water, health and sanitation facilities. This coupled with the fact that most IDPs are farmers and agropastoral groups who lack the right skills to generate income in the main urban centers. Therefore, the majority of IDPs are working as porters, domestic workers and casual labourers. Women remain to be the breadwinners despite the poor working conditions, which affects their health conditions and their caring capacities.

[...]

While aggregate economic indicators identify Somalia as one of the poorest nations, analysis of the informal economy depicts remarkably different picture. In particular, the role of remittances in sustaining household incomes illustrates an important dynamic of informal economy upon which a significant number of Somali families depend. Social networks and kinship support represent another dynamic in the household economy that has not yet been quantified by modern economic methods.

The situation of IDPs in Somalia varies significantly between the different regions of the country. In the northeast (Puntland) and northwest (Somaliland) where some degree of stability and some economic development took place in the last five years, IDPs in Hergeysa and Bassasso are essentially dependent on remittances in sustaining their livelihood. Thus the study of IDPs in the northeast and northwest provides special attention to the economic livelihood particularly the role of remittances in household income and hence the livelihood of IDPs. It is worth noting that this important source of livelihood has been subjected to a major shock such as the US sanction, after the 11th of September 2001, on ALBARAKAT Company, the main Remittances Company in the country. That said, the impact of ALBARAKAT closure on livelihood of IDPs remains outside the focus of this study.

In south and central Somalia where intermittent insecurity prevails such as Gedo, Lower and Middle Jubas and Mogadishu, IDPs have limited access to the informal economy. Their main benefit from the market is in the form of service provision such as porters and casual labour. The IDPs are dependent on social network support for their livelihood, besides the limited assistance from the international community in some regions e.g. Gedo.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp1;2)

### ***Hargeisa:***

“Not surprisingly there is a stark difference between urban residents and the IDPs and returnees living in camps on the outskirts of Hargeisa. While only 7 percent of urban residents can be categorized as destitute, as many as 50 percent of the Returnees and IDPs in the camps belong to this category.

[...]

There are no large-scale labor market surveys of the Hargeisa municipality. However, according to our survey the majority of urban residents (a total of 61percent) are involved in largely informal market and service oriented economic activities. A similar proportion (67percent) of returnees and IDP households earn the majority of their income from market and service oriented work mostly in petty trade and unskilled labor including work in construction and as porters. This implies a keen competition between resident and returnee/IDP in these sectors. For example, urban residents working in the construction sector have organized informal labor unions to keep out displaced persons, particular from southern clans, from competing in the construction sector. Both IDP and returnees complain bitterly of the lack of job opportunities, and the importance of clan and familial contacts in securing gainful employment.

The key distinction between resident and returnee/IDP populations is that the 23 percent of urban households enjoy access to remittances from overseas as a major source of income. In addition, while few households in Hargeisa proper derive income from begging, as many as 9 percent of the displaced – primarily among the Ajjuran of Dima camp—live almost exclusively by begging. Indeed, taking into account the IDPs from the south alone, the percentage of households whose income includes begging is over 80percent.

[...]

The graph below, demonstrates that in terms of sub-clan categories the dominant Isaak sub-clans in Hargeisa receive remittance on a largely even basis. No particular sub-clan has a monopoly of remittance inflows. Consequently it is safe to assume that who benefits from them is dependent on a previous asset base that is contingent on the fortunes of particular households, rather than a particular sub-clan." (UNCU, 30 July 200, pp.8-9;11)

"- 73% of men work to bring income into their households, while only 32% of women work to bring income into their households.

- The most common jobs are market activities and casual employment.

- Men have received vocational training at four times the rate that women have. 16% of adults have been through vocational training." (Clark, June 2002, p.7)

"In Daami, Sheikh Nur, and Stadium the women also work as household servants. On the other hand, men tend to work as construction laborers, charcoal producers, livestock brokers, and porters. Day laborer incomes were reported as between US\$1 and US\$2 per day. Some men in Sinai and Stadium generate income through donkey cart businesses, while it is worth noting that only the men in Stadium were identified as bringing in income through work as soldiers, waiters, or latrine diggers. Only in Ayaha, Daami and Mohamed Mooge were men identified as working in the livestock brokerage business.

Daami was the only area where notably different skills and trades were relied on for generating income. Immigrant and Southern Somali men work as farm laborers, livestock brokers, and construction laborers while the women beg with their children. In contrast, the minority groups rely on their traditional skills to generate income. The men work as barbers, blacksmiths, shoemakers, and rubbish collectors while the women earn money through practicing female circumcision and producing traditional items such as water pots, wedding pots, brooms, and stoves." (Clark, June 2002, p.50)

"Majority of the population in the resettlement camps falls within the very poor and poor wealth groups. The urban food economy group relies on purchases as a source of food or may have relatives in the rural areas that send them gifts in form of cereals, milk or meat. Other sources of income and food for this group include employment in construction ventures or large/small scale trade, and gifts and remittances from relatives.

The food security situation of the population in the resettlement camps of Hargeisa is greatly affected by issues that either increase the cost of foods or reduce income accessibility. Of importance in the past one year has been the cessation of construction activities in Hargeisa town, devaluation of the Somaliland shilling and impact of the livestock ban imposed by the Gulf countries in September 2000. This led to reduction in foreign income inflow culminating into decreased employment opportunities and low business activities. The resettled population in Hargeisa camps, just like any poor sections of the town have been greatly affected by these mentioned factors and their food security position compromised." (UNICEF/MoH&L/FSAU, September 2001, p.7)

***Toghdeer region:***

"The socio-economic picture for IDPs from the south residing in Haryan (Bura) and Ajjuran (Yirowe) camps is far worse. In the absence of a formal administrative and legal framework, the labor market in Bura-Yirowe (as elsewhere) is regulated by clan and sub-clan networks. As a result, IDPs from Bay and Bakool, in this instance, find it very difficult to find gainful employment in the service, market or trade activities. Only 9 percent of households in Haryan and Ajjuran camps generate income from service and market oriented jobs, and there are no families that are engaged in trade dominated by the Isaak sub-clans of Haber Younis and Haber Jaalo. The fact that they are not pastoralists or merchants from the south has made it difficult for most to integrate into the local informal economy. They are separated from Yirowe residents and all its commercial activity As a consequence southern IDPs rely on their traditional survival mechanism, begging. As many as 93 percent of households depend exclusively on the women and children of the household begging for either money or cooked food to sustain them. Nor do any families among the

southern IDPs receive financial assistance from relatives living and/or working abroad.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p15)

### **Self-reliance in the Northeast: Puntland (2002)**

- 77% of Bosasso’s 28,000 IDPs work as unskilled and semi-skilled laborers
- 17% of IDP households rely on market activities as major source of income and only 4% have the capital and networks to enter the more lucrative informal trade
- Only 2% of IDP receive remittances compared with 38% of urban residents
- Bosasso IDPs earn about US\$1 daily which represents 50% higher wage than for Hargeisa IDPs
- IDPs chances to find seasonal work in the Gulf was restricted by Bosasso port security regulations

“The majority (77percent) of Bosasso's estimated 28,000 IDPs work as. Although, IDPs serve as casual laborers, rarely finding regular work. However, given the fact that few of IDP households possess significant capital or other assets and they hail from marginalized clans and castes they have minimal opportunity to enter the market or trade sectors. The Majerteen and other Harti sub-clans dominate the latter. In fact, only 17percent IDP households can count on market activities as their major source of income; while only 4percent have the capital or social networks to enter the more lucrative informal trade sector.

Remittances also play an important role in supplementing incomes and establishing a modicum of economic well being. However, while as many as 38percent of urban residents enjoy assistance from expatriate relatives, only 2percent of IDP households receive remittance on a regular basis. Consequently, in addition to their vulnerability stemming from ethnic and geographical marginalization, the lack of access to remittance compounds the relative poverty of residents living in IDP camps.

[...]

In comparison to Hargeisa, Bosasso residents enjoy a higher standard of living if we compare average daily incomes. While urban residents of Hargeisa earn, on average, about \$1 a day, Bosasso residents earn over \$4. Naturally, with respect to Bosasso, IDPs earnings are far lower. Most IDP households in Bosasso earn a daily wage of a little over a \$1, which is more than 50percent, more than most returnee/IDP families living in and around Hargeisa. However, for Bosasso's IDPs these earnings are seasonally dependent.

There is less economic activity in Bosasso's main port during the summer months and since most IDPs work in activities associated with port trade, the figures cited above reflect earnings during the more busy winter months. Many IDPs said that since job opportunities decrease greatly in the summer, they often migrate southward towards Nugal and Mudug regions of Puntland. However, the significant income earning opportunities for IDPs explains the fact the most cite shelter, health and food as priorities rather than job opportunities . Nevertheless, conditions for IDPs in Bosasso are the most severe in northern Somalia. The majority are economic migrants, many with hopes of continuing their migration to nearby oil-producing Gulf countries. However, in recent years local authorities have tightened regulations and security around Bosasso port restricting the chances of many IDPs from travelling to the Gulf. In Bosasso, the issues are largely related to urban planning. In contrast, as noted below, IDPs in Mergaga camp north of Gelkayo are victims of drought. As such, they require different kinds of interventions.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.20-1)

### **IDPs self reliance in southern and central Somalia complicated by drought and conflict (2002)**

- To make a living IDPs use their own skills which run along ethnic identity

- However, Bantu and Galgala minorities suffer ethnic discrimination and are prevented from using their traditional farming and wooden crafts
- They mostly end up in non-skilled jobs working as porters or digging latrines
- IDP women generate the largest income in the household working as domestic servants, cleaners, petty trading, or porters
- Displaced women in Bu'ale sell water from the river or firewood
- Bantus displaced in Jilib are exploited economically by the same Habargedir people who grabbed their agricultural lands
- In Bay and Bakool IDP coping strategies for their food supply are hampered by conflict, drought and inflation

***Kismayo:***

“Many of the displaced now live in or close to destitution with the main sources of income consisting of casual work (farm labour, household chores, loaders/porters at the port) and bush product collection (firewood and charcoal burning). Although the unskilled labour rates in Kismayo (less than 25,000Sh/day) are lower than in other areas of Lower Juba, they remain well over those in other areas of Southern Somalia. Unlike the local residents, IDPs have no kinship support and tend to be engaged in less regular and lower status occupations. On the other hand, the *urban poor* of Kismayo are involved in petty business, sale of water and farm labour.” (FSAU Nutrition Update, 31 December 2002)

“The **IDPs** in Kismayo are in extreme poor economic conditions because of loss of their properties, productive assets, difficult social and political environment and lack of relief food and assistance by aid agencies. For their survival, **IDPs** use their own skills and each **IDP** community has its own skills, which correlates with its distinct identity and culture, which shape its own way of survival. For example, the Bantu **IDPs** are traditionally small-scale farmers whose major skill is farming, while, the Galgala **IDPs** are traditionally wooden craftsmen. The Galgala IDPs capitalized on their skills depend on that for survival. The Bantu **IDPs** prefer obviously in working on non-skilled work such as carrying goods, loading and offloading of trucks, digging latrines etc. Their women work as domestic servants as washers and cleaners.

The IDPs have no bargaining power. They are forced to work cheaply and under unfair working conditions that have led them to be in servitude conditions. The maximum wage earned by is about 3000 to 5000 So.Sh, which is equivalent to \$0.15-0.25. Although that small income it doesn't help IDPs to meet their basic needs. A Somali household of 6 to 10 family size needs a minimum of 80,000 So.Sh (USD 4) for its daily subsistence food.

Some Bantu IDPs have profitable skills and they can work as carpenters and mechanics. However, ethnic discrimination denies them to get access to such jobs. IDP's access to land is also very limited. There is no farming land inside Kismayo town. However some Galgala IDPs are engaged in some sort of farming activities on the outskirts of the city, and near the airport. Because of lack of resources and high dependence on rain, the production is very little food. No crop sharing practices is practiced in this area.

Being more dominant than men, IDP women a key role in generating the largest household income in the camp. Some work as domestic servants as cleaners, while others generate their income through petty trading, selling tea or cooked food in the market. The only way they can generate their income is to work as street peddler or porters.”(UNCU, 30 July 2002,p26)

***Bu'ale:***

“IDPs in Bu'ale are very poor. Their economic livelihoods depend largely on subsistence income that comes from non-skilled work or begging. Being more dominant than men, women play a greater role than men do in household income. They sell water from the river at 500 SoSh per jerrycane of 20 liters. However, because most IDPs collect their own water, there is less demand for water IDP in the camp. A woman could generate between So.sh 10,000 to 15,000 as income, which is much below the required

income for subsistence (average So.sh 30,000). Other women generate income by selling of firewood at 500 SoSh per bundle, while others beg in the markets.

Most of the IDPs men are agropastrolists with no profitable skills. They generate marginal income through non-skilled work, such as digging latrines and constructing huts. They have no bargaining power to demand an increase of their wages, which range from So.sh 5000-10,000 per day.”

***Jilib:***

“These living conditions have exposed many IDPs to economic exploitation by the Habargedir and those who took over agricultural lands in the area. Some IDPs alleged that they are forced to work the whole day for only So.sh3000 to 5000. This is not even enough for the breakfast of an IDP household. Others claimed that instead of money, they are given only some cooked maize for the heavy work leaving their families remain without food in their houses. The work the IDPs undertake includes ploughing, sowing, harvesting or guarding harvest from birds and other animals.” (UNCU, 30july 2002,p.31)

***Bay and Bakool:***

"The poor harvest is hitting many areas where levels of malnutrition have been relatively high for the last two years. Assessments carried out in Bay, Bakool and Gedo as well as information collected from feeding centres indicate that many poor families are at the end of their resources. Most of the poorer households have no stocks from previous years and possibilities to find jobs or generate income are very limited.

Low cereal production and resultant food shortages will impoverish, even further, families who already live on very little, and whose nutritional state is already fragile." (WFP 22 August 2001)

"Recent escalations in tensions have once again caused displacement of populations into communities that are unable to assist because of their own limited stocks and it appears that some IDPs and resident populations are already becoming quite desperate in their search for external assistance.

[...]

The anticipated food scarcity resulting from failure of the Gu harvest has exacerbated the problem as otherwise the returnees would have been easily absorbed within the existing community social support. Although the IDPs are engaged in coping strategies like selling firewood, water and construction materials; digging toilets and seeking for community support (mobilised handouts) for their food supply, the general downturn of economic avenues occasioned by drought and inflation weighs heavily against any significant contribution to their food security. Food availability is also reported to be low in the market. Gifts from the community have also reduced, as the community does not have sufficient stocks to allow sharing to take place.

At the time of the visit, no support interventions for this group were in place. Most of the IDPs were seen crowding around the IMC health facility in search of assistance, in particular hoping to be admitted to the ongoing Supplementary Feeding Programme/family ration programme. The health facility in Rabdure is also strained with additional need for supplies. Immediate needs of this group include assistance with shelter, food, medical attention and chlorinated water." (FSAU 16 August 2001, Overview and Update on Bakool).

**IDPs resources stretched to maximum (2002)**

- IDP women do not receive the same wage as men for the same work done
- Internal displacement and the collapse of the industry and service sectors has led to high rates of unemployment which sustain large number of militias
- Paradoxically, some coping mechanisms like clearing land for agriculture, producing charcoal, overgrazing herds on shrinking pastureland, selling timber for construction are all eroding long-term coping mechanisms

- Movement of IDP families into regions where resources are already stretched means that both IDPs and resident families are increasingly desperate

“For their survival, the IDPs generate their income from marginal jobs. They work as farm attendants or domestic servants. Others collect firewood or deliver water. Yet women do not get equal treatment as men, though they perform the same job as men. Women’s wages do not exceed 5000 So Sh per day. Reports also indicate that some women work only for some subsistence food, and are economically exploited. They have no bargaining power to demand an increase of wages to improve their livelihoods. Harsh living conditions and their need to survive forces them to accept any wage and any work conditions, even if it exposes them to economic exploitation.

In addition to poor wages, inflation and steady increase of the prices of food jeopardizes the purchasing power of IDPs. For example, the price of one KG of maize, the main diet of IDPs had increased from So.sh 2000 to 6000 between May and July 2001. The IDPs can not therefore afford to buy the quantity of food they require. Most of the IDPs eat once in 24 hours a day.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.35)

"Prior to the war it was estimated that over 70% of the population lived in the rural areas and that over 75% of the population drew their livelihoods from pastoralism and agriculture, 16% from the service sector and 8.4% from the industry [...]. There are currently no estimates of levels of income or employment for various sectors [...]. The rural sector continues to provide the main source of employment of people, but due to massive internal and external displacement and the collapse of industry and public services a high percentage of the population in both rural and urban areas is unemployed or underemployed. Lack of employment opportunities is one factor sustaining the large numbers of militia, particularly in the urban areas of southern Somalia." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.70)

"Somaliland's estimated unemployment rate in mid-2001, however, exceeded 80 percent." (USCR, December 2001, p.7)

“Ironically, some efforts to earn a living – clearing land for agriculture, producing charcoal, overgrazing herds on shrinking pastureland, selling timber for construction – contribute to the problem, are jeopardizing Somali's ability to eke out a living from the land in the future.

'Somalia is caught in a vicious cycle where poverty and desertification are intertwined,' said Randolf Kent, UNDP Resident Representative. 'You can't address one problem without addressing the other.'" (UNDP 18 June 2001)

### **Livestock ban has led to major income deficits for pastoralists and IDPs (2000-2003)**

- While Saudi Arabia has not lifted the livestock ban trade continues to other Gulf States
- NGOs and the EC contribute improving veterinary services to boost importers’ confidence
- IDPs in Mogadishu and Bosasso hit by loss of trade-related employment.
- Printing of new currency leads to hyperinflation, devaluation and reduces purchasing power and labor opportunities placing IDPs at particular risk
- Livestock production is estimated to be the main source of livelihood for 70% of the population in Somalia
- Livestock ban imposed by Gulf countries since 2000 severely eroded purchasing power undermining food security in main livestock producing areas Puntland and Somaliland
- Somaliland is particularly hard-hit with shortfall in export earnings of US 2.4 million
- On alleged links with terrorist networks the US closed Somali remittance companies the single most powerful business, generating about US\$ 800 million yearly

“Within the livestock sector, contributions have continued to support efforts to strengthen the livestock trade sector, particularly, an effective system for disease surveillance and health certification of livestock and livestock products. Although the livestock embargo imposed by the Gulf States on import of livestock from Somalia remains in place for Saudi Arabia, the trade in live animals and animal meat products is increasing to other Gulf States. A possible way forward for support to the Somali livestock trade will be presented at a meeting jointly held by Food and Agriculture Organization / United Nations Development Programme (FAO/UNDP) with the OIE and Somali Business Council on 29 and 30 April in Dubai. The major constraints remain the lack of importer confidence in Somali certification and veterinary services. NGOs contribute significantly to the animal health sector mostly under the auspices of the EC-funded Pan African Programme for the Control of Epizootics (PACE) for Somalia.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.4-5)

***"Other Urban Areas, including Mogadishu Estimated Vulnerable Population: 40,000***

Urban areas are largely dependent on the modern trade economy, including domestic food produce and imported commodities such as sugar, salt and non-staple items. This makes urban residents and IDPs particularly vulnerable to economic shocks that may limit increase price levels and limit market access. In addition to the livestock ban, the printing of new currency has placed a severe strain on the purchasing power of poor households. Further, opportunities for casual labour at the ports have diminished." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.5)

***"Bari, Nugal and northern Mudug Estimated Vulnerable Population: 33,400***

The most vulnerable pastoral population group is lying along the coast where food availability and market access are severely reduced by the impact of the livestock ban and the poor state of infrastructure. Pastoralists in the Iskushuban area are particularly affected. In general, however, northeastern pastoral areas are not considered to be severely at risk to food insecurity or cholera outbreaks at the moment. That said, poor urban households and IDPs in the surroundings of Bossaso are extremely vulnerable following the loss of trade-related employment." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.4)

***Livestock ban imposed by Gulf countries since September 2000:***

"The economy of northern Somalia is significantly dependent on livestock production. It is estimated that livestock production contributes to 60% of the income of Northwest Somalia and 90% of the income of the Northeast. Livestock production is estimated to be the main source of livelihood for 70% of the population. The ongoing livestock ban imposed by Saudi Arabia has had a devastating impact on the social and economic systems of Somalia. ." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR June 2002, p.17

"The first reported outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outside of Africa, in Saudi Arabia, has resulted in a regional ban on imported livestock from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti.

[...]

Most seriously affected by the regional ban is likely to be Somalia, a country which depends heavily on export of livestock. It lacks an established government and institutions to cope with the ban, and has very limited opportunities for economic diversification. Without a recognised central government for almost a decade, Somalia has struggled to find ways to get livestock certified for export.

[...]

According to one Somali livestock expert, the ban 'reflects not just on export quality but also on local markets and the environment. It will result in the over-production of herds, without the usual market outlet, which will cause environmental damage.'

Somali sources told IRIN that there was an urgent need for international agencies to assist by helping to establish systems to 'investigate the health of animals.'" (IRIN-CEA 22 September 2000, "Introduction" and "Somalia")

"The current livestock embargo was initially imposed by the Saudi government on the 19th September 2000, following a reported outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in early September. Many of the Gulf countries followed suit some days later, banning the importation of all livestock from the main livestock exporting

countries in the region. If this ban remains, and is a comprehensive ban involving all livestock species and all of the Gulf market (as was the case in the previous ban), the implications for the economy and food security are very grave. Latest reports regarding the embargo revealed sharp declines in livestock prices in northern and central regions. The knock-on effects of restricted trading are expected to reduce employment opportunities and effect access to other important income sources. The economy in the northern and central parts of the country being most susceptible." (FSAU/FEWS 15 October 2000, "Highlights")

"The last time the Saudis issued such a ban, in 1998, it was only partially enforced, due to widespread smuggling through Yemen. This time, however, Yemen appears to be clamping down as well, making this episode potentially much more disruptive." (Menkhaus November 2000, p. 7)

***Ban has resulted in significant loss of income at macro and micro levels for Somalis:***

"The livestock bans have particularly hurt urban populations, including returning refugees and IDPs who, being dependent on the market, are reliant on a healthy economy for access to jobs and income generating opportunities." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.68)

"Moreover, since September 2000, states on the Arabian Peninsula imposed a ban on the importation of livestock from Somalia. As a result, the income of urban and pastoralist households in Puntland and Somaliland has been severely reduced, leading to dwindling asset levels, food deficits and increased malnutrition rates." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.3)

"There has been substantial loss of income at macro and household levels, which had limited the purchase of many goods, including medicine, and had accelerated the depletion of assets. Market failure because of the livestock ban would 'threaten livelihoods for many groups'. FSAU monitors and nutritionists said there was particular concern for the urban poor and Internally Displaced Population (IDPs) in and around most towns in the north. Burao, in Somaliland, was marked out as of particular concern as it was a 'heavily livestock dependent'. Bosaso and Galkayo in the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeast Somalia, were also of concern, the report said. However, the worst effects of the livestock ban on food security had been mitigated by 'unusually good livestock production and reproduction', resulting in a high level of milk for consumption and sale." (IRIN-CEA 12 February 2001, Somalia)

***Closure of remittance companies by the US because of alleged links to terrorist activity, led to the country's economic collapse:***

"Families with access to overseas remittances enjoy privileged access to social services and have better food security than households without.

[...]

Remittances have long been a critical part of Somalia's economy. Currently, with very low levels of agricultural production and manufacturing, remittances from the large Somali diaspora enable the country to run a balance of trade deficit and to enjoy higher levels of food security and access to private social services than would otherwise be the case. Future trends in remittances will be a key factor in sustaining human development.

[...]

The service sector is the most dynamic part of the economy. Money transfer companies and telecommunication companies have expanded throughout Somalia and increased the range of financial services, facilitating the flow of remittances from the diaspora and commercial transactions.

These companies, which did not exist a decade ago, are amongst the most powerful businesses in Somalia today." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, pp.38-9)

"Another study estimates that remittances to Somaliland alone could be as high as US\$500 million per year. That is four times the value of livestock exports from Somaliland in a normal year [...]. Another study estimates annual remittances to Somalia of US\$800 million.

[...]

A study in Hargeisa, Burco, and Bosasso calculated that remittances constitute nearly 40% of the income of urban households.

[...]

The rural poor and the internally displaced from groups who have fewer relatives abroad receive fewer remittances and are less well served by telecommunications. One study found that while the majority of households in Hargeisa received remittances, only 5% of rural households did [...]. In Hargeisa and Bosasso, there is clear evidence of significant differential access to remittances between urban residents and displaced populations and economic migrants from southern Somalia." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, pp.104-105)

## **Access to land**

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### **IDP women cannot access land without male support (2002)**

- Most IDP women who lost their husband in conflict or during displacement are in a predicament to access land and feed their families

“Representing the majority of IDP population in the district, women play a key role in supporting the household income. In their camps, the IDPs women bear two responsibilities reproductive and productive to support their household income. However, discrimination affects their socio-economic activities both in and outside their households. Traditionally women need a husband or male relative to have access to land. However, most of the IDPs women are single parent mothers who lost their husbands during the conflicts or displacement. They suffer lack of access to cultivable lands, which they can use to produce some subsistence food. Even when the husband is present, women still suffer social problems that results from entrenched attitudes of men towards women. In many cases men misuse their responsibilities and harass their wives, particularly when they want to misuse the household income to buy unnecessary goods such as miraa. Because of lack of jobs, most of the IDPs men are depressed and they chew miraa to entertain themselves.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.35)

## **Coping mechanisms**

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### **Traditional coping mechanisms eroded by protracted conflict and drought (2002)**

- IDPs in Somalia receive hardly any assistance and most survive through cheap and irregular labor which barely covers basic needs (UN 2002)
- Most IDPs have no economic safety net as they do not benefit from the clan system and either from remittances
- Economic diversification and informal employment options account between 25-60% of household economy
- Seasonal migration, adoption into another clan area and exogamy are ingrained strategies in risk-prone environments
- Changes in consumption and intake of famine foods, sacrificing short-term needs for long-term life-investment
- Mutual trust and reciprocity between kin have been considerably eroded by protracted droughts and conflicts

“It is estimated that there are about 350,000 internally displaced persons throughout Somalia with an estimated 150,000 IDPs in Mogadishu alone. They receive little or no assistance and most survive through irregular and cheap labour. Incomes barely cover basic food needs. Most cannot access clan support systems and do not have the benefit of receiving remittances. Moreover, they lack any form of protection and are subject to an array of human rights violations.” (UN, November 2002,p.92)

"Individuals and communities are not passive in the face of crisis but employ their intimate knowledge of the environment, or political and social relations to mitigate against disaster. Rural households in Somalia employ a range of strategies to cope and survive in adverse circumstances. These can include the diversification of livelihood strategies through seasonal migration for employment, changes to dietary intake, or the consumption of famine foods. Often, short-term needs are sacrificed to preserve a 'way of life'. In the absence of any formal welfare system in Somalia, resource transfers and wealth redistribution within social networks play a crucial role in the maintenance of livelihoods. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in hard times resources from their informal networks can account for 25-60% of the household economy.

[...]

Migration is an integral part of people's way of life in Somalia and a critical coping strategy in a risk-prone environment. Migration, resettlement through adoption into another clan (*sheegata*), and exogamous marriage mean that most Somali families have relatives spread among clans and over a large geographic area. These personal and familial networks can be drawn on in times of conflict or drought. Mobility as a coping strategy of pastoralists during drought, however, is restricted during conflict.

[...]

Clan affiliation and identity with a place of residence form a system for the sharing and co-operative control of resources at the level of the household, compound, community and clan. [...] [T]raditional obligations of assistance, in the form of food, shelter, and water [...]. Other forms of assistance include the loan of farmland (*hoorsi*) or a milking animal (*irmaansi*), the restocking of livestock, and the giving of credit (*amaa*). Helping those most in need is also integral to the religious and social obligations of Islam, institutionalised in the giving of *zakat* and *sadaqa*.

[...]

When widespread conflict and drought are combined, as witnessed in the early 1990s, the impact can be devastating. Production systems and household and community assets, such as food stores and livestock, were destroyed or looted and the option of migration was constrained by warring militia. As livelihood options were reduced and trust within and between clans was eroded, the geographical spread of the resource networks contracted, and families retreated to the reassuring safety of the community." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.69)

## **Public participation**

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### **Gender discrimination barrier to public participation (1998-2002)**

- Conflict and displacement have opened new opportunities for women's participation beyond traditional gender roles
- Women's newly acquired roles and skills as widows and household-heads needs to be carefully considered during the rehabilitation and return processes taking place in northern Somalia Women prevented from participating in decision-making and from accessing resources
- Increased role in commerce sometimes makes women more vulnerable to discrimination

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making and access to resources.

Violence against women and girls, resulting either from tradition or the civil war, includes the almost universal practice of female genital mutilation and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups." (UNICEF 2000, paras. 7 and 8)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in Somali society, where the rights of women in both the private and public spheres are seriously undermined. Rape, which was uncommon in Somalia before the war, has become a weapon of war for the militia and bandits, as well as in camps for displaced persons and returnees. Women belonging to minority groups, such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn, are particularly subject to these crimes." (CHR 18 February 1999, para. 74)

"Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable; in some areas half of the households are headed by women, who shoulder all household responsibilities while generating family income through commerce or farming. There is throughout Somalia an increased role of women in meeting household needs, in participating in community affairs, in agricultural production and in business activities. Since the collapse of the state, the role of women in commerce has grown markedly. The element of rapid change has been important; for many women it has made them more vulnerable, while for others it has opened vistas of opportunity virtually impossible in Somalia before the war.

[...]

In line with this changing role of women in post-war Somali society, evidence is emerging of women gaining political awareness. However, gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional, socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in formal decision-making processes and bodies." (UN December 1998, pp. 7, 47)

# ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

## General

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### Lineage identity is central organizing force in Somalia (2002)

- The six major Somali clans are Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Issak forming the Samale group, and the Rahaweyn (Digile and Mrifle) known as the Sab group
- Minority groups who fall outside major clan lineage divisions are often discriminated and marginalized in Somali society
- Minorities are traditionally hunters or craftsmen
- Bantu minority groups tend to be small scale farmers or laborers and lived in the riverine areas
- Bantu were victims of cultural genocide now all speak Somali except the Mushunguli group
- Clan networks provide physical and social security for Somalis

“Based on their patrilineal kinship and lineage segmentation, the Somali people are divided into six major clans, which in turn branch out into numerous sub clans, and minority groups. The major clans include Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Issak collectively known as Samale group, and the Rahaweyn (Digile and Mrifle) community categorized as Sab group. The Hawiye clan includes Habargedir, Abgal, Murusade, Hawadle, Galjel, Moblen, Sheikal, Djijele, Badi Adde, and Ajuran while the Darood group include Majerten, Marehan, Dhulbahante, and Ogaden, LeelaKase, Ortoble, Kaskiiqabe and Dashiishe.

The Dir sub clans include Biyamal, Gadsan, Gadabursi, Fiqi Muhumud, Samaron, Qubeys, Werdai and Akishe. The Issak are subdivided into Habar Awal, Habar Jalo and Habar Yunis, Edigale, Ayub and Arab. The Digil and Mirifle are subdivided into sub clans. The Digil include Geledi, Shanta Aleen, Bagadi, Garre, Tuni, Jido, and Dabarend while the Mirifle are divided into Siyed and Sagal. Some of the major subclans in the Mirifle group are Laysan, Harin, Elay, Boqol Hore, Jiron, Jilible, Gelidle, Hadame, Luway, Huber and Yantar.

Those who fall outside the major clan lineage divisions are considered as minorities. They are disadvantageous of being minorities except when they have patrons or patron clan that support them. This lack of clan protection puts them at the mercy of arbitrary action by major clans.

According to their lineage, the minority groups are divided into two groups: A group, which has similar ethnic origin with the Samale group, but traditionally considered as cast people who have no equal rights with others. This group includes Midgan, Tumul and Yibir (collectively known as Baidari group), Gaheyle and Galagale and Boni. They are traditionally hunters, leather and metal workers, and craft makers living in some parts of north, central and southern Somalia.

A second group, which is distinct from other Somalis in ethnic identity, cultural and tradition. They include Bantu, Benadiri and Eyle. The Bantu, who are refer to as “Jarer”, which literally means thick hair are small scale farmers or labourers who live in the riverine areas in southern Somalia. They are also divided into various sub clans with different ethnic origin. Some for example the Mzigua, Mzaramo, Magindo, Myao, Makua, and Manyasa collectively known as Wa Gosha “ forest people” or Oji are believed be descendents of Tanzanians, Mozambicans and Malawi’s who were taken to Somalia in the 19th century by Arab slave traders (MRG, 1998). They live and practice some subsistence farming in the Gosha area in the Lower and Middle Juba regions.

Second Bantu sub clans, which include Shidle, Shabelle, Makane and Kabole, are believed to have descended from early non-Somali agricultural communities. They are also small-scale farmers who predominantly live in the Middle Shabelle and Hiran regions. The third Bantu group lives in the Lower Shabelle region. Because of cultural genocide, and most importantly for protection reasons they have identified themselves with the other Somali communities in the region. These include Jarer-Hintire, Jarer-Wacdan, and Jarer-Biyamal. Except the Mushunguli group who retained their Mushunguli language, the other Bantu speak Somali language and have become assimilated into local Somali communities. However, they have never been recognized as real Somalia, as a result, they suffer ethnic discrimination which placed them into servitude class. They are marginalized and excluded from main stream of administration, education and minimum social and economic development.

[...]

The Somali clans are grouped into clan bonds or clan alliances formed to safe guard the mutual interest and protection of the members of the alliances. The Social contract or “xeer” is the most important component that cements together the alliances. It calls upon the collective response of any threat to members of the alliance. As marginalized groups, the minorities are outside this system, and they are vulnerable to attacks and human rights violations by the dominant clans.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp 5-6)

"In Somali culture, clan is the inherited patriarchal lineage of ancestors, passed down orally in detail, generation to generation, determining origin, social standing, and access to territory, property and power. In times of trouble, the clan also pays a penalty for inflicting death or injury, which relieves the burden from individuals and families. At its worst, clan leads to conflict, xenophobia and control. 'But at its best, the clan works like the western world's social security welfare system. It protects, it means that all actions against you and your family will have consequences,' said a Somali source." (IRIN-CEA 15 June 2001)

"In addition to conflict, technological change, trade, religion, migration patterns and the return of the Somali diaspora have broken down geographical and social boundaries. This has resulted in fundamental local and familial changes. In the absence of a central authority, the clan represents the lowest denominator in providing group and individual protection and social security. Yet, the clan remains the most potent force in contributing to social and political division and diffusion." (UN November 1999, p. 4)

"The social context of human development in Somalia cannot be understood without reference to clan affiliation. Lineage identity is a central organizing force in Somali society. At the grassroots level, clan elders and other community leaders play a vital role in providing most of the day-to-day governance throughout Somalia, in the absence of effective state authority, and are often instrumental in maintaining local stability. One of the paradoxes of contemporary Somalia is that some of the most powerful social and economic forces are simultaneously sources of both stability and insecurity. On the one hand, clan networks provide an essential level of physical and social security to many Somali households; the clan is a vital source of group protection, social security and customary law in the absence of state infrastructure. On the other hand, clannism is a powerful force contributing to unstable alliances, diffusion of power and communal conflict over scarce resources. In the period of state collapse, it has proved to be a divisive and destructive tool in the hands of political leaders. A second force, economic and business interests, at times promotes inter-clan and inter-factional accords for the sake of improved market conditions. However, these players also resort to armed conflict in pursuit of market control and price-fixing." (UN December 1998, p. 7)

# PROPERTY ISSUES

## General

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### **Most IDPs from Southern Somalia in Hargeisa rent land from private individuals (June 2002)**

- Displaced from southern Somalia do not own their land and 30 out of 34 interviewed Southern Somali families paid rent

*Interagency assesment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia (Clark, June 2002, p.27)*

"- 30% of area residents report they owned property before the war and virtually all report having no access to it now, citing war and insecurity as the primary reasons why they no longer have access.

- Almost half of the residents currently own their land. The rest of the households live on land owned by the government (primarily Stadium and State House residents) or by private individuals (primarily in Daami). Three out of four households currently owning their land were allocated it by the government.

- Somalilanders are most likely to own their own land, while Southern Somalis generally do not own their land and are the group most likely to be paying rent for their land/home.

"75% of Daami residents who don't own their land pay rent on it; these residents are predominantly the Southern Somalis and Ethiopians. In Daami, 30 out of 34 interviewed Southern Somali families paid rent, while 11 out of 13 Ethiopian families paid rent. In Daami, only 4 out of 50 families originally from Somaliland pay rent." (Clark, June 2002, p.32)

### **Bosasso IDPs evicted from their plots by original owners (2002)**

- The fact that public land is 'privatized' by local residents and then rented for exorbitant prices worsens IDP status
- Many IDPs are victims of forced relocations
- IDPs recurrently evicted incur high re-settlement expenditure
- Haphazard settlements and poor sanitation contributing factors to April 2002 cholera outbreaks

"The larger problem of the IDPs in Bosasso is the complete lack of urban planning and management of the town. While IDPs are the most vulnerable, the fact is that a high degree of land grabbing in which public land is spontaneously "privatized" by a resident landowner has worsened the status of the IDPs. More specifically, the landowners of land occupied by IDPs in Bosasso charge exorbitant rents not only for the occupied land, but also for the use of latrines and in many cases even the charge collection of water from shallow wells or water tankers. UNICEF officials have repeatedly discussed this issue with the camps' landowners and asked them to reduce the rents they charge for UNICEF constructed latrines and water facilities.

A significant number of the displaced population are very vulnerable to spontaneously and forced relocations. The insecurity of land tenure and ownership on the part of IDPs was cited as the primary

concern of the majority of IDPs we interviewed. To make matters worse the security situation in the camps is quite precarious and often dangerous for residents of the IDP camps. This is a particular source of concern for non-Darod clans such as the Madhiban and others displaced from Bay and Bakool." (UNCU, 30 July 2002,p.19)

"Significant proportion of the Bossasso District's population lives in the urban areas and is involved in business activities. However the high number of IDPs in Bossasso town and its environs as well the urban poor struggle to meet their daily needs. They are engaged in casual labour such as portering, house help activities, garbage collection and begging. The IDPs are constantly evicted by original owners of plots they have settled on and consequently incur high expenditure on their resettlement. The haphazard settlements have negative implications since little consideration on the environment is made resulting in poor sanitation and increased risk to diseases. On 13th April. Bossasso town received heavy showers, a most unusual occurrence in the area. Measles cases were reported in Bossasso town at the time of the assessment and a serious cholera outbreak hit Bossasso town in the week of 14th to 21st April 2002." (FSAU Nutrition Update, May 2002)

### **Inter-clan fighting results in land disputes and dispossession (1999-2000)**

- IDPs from minority clans with a low status in the community are unable to buy land (2001)
- Jiddu clan fighters in Qoroley displacing other farmers in land dispute (October 2000)
- Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities forced off lands (1999-2000)

#### ***IDPs of minority clans only able to rent land:***

" IDPs often come from minority groups (Bantu) and clans with low status in the community. One problem of the IDPs is that the major clans will not sell land to 'outsiders'/members of other clans. IDPs therefore only have access to rented land." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

#### ***Jiddu sub-clan claim to own all land in Qoroley:***

"Fighting between different clans with rival claims to land has left at least 10 dead and 15 injured in Yoroley, 75 km south of the Somali capital Mogadishu, the Associated Press agency (AP) reported on Monday [23 October 2000]. The fighting, which began on Sunday and continued sporadically Monday, pitted members of the Jiddu sub-clan, which claims to own all the land around Qoroley, and farmers from other clans who it claims have occupied its land, the report said. 'The Jiddu clan fighters have started displacing all of the other farmers, by either setting their animals to graze in the others' farms or just destroying them,' AP quoted a traditional elder Abdullahi Khalif Kobleh as saying. So far, six members of the Jiddu and four from other clans had been killed." (IRIN-CEA 24 October 2000, "Ten reported dead in Qoroley land struggle")

#### ***Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities forced off lands:***

"During the civil war, the Bantu population has been systematically pushed off their land towards the river by militias or bandits. They are now so close to the river that they face a real risk of their settlements being washed away during floods.

[...]

The Rahanweyn minority lives on fertile agricultural land and is more advanced in agriculture. It too has been subjected to dispossession and displacement." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 77-80)

"Bantus continue to be forced off their land, their property continues to be looted and their villages destroyed." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 17)



# PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

## General

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### **IDPs from the South have little to return to (2002)**

- IDPs' right to return can be drawn from the ILO Convention No. 169 for Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries, concerning freedom of movement and right to choose one's residence
- Very few displaced return to the south due to lack of security and no economic viability in their war-ravaged areas of origin
- Most IDPs are from minority groups and are afraid of returning to their home areas by fear of persecutions and attacks from the clans de-facto controlling their lands
- The unresolved issue of violent transfer of property and land along clan nepotistic policies is a major obstacle to return
- 44% IDPs from Southern Somalia in Hargeisa want to stay there
- Over 80% Southern Somalis state war as the main obstacle to return
- No social services or infrastructure in communities of origin
- Poor security is impediment to return and reintegration

“Once persons are internally displaced, they need to be guaranteed the right to return voluntarily and in safety to their place of residence. Although there is no general rule that affirms the right of internally displaced persons to return to their original place of residence or to move to another safe place of their choice. However, such a right can in principle, be deduced from the freedom of movement and the right to choose one's residence. ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries states explicitly that “whenever possible, these people shall have the right to return to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist” (art.16 para.3)” (Ibrahim F., 15 August 2002, p.4)

“The Rahanweyn constitute over 50% of the IDPs in Luuq. They came from Hudur and Wajid following the violence and occupation that occurred in Bakool and Bay region from 1995 to 1999. Despite harsh living conditions of the IDPs are ambivalent about returning to their original lands. For example the Marehan IDPs have expressed profound fear of the persisting insecurity and sporadic clashes between Marehan subclan which caused their displacement. The Rahanweyn IDPs indicate that that the situation in their original lands is not yet good for their return.” (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p26)

“All IDPs have little prospects of returning to their original places, as conflicts and human rights violations still persist in some of these original places. For example, the Galagale IDPs have profound fear of persecution from the Abgal clan who is still in control of their territories. The Bantu lost all what they had during the conflict and they have little hope of getting back their ancestral lands. The Rahaweyn IDPs reported that situation in their original is not yet conducive for their return.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.34)

"However, few of the existing displaced seem to be returning to their original homes. For some who were displaced from rural areas such as Bay and Bakol, there is little economic incentive to do so. For others who were originally residents of Mogadishu, a significant proportion do not feel it is safe or viable to return there. This is a potential obstacle for future reconciliation. First, because it reflects the continuing instability

of several regions, and second because it reflects a consolidation of population realignments and the violent transfer of property, such as land, that occurred during the war." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.61)

***Interagency assessment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia (Clark, June 2002, p.27)***

"All respondents were asked if they planned to remain living "here" for the rest of their lives, insh'allah; [...] Residents in all areas but Daami, State House, and Stadium responded "yes" in large numbers. The residents of State House and Stadium are aware that they do not own the land and that they may well be resettled, accounting for the low rate of planning to remain there. Overall, non-Somali Ethiopians planned to remain at a significantly lower rate than those from Somaliland (a rate of 71% [56-82%] versus 85% [81-89%] (P<0.05)). Those originally from Southern Somalia planned to stay at a rate of 44% [30-60%] compared to 85% [81-89%] (P<0.0001) for those originally from Somaliland." (Clark, June 2002, p.28)

"Southern Somalis report owning land before the wars at a significantly higher rate than those residents who are originally from Somaliland. Over 80% of Southern Somalis who had land before the war cited war or insecurity as a reason they could not return; the rest cited drought (under "other reason")." (Clark, June 2002, p.31)

"It is unlikely that the Somali diaspora can be attracted to return to a country where mere survival is often the main priority, development beyond aspiration and where social services and economic and administrative infrastructure have collapsed. Effectively addressing these gaps in services is crucial to the reintegration of the absolute poor, including returning refugees, IDPs and the poorest sectors of the urban and rural populations, who live on the brink of disaster.

[...]

Until security issues are addressed, recovery or progress towards it through reintegration, will remain under threat. Insecurity is a key component of recurrent emergencies in Somalia and one that needs to be taken into account in order to find viable and enduring solutions. Rehabilitation and reintegration interventions have significant potential to reduce insecurity. In particular, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-militia during rehabilitation phases contribute to overall security in a region. Settling the militia has been a pre-requisite for lasting peace and security in current zones of recovery and transition." (UN December 1998, p. 10)

### **Mayor of Bosasso requested assistance to settle some of the 28,000 IDPs (2002)**

- International community has provided hardly any support to the 28,000 Bosasso IDPs
- Mayor of Bosasso has put aside some land for resettling some IDPs, expecting assistance from UNICEF however disagreements hampered implementation of this pilot project
- Puntland Minister of Interior informed that he planned to return Bosasso IDPs in areas of origin with assistance from UNHCR

"There are approximately 28,000 (twenty-eight thousand) displaced persons living in five sections in the outskirts of Bosassi town. The largest IDP population has settled in the eastern section of Bosasso. By most accounts the IDP population according to local authorities, poses great risks in terms of sanitation, and health. The meager shelter available is also vulnerable to frequent fires. The Mayor of Bosasso has complained about the fact that for the last ten years none of the international agencies have done anything about the IDPs in Bosasso. The Mayor has asked international agencies to provide assistance and prepare other sections of the city for the permanent settlement of the IDPs.

The local authority has in recent months made significant moves to begin to alleviate the plight of the IDPs. Most notably, the Mayor of Bosasso, has officially set aside public land measuring 400 x 400 meters with the expectation that UNICEF and other agencies would contribute to planning and resettlement of some IDPs. The idea of this pilot project is to provide shelter, the extension of water and proper sanitation as a model for future relocation of more IDPs presently living in severe conditions. However, this plot is sufficient to house only a small fraction of the IDP population and as such cannot, in itself, represent a viable solution for the majority of IDPs. At present, the implementation of this pilot has stalled owing to a recently resolved disagreement between UNICEF and the Puntland administration over the management of a municipal engineering project in Bosasso. This issue was resolved as at early January 2000. However, both municipal and central authorities that a number of larger issues must be addressed within the context of both resident and displaced populations. This would include proper urban planning, an assessment of water needs, land management, and the strengthening of capacity building of the municipality.

There may also be potential disagreements between municipal and central authorities vis-à-vis a long-term policy towards the IDPs in Bosasso. For example, while the Mayor of Bosasso is quite willing to entertain the permanent settlement of these populations, the Minister of Interior informed us that he envisages the eventual return of these IDPs to their original areas with the assistance of UNHCR. In short, prior to any coherent policy with respect to the IDPs, it is vital that a clear and coherent policy be agreed upon both between local authorities as well as with the Puntland administration and international agencies." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.18-9)

### **Displacement and return are occurring simultaneously as populations move to access resources (1998-1999)**

- Refugees and IDPs apparently have returned to their homes with improved security conditions in many parts of the country
- Families move repeatedly to access relief aid
- Large part of the population is nomadic, moving away from homes and back again with seasons

"As security conditions continued to improve in many parts of the country, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to their homes..." (USDOS February 2001, Freedom of Movement)

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

"The character of Somalia's displaced people is complicated by several factors. Since the civil war, virtually everyone has either had to leave the country or has been permanently displaced following fighting. A large part of the population is nomadic, and so has no fixed residence. The war has taught Somalis how to be resourceful and, therefore, they can easily 'displace' themselves if there is an opportunity to gain something by it through relief channels. These factors make it almost impossible to put a fixed number on IDPs within Somalia at any one time." (Redding and Hansen 1998, pp. 82-83)

# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

## General

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### **Serious insecurity hampers humanitarian programming in most of southern and central Somalia (June 2003)**

- Security enjoyed in the self-declared (not recognized) Republic of Somaliland has enabled the sustained work of 38 international NGOs and 11 UN agencies
- Puntland witnessed relative stability since end 2002 enabling the quasi uninterrupted work of humanitarian agencies while being off limits for most of 2002
- While Southern and Central regions witnessed violence stability has returned in some pockets, enabling access to assist 15,000 IDPs in Juba and Kismayo in 2003
- Violent fights intensified in Bay, Middle Juba, Mudug and Lower Shabelle regions in early 2003
- Baidoa deprived from aid for over 8 months due to fighting between RRA factions
- In Mogadishu clan conflict and crime hinder access to over 150,000 IDPs, the largest displaced population in Somalia
- In cooperation of UNSECOORD and OCHA some assessments were conducted in previously inaccessible areas of South Mudug, Nugal and parts of Lower Shabelle regions
- 2002 saw an escalation of violence and loss of humanitarian space particularly in Puntland, Gedo, Baidoa and Mogadishu
- EC and NGOs has increasingly sought direct engagement with local authorities

“While fragile, the relative levels of stability achieved in northern Somalia and more recently in some pockets of the south have allowed for increased advocacy for access to and protection of civilians as well as cautious consideration of expanded operation in some areas. The comparative security long enjoyed by the international community working in the self-declared, but otherwise unrecognised Republic of Somaliland, and more recently in the Puntland State of Somalia toward the end of 2002 has continued. While still fledgling and limited in capacity, local institutions continue to develop in both regions, including ministries and networks of regional, district and local authorities. Somaliland’s continual move away from conflict culminated in its first peaceful multi-party presidential elections on 14 April 2003. Thirty-eight International NGOs and eleven UN agencies continue to work in this region in an increasingly coordinated manner.

In Puntland, the year so far has been characterised by relative stability, following a violent political and constitutional crisis that restricted access to the northeastern region for much of 2002. This has allowed aid work to continue with comparatively little interruption and for the UN system and its partners to take steps to expand its operations there in support of peace building, as well as to revitalise coordination mechanisms. While the southern and central regions remain largely characterised by violence and armed conflict, some levels of stability have improved in the Juba regions, in particular, in the areas of Kismayo, where the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) has created a relatively secure operating environment. As a result, several NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have recently undertaken assessments with a view to possibly re-establishing operations there, and the UN, namely UNDP and OCHA, are initiating work in the area to complement the longstanding programmes of UNICEF, Muslim Aid and the Somali Red Crescent Society, in particular, in strengthening assistance to some 15,000 IDPs and local destitute populations. It remains imperative in 2003 that the UN and NGO community take

advantage of such pockets of peace to work with whatever local and regional administrations are in place to enhance access to basic services and support wider rehabilitation potentials in support of peace building.

#### Persistent areas of conflict and the arms embargo

Meanwhile violence and armed conflict have continued or in some cases intensified in areas of southern and central Somalia. In the early part of 2003, fighting affected the Bay, Middle Juba, Mudug and Lower Shabelle regions, as well as Mogadishu. Tensions that could lead to fighting have also limited access to the Sool, Sanaag, Middle Shabelle and Gedo regions. The heaviest conflict has been around the once stable humanitarian base of Baidoa where fighting amongst the factions of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) have forced international aid staff and many people to leave the town. Clan conflicts around Buale in the Middle Juba region have claimed the lives of scores of people. In Mogadishu, where an estimated 20% of the Somali population lives, including 150,000 IDPs (many of whom have been displaced for over a decade), access remains restricted to UN international staff due to ongoing clan conflict and criminal activity.

Meanwhile, the Security Council in early April 2003 extended for another six months the mandate of a panel of experts appointed to investigate violations of the arms embargo for Somalia to allow further investigation and refinement of its recommendations. The report found evidence that weapons, equipment, militia training and financial support is being given regularly by neighbouring states and others to Somali factions and that the factions have purchased weapons on the open market.

Its recommendations for an enhanced sanctions regime implemented with increased determination, especially the establishment of a monitoring mechanism, are especially pertinent to the improvement of the operating environment in southern and central Somalia. Until the flow of arms is stopped, human suffering will continue and the efforts of UN and NGO agencies to alleviate it will remain dependent on highly unpredictable opportunities for action, driven not by need but the aims of those who have the guns.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.1-2)

“In cooperation with United Nations Security Coordinator, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNSECOORD, OCHA) continues its efforts to exploit new opportunities for expanded humanitarian operation in stable areas. So far in 2003, UN security officers have conducted assessments in areas where insecurity or other factors have prevented visits in the past, including in South Mudug, Nugal and parts of Lower Shabelle regions.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.5)

« UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia Maxwell Gaylard is deeply concerned about the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in and around Baidoa, where fighting for control of the town has disrupted aid activities for more than eight months.” (UNRC, 12 March 2003)

“Despite the intensification of the national reconciliation process in 2002, the year saw an escalation of violence in much of the country. As a result, tens of thousands of Somalis – already vulnerable due to years of displacement, drought, poverty and lack of access to even the most basic social services – suffered intermittent periods of suspended or diminished humanitarian operations throughout much of the country.

[...]

Against this backdrop, Somalia continued in 2002 to present a complex challenge to humanitarian and development initiatives. In many areas – such as Mogadishu, Gedo and the Sool and Sanag regions -- humanitarian interventions remained imperative. As a result of the loss of humanitarian space throughout the country in 2002, the UN Coordination Unit / Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNCU / UN-OCHA), in conjunction with the operational UN agencies, the European Commission (EC) and NGOs, has increasingly sought direct engagement with the authorities, and thereby successfully brokered access agreements in both Gedo region and ‘Puntland,’ which allowed for the safe return of international UN staff to these regions. ” (UN, November 2002, p.3)

“The escalation of conflict and insecurity greatly affected the humanitarian situation in 2002. Whereas banditry, extortion, kidnapping and other threats have long plagued aid operations in parts of Somalia, outright warfare in ‘Puntland,’ Gedo, Baidoa and in and around Mogadishu led to new waves of displacement; hampered relief efforts and seriously put at risk the lives of aid workers. In response to a request from the Security Council, a UN headquarters-led inter-agency mission dispatched to Somalia in January 2002 to assess the security situation confirmed that Somalia remains one of the most dangerous environments in which the UN and other aid actors operate.

Access to vulnerable groups reached a low point in the second quarter of 2002. The consequences were particularly grave in Gedo, where factional fighting between April and June caused more than 10,000 Somalis to flee to Kenya and cut food aid to a further 200,000 Somalis already suffering from an insufficient harvest and drought, which had increased their vulnerability and eroded what minimal assets they possessed.

Meanwhile, continuing insecurity in Mogadishu and in the southern part of the country resulted in civilian casualties, including humanitarian aid workers. On 22 February 2002, a Swiss aid worker was murdered by gunmen in Merka and a Somali NGO staff member was killed in April in the fighting in Gedo. In Mogadishu, a wave of kidnappings – including five UN staff within six months – further hampered relief operations. Of particular concern was the fate of more than 150,000 destitute IDPs in Mogadishu” (UN, November 2002,p.12)

### **Warlords and militias regularly extort humanitarian assistance (2003)**

- The ‘market value’ of international staff for militias forced ACF to pull out of Luuq in March 2002
- Insecurity in Mogadishu, Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Gedo resulted in sub clans controlling these regions diverting more aid than that reaching IDPs
- Militias de-facto controlling some territories divert assistance by granting ‘protection’ to humanitarian convoys
- In the North authorities have been reluctant to design comprehensive IDP policies and have sometimes blocked or diverted humanitarian assistance to IDPs
- The 20 roadblocks between Jilib and Kismayo dramatically increase food prices for IDPs

« Aujourd'hui, face à " l'oubli " dont est victime la Somalie, Action contre la Faim, une des rares ONG encore présentes dans le pays, dénonce une situation humanitaire très préoccupante et des conditions d'intervention toujours dangereuses.

### **Des violences inter-claniques mettant la population en situation de précarité nutritionnelle et sanitaire...**

Des années de guerre civile en Somalie ont abouti à la division du pays en zones claniques, contrôlées par des chefs de guerre, d'où un climat d'insécurité permanent et une forte criminalité. Les populations subissent cet état de fait au quotidien et ne peuvent s'aventurer hors de leur zone sans risques.

Cette situation ne fait qu'accroître leur précarité nutritionnelle et sanitaire. En effet, sans liberté de mouvement, il devient impossible pour elles de mener à bien des activités professionnelles, agropastorales principalement, ou d'accéder aux soins et à l'eau potable, déjà rares en Somalie.

### **...et rendant difficile et dangereux le travail des ONG**

Cette situation est délicate pour les ONG qui, sans interlocuteur étatique ni institutionnel, doivent morceler leurs interventions et ont donc difficilement accès aux populations. A Mogadiscio en particulier, elles ne peuvent intervenir que par l'intermédiaire de leur personnel national car le risque d'enlèvement est

considérable pour les Occidentaux, dont la " valeur marchande " constitue un véritable enjeu dans l'économie des milices. Présente à Luuq (Région du Gedo, Sud-Ouest Somalie) depuis 1999, Action contre la Faim a dû évacuer en mars dernier en raison de la recrudescence des combats. » (ACF, 5 February 2003)

“The provision of assistance varies from one zone/region to another dependent on the degree of stability and security of the region.

UN agencies such as UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, UNDP and some NGOs provide limited assistance. Insecurity in some areas in the south such as Mogadishu, Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Gedo affected effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. In such a situation it has been claimed that some of the sub clans that control these regions have benefited more than the target group “the IDPs” by manipulating the delivery of assistance because the clan militia provide security and safe passage to aid workers and supplies. In the northwest and northeast the administrations are not enthusiastic to design a comprehensive policy targeting the IDPs and returnees e.g. issues of urban planning, legal status and property rights. There are some cases where officials have blocked efforts to effectively assist these communities and in some cases diversions of assistance from IDP camps were reported.

[...]

Relief food and aid assistance does not normally get through to the IDPs. Most often, relief food is not IDP focused, and the Habargedir and other militia who are in control of the district manipulate the delivery of humanitarian assistance because they grant aid workers a safe passage only to areas that are beneficial to their clan militia groups. Little aid tends to reach IDPs and other vulnerable groups. An IDP elder indicated that the IDPs would continue to suffer high incidences of food insecurity as a result of discrimination.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.2-3; 34-5)

« Persisting insecurity has affected agricultural activities and other coping mechanisms of most of the residents in the Lower Juba region, including relief assistance. Aid agencies found it difficult to effectively monitor the humanitarian condition in the region and provide adequate assistance to the IDPs and other vulnerable groups. There are over 20 roadblocks on the road between Jilib and Kismayo, at which the public transport are forced to pay extortion each time they pass through the roadblocks which increased food prices.” (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.27)

### **International presence in Mogadishu on a visiting basis only (2003)**

- Mogadishu is divided between north and south by militias since 1992
- Most international humanitarian agencies working in Somalia are based in Nairobi since the UNOSOM's withdrawal in 1995
- Somalia declared by UN the most dangerous operational environment, with unrelenting banditry, extortions and kidnappings
- Fighting over control of strategic towns and key ports are common
- ACF is only international NGO in Mogadishu
- Without permanent presence, information about the humanitarian situation is scarce

« En revanche, dans la capitale Mogadiscio, l'association poursuit son action depuis 1992. Mais, deux programmes distincts doivent coexister : un dans le nord de la ville et l'autre dans le sud, conséquence de la division de la ville-même et de la difficulté pour les populations de se déplacer d'un quartier à l'autre. En effet, une ligne de démarcation, contrôlée par des milices, divise Mogadiscio et il est très risqué de la traverser. » (ACF, 5 February 2003)

"All UN agencies have a permanent presence in Somalia, although they have remained based across the border in Kenya since UNOSOM's withdrawal in 1995. With such an operation, there are a number of over-arching constraints. These include restricted and unpredictable access due to insecurity; lack of

presence in much of southern and central Somalia of international partners; limited or late funding curtailing emergency prevention and preparedness, as well as longer-term activities where feasible. However, in light of the changing security dynamics in the country, UN projects and programs are increasingly being relocated to Somalia, in order to strengthen the local monitoring / response capacity in four main areas of Baidoa, Garowe, Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Additionally, a common UN House is being rehabilitated in Baidoa to accommodate further staff." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.2)

"Continuing insecurity poses the greatest constraint for UN agencies and NGOs providing relief to the most vulnerable populations in Somalia. Although large-scale factional fighting is rare, banditry, extortion and kidnapping threats are rife in the absence of any authority to enforce law and order. This was demonstrated by the attacks on ACF, MSF and UNICEF in Mogadishu in late 2000 and early 2001.

Insecurity is often related to contractual and administrative disputes, preventing the modification of project designs and slowing rapid response to emergencies by aid agencies with risk-averse project designs. To overcome these constraints, UNICEF, WFP and other UN agencies ensure flexible operational profiles, balance national staff with members of all Somali clans, and use novel forms of sub-contracting and bonded transport.

Reaching vulnerable groups in Somalia is further complicated by the dispersion of destitute populations. For instance, since 1999, there are very few IDP camps in Somalia. Rather, IDPs and other high-risk groups are integrated within larger urban communities and rural villages. This renders their vulnerability less visible and makes targeting difficult, although the suffering of poor Somalis is no less real.

Four regions in Somalia – Middle and Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Benadir / Mogadishu – due to insecurity and lack of funding, have very little continued agency presence and programmes. Hence some 1.6 million Somalis are denied access to basic social services and relief assistance." (UN November 2001)

"The recent flare-up of fighting in Somalia has led to concern among humanitarian agencies over the impact of renewed conflict on an already vulnerable population. Fighting in the southern port of Kismayo and in the northeastern port of Bosaso has been among the heaviest seen in recent years. It comes at a time when aid workers are trying to sound the alarm over poor rains and crop failure in areas of the south, and the effects of general economic malaise as a result of a livestock export ban imposed on Somalia by the Gulf states in 2000. Randolph Kent, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Nairobi, talked to IRIN about the need to establish essential humanitarian access in the face of the new crisis. "(IRIN-CEA 7 August 2001)

"ACF is the only international NGO in Mogadishu with a permanent presence in both north and south Mogadishu." (UN Sub-Committee on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31)

"The vulnerability of Somalia is exacerbated by the pull-out of most international humanitarian organisations, leaving Mogadishu very isolated. The threat to aid workers in Mogadishu was such that aid moved out of the capital and almost exclusively into the regions - particularly Somaliland, Puntland, and areas of southern Somalia - with expatriate presence in Mogadishu on a visiting basis only. In Mogadishu, since the pull-out of the humanitarian and military operation, expatriate staff are, in many ways, seen as a "commodity" or a "resource". Hostage-taking has sometimes resulted in huge pay-outs by local businessmen. Likewise, aid programmes are seen far more as an economic opportunity than a humanitarian effort - in terms of employment, finances and equipment. Not only an economic asset, the expatriate aid worker is also a political target, with resentment over the international military and humanitarian effort still a factor.

International organisations have therefore headquartered themselves in Nairobi and operate 'in absentia' through a skeleton local staff, which results in large proportions of available funding being used for logistics and salaries - and has increased feelings of resentment. One consequence of this is that Mogadishu has become one of the most isolated capitals in the world. Apart from the strictly controlled aid flights, no

commercial flights as such operate from the capital - chartered small aircraft from Nairobi, carrying the stimulant plant qat, take only one or two passengers at a time. Information is therefore very scarce, and dependent on the security perspective of humanitarian agencies based in Nairobi - which try to act in concert over threats, kidnappings and killings in order to protect staff and programmes. This extreme isolation of Mogadishu and lack of information in itself inhibits development.

[...]

Western humanitarian organizations maintaining a rudimentary presence in Mogadishu are ICRC, MSF Spain, Action Internationale contre la Faim, Peace and Life (Sweden), and Daily Bread from Germany. United Nations offices include representatives from UNDP, FAO, UNHCR, WFP and WHO. These humanitarian agencies presently have no permanent expatriate presence and depend on a skeleton structure of local staff. Some local Somali humanitarian organizations have made efforts to work in the camps, but lack funding. For example, the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, founded in December 1998, has mapped out the camps and compiled lists of families, adults and children, as well as the main health and sanitation problems." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

### **Serious challenges facing the new government regarding improvement of security and humanitarian access (2000)**

- Security situation has been new president's biggest challenge and main priority
- Mogadishu business community has provided 300,000 USD per month toward establishment of a security force

"In Somalia, the Transitional National Assembly and the new Government have stated their determination to address the chronic insecurity prevailing in the South and other areas of Somalia. Opposition to the establishment of a new Government is generating new forms of instability with potential regional dimension that may pose a security concern for the humanitarian community." (UN 2001, p. 13)

"The biggest hurdle is the security situation, particularly in Mogadishu - which the new government decided was nevertheless secure enough to move to. Although the security situation has improved considerably over the last two years, businessmen and international humanitarian staff still rely on protection from militia, and an absence of law and order means fire fights between gunmen and clans can break out without restraint. Talking to reporters after his arrival, Abdiqasim said the security situation would be his priority.

[...]

Somali political sources pointed out that, in order to succeed, the government must have a cohesive cross clan force that answers only to a centralised authority, and not to their respective clans. Presently, the militia and their 'technicals' - jeeps mounted with heavy weaponry - belong to the clan. "We have to break the link between the security forces and the clans" said a businessman. Previously, faction leaders proved unable to break the clan's grip on the militias and their weapons. They depended on clan allegiance to utilise gun men they were otherwise unable to pay or equip.

As a central authority, the interim government now faces the challenge of finding the means to pay its nascent security force - and also equip it. The Mogadishu business community, tired of large overhead costs on security, have so far pitched in to the tune of \$300,000 a month toward the establishment of a security force for Mogadishu. 'How long can they sustain this?' a Mogadishu resident posed.

Local and international expectations will focus on the ability of the new government to get a grip on Mogadishu. During the Djibouti peace process, when clan representatives negotiated power, the Hawiye, who control the capital, were given the presidency in recognition that it was the only way to reestablish peace and security in Mogadishu - after a decade of competing Hawiye sub-clans laying waste to the city. 'The Hawiye created this mess, they have to sort it out', one of the clan representatives said during the peace talks.' (IRIN-CEA 16 October 2000, "Security")

## NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

### National response

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#### **The Somali Red Crescent has provided medical aid to the drought-affected throughout the conflict (2000-2001)**

- Somali Red Crescent Society is only humanitarian institution represented across the nation
- It has had network of primary health care clinics since overthrow of the Barre regime in 1991

"The Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) has been active in most parts of the country during the years of conflict that have followed the overthrow of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991. It is the only humanitarian institution represented across the nation, although its leadership is still based in Nairobi, Kenya. Its network of primary health care clinics has saved many lives and supported the most vulnerable people in society, especially mothers and children. This programme continued in 2000 with support given by the Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to the Somali Red Crescent Society's. The Federation programme aimed to assist the SRCS with the development of its human resources at national and regional levels, and to strengthen its institutional capacity for disaster preparedness." (IFRC 25 May 2001)

"Although it faces difficulties in maintaining effective leadership and lacks secure resources, the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) is still the only indigenous nation-wide humanitarian institution in Somalia. It provides health care for vulnerable groups as well as activities in the field of disaster preparedness and relief. The SRCS has paid special attention to the promotion of fundamental principles and humanitarian values, disaster preparedness and disaster response, and health and care in the community. It has also tried to improve the capacity and performance of its branches despite the difficulties of operating in a fragmented society with no central administration. Core activities have included first aid training and tracing services for people dispersed by the conflict.

[...]

With the support of the Federation, the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) has managed to survive during the civil war and maintain operations in favour of vulnerable groups where all other formal structures and services have collapsed. To respond to the humanitarian needs and to continue providing the required support to SRCS, the Federation formulated a strategy intended to support SRCS efforts by focusing programme activities primarily on the health sector, and more specifically: providing essential health services through the SRCS Integrated Health Care programme; supporting the Garoe Community Hospital; improving the institutional development of the National Society; introducing a community based first aid programme in some regions of the country; and improving the emergency response capacity at branch level. Federation activities will be coordinated with the ICRC which is the lead agency in Somalia, as well as with the United Nations agencies." (IFRC 18 October 2000, paras. 1 and 3)

#### **Islamic organizations have provided assistance in Mogadishu displaced persons' camps (1999)**

"In the IDP camps, Islamic organizations provide some assistance to the displaced, but mainly during Muslim festivals. Some 20 or 30 head of sheep are delivered to each camp for the Eid festival. Otherwise, Islamic organizations are concentrating on orphanages, funding Koranic schools, or injecting money into business ventures. The main Islamic organizations operating in Mogadishu are the International Islamic

Relief Organization; Al Haramayn; Al-Islah Charity; Monazamat Al-da'wa; African Muslim Agency and Muslim Aid UK." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

## Coordination

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### The Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) (1994-2003)

- The Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) established in 1994 includes UNCT, NGO Consortium and the Red Cross Movement
- SCAB developed the Guiding Principles of Operation to ensure a principled framework for intervention in the particular Somali context (2002)
- OCHA establishing field coordination network with five Humanitarian Affairs Officers for south and central Somalia
- SACB established a secretariat in Hargeisa Somaliland to strengthen coordination (2003)
- SCAB is a unique coordination body where there is no functioning national partner
- SACB's five sectoral committees provide close co-ordination in specific sectors and establish humanitarian ground rules
- International NGOs have become implementing agencies
- MSF withdrew from SACB in July 2001 in effort to maintain neutrality

"In implementing their various mandates, individual UN agencies continue to coordinate and cooperate closely together through the range of readily available mechanisms, including the framework of the UN Country Team (UNCT), the CAP itself and the SACB. The recent recruitment of five national Humanitarian Affairs Officers for the south/central zone has enabled OCHA to start building a field coordination network that will greatly enhance the role of SACB in its efforts at strategic coordination of aid activities in the country. In particular, the decentralisation of coordination will improve the participation of Somalis and Somali leadership in the coordination process, and allow more decision making to take place closer to the ground. The SACB has set up a secretariat in Hargeisa to allow this process to develop in "Somaliland" (UN, 3 June 2003, p.5).

"In an effort to promote humanitarian principles and human rights and to reduce the chances of aid manipulation and insecurity, the UN agencies have instituted, with their partners, a number of initiatives to ensure a principled framework for intervention. Chief among them are the *Guiding Principles of Operation*, which were developed on the basis of the following frameworks for international activities in Somalia, in effect since the early 1990s.

Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia  
SACB Policy Framework for Continuing Co-operation in Somalia  
SACB Operational Framework for Continuing Co-operation in Somalia

Drawing from these sources, as well as international humanitarian law and principles, the newly endorsed *Guiding Principles of Operation* provide a framework for the interface between international aid representatives and local authorities in Somalia through the establishment of the basic responsibilities and roles of each group and covers aspects such as recruitment procedures, immunities and privileges, information sharing and procedures for the settlement of disputes. Plans are underway to translate this document into Somali, alongside a comparative analysis of the humanitarian elements of Islamic teachings, in an effort to build awareness among local authorities, as well as among agency and UN partner staff, of

their purpose. The *Guiding Principles of Operation* were developed by a SACB working group and endorsed by the SACB Executive Committee in June 2002." (UN, November 2002, p.16)

"In the case of Somalia, external donors, UN agencies, and NGOs have created a formal mechanism, the Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB) as a forum to co-ordinate development and humanitarian approaches, policies and strategies in Somalia.

The SACB is a unique structure for a unique development context, facilitating co-ordination that under normal circumstances would involve the participation of an organ of the State. The SACB's five sectoral committees provide close co-ordination in specific sectors, and play a valuable role in managing the prioritisation and programming of global issues." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.15)

"In response to the vacuum created by the absence of a Somali state many donors have turned to international NGOs to act as their implementing agencies. These NGOs have, in turn, gravitated towards structures familiar to them and used local NGOs as implementing partners and sources of local input." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.15)

"The international medical aid organisation Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) today announced that it has withdrawn from the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB). MSF fears that continued coordination through the SACB will be in conflict with the organisation's principle of neutrality and impartiality in conflict areas.

According to the organisation, the Coordination Body's mandate to 'provide policy and operational co-ordination for rehabilitation and development activities' has led some SACB actors to be increasingly involved in peace-building efforts. However, with a view to recent political developments in Somalia, MSF sees peace-building activities by humanitarian organisations as a threat to the basic principle of neutrality and impartiality in providing assistance to people in need, which could limit the access to such a population.

The organisation sees the trend within the SACB to - sometimes publicly - affirm and support peace-building through the support to Transitional National Government as a threat to the neutrality of humanitarian assistance, and understands it is not the humanitarian agencies role to strengthen any administration.

Over the last few months, MSF has tried to reverse this trend from within the SACB. However, this did not lead to satisfactory results. According to MSF, the needs of the Somali people should be the only criteria for such assistance." (MSF 11 July 2001)

"Since 1993 aid assistance to Somalia has been influenced by a unique experiment aimed at consensual decision-making between donor community, UN Agencies and NGOs. After the Humanitarian Assistance Conference in December 1993, in Addis Ababa, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was established to undertake most of the tasks associated with aid coordination including information sharing, common planning and implementation. It consists of donors, the UN Country Team, the NGO Consortium, and The Red Cross Movement. The NGO Consortium is a voluntary association of the approximately 60 international NGOs working in Somalia. The Red Cross Movement includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS).

Six years on, the SACB has become an important forum whereby the main aid constituencies in Nairobi share information within the various sectors and themes of emergency and developmental assistance. Over time the SACB has developed into a system of committees and working groups that facilitate the coordination of aid agencies. It comprises a policy level (Executive Committee) and an operational level (led by the Sectoral Steering Committee) and a public interface (the Consultative Committee)." (UNRC 4 February 2000, sect. 1.4.A.3)

## **The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) and the UN Country Team (UNCT) (1998)**

- The UN Country Team (UNCT) comprises 13 UN agencies
- The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) is responsible for facilitating coordination among the UNCT in Nairobi and in operational areas

"The UN Country Team (UNCT) is comprised of 13 UN agencies, several large project teams, as well as a number of organizations with observer status. Each of these organizations has a responsibility for good management towards effective achievement of its individual mandate. In addition to their individual agency responsibilities for good management, collectively the UNCT is responsible for good management in four main areas affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of interventions in Somalia" (UN December 1998, p. 19). These are (i) ensuring ongoing consensus on the priority problems, the strategies to address them, and the division of labour among UN agencies and their partners; (ii) strengthening of its 'area-base' approach through the necessary flexibility to take into account differing circumstances and attitudes in different parts of Somalia, as well as employing participatory approaches and emphasizing Somali leadership and responsibility; (iii) improving the monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian assistance and development activities, as a management tool, and (iv) continuing to seek ways to reduce and to share the high cost of operation in Somalia, such as the transport savings achieved through the UN Common Air Services.

[...]

Primary responsibility for IDPs rests with their governments. In the case of Somalia, where there is no central government, local authorities must in principle accept this responsibility, though in practice these entities are not yet sufficiently capable to provide IDPs much protection. The international community therefore must do its utmost to assist. Recently, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator was given the mandate to ensure the protection of and assistance to IDPs, and to coordinate implementation of the activities by UN Agencies and partners which are operational in Somalia.

[...]

The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) is responsible for facilitating coordination among the UN Country Team in Nairobi and in operational areas. In Nairobi UNCU helps to assure representation of UNCT interests in various multi-agency forums, particularly the committees of the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB). In Somalia the UNCU is responsible for facilitating and, where appropriate, assisting operational UN agencies to coordinate among themselves in terms of common issues of policy, administration, logistics, security, planning and programme implementation. UNCU's main functions are: (i) secretariat support to the UN Country Team; (ii) support to UN humanitarian affairs in Somalia; (iii) human rights advocacy, and (iv) monitoring of and reporting on UN activities in Somalia." (UN December 1998, pp. 20, 53, 64)

## **The NGO Consortium (1998)**

- The NGO Consortium is a voluntary association of international NGOs working in Somalia

This is "a voluntary association of virtually all the international NGOs working in Somalia, i.e. currently about 25 active agencies. The Consortium, with its seven-member Executive Committee, has three main aims: exchange of information of common interest and concern, including technical information and lessons learned; orientation of NGOs new to Somalia; and a 'cascade' system for rapidly notifying members of urgent matters. Consortium members meet in Nairobi and in Hargeisa every month. Its elected executives help to represent NGO interests in the various SACB committees." (UN December 1998, p. 63)

## **International response 2003**

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### **CAP 2003 focuses on integration and protection of IDPs**

- The priorities of CAP 2003 include containing the spread of HIV/AIDS, education, protection, provision of basic services and coordination
- Three main goals of CAP 2003 for Somalia are 1) saving lives and improving livelihoods 2) integration and protection of IDPs and vulnerable groups 3) good governance, peace building and economic recovery
- CAP 2003 presents 56 projects from 14 UN agencies and NGOs which amount to US\$ 77,824,105
- UNCT is developing three national multi-agency peace-building initiatives including humanitarian and developmental elements
- The office of the Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator's (R/HC) UN-wide public information campaign on Somalia poorly funded (2003)
- Decentralized rural livelihood support: new UN strategy to reduce permanent and temporary displacement, prevent destitution of resident populations, encourage return in rural areas and check IDP numbers in urban areas
- Main obstacles to humanitarian operation are insecurity, the difficulty to distinguish IDPs from seasonal migrants, and lack of central authority
- Lack of willingness of de facto authorities to protect and respond to IDP needs and ensure the safety of aid workers are common challenges facing the UN
- Working against positive perception of the UN in Somalia are its past failures notably: the UNOSOM intervention, the stalled Arta process, the non-recognition by UN Member States of 'Somaliland' and the establishment of the TNG
- Operations are further constrained since 1995 by the costs of cross-border operations and resulting inability to gather quality and systematic information
- UNICEF is one of the few agencies who established operational sub-office in Jowhar Somalia

“Of highest priority for the remainder of 2003 include: containing the spread of Human Immune-deficiency Virus / Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS); educating future generations of Somalis; strengthening protection frameworks; the provision of basic services for vulnerable communities; and strengthening field coordination to maximise the impact of scarce resources.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p. 1)

“As before, the Appeal for 2003 is structured around three key themes that are reflected throughout the programmes, but with a greater emphasis on emergency preparedness, cross border operations, public information outreach and the protection of the vulnerable, as follows.

*Saving lives and improving livelihoods* by: 1) meeting immediate needs and strengthening the coping mechanisms of vulnerable households, 2) enhancing access to vulnerable populations through strengthened field security, information and coordination measures, and 3) promoting linkages with regional organisations and other actors within the Horn of Africa.

*Assisting in the integration and protection of internally-displaced populations, minorities, refugees and returnees and other vulnerable groups* by enhancing protection efforts aimed at: 1) building of local/national protection capacity, 2) participation in governance, 3) increased humanitarian access, 4) awareness raising among populations and local authorities, and 5) the development and promotion of durable solutions.

*Supporting good governance, peace building and economic recovery* through projects aimed at enhancing organisational and managerial capacities of civil society organisations and NGOs through labour-intensive public works projects and effective market support designed to: 1) stimulate household income, 2) ensure adequate access to and terms of trade, 3) encourage the lifting of the livestock ban, and 4) diversify income generating opportunities.

The Appeal contains 56 projects from 14 UN agencies and several Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). It totals US\$ 77,824,105.” (UN, November 2002, p.1 )

“Meanwhile, the ongoing operational efforts of the UN agencies and programmes continue to be based on the premise that much useful work can and is being done to promote and build peace in situations of localised conflict and uncertainty. These particularly focus on regions of relative calm, which have functioning regional and local authorities and where staff can operate safely. Special attention is being given to vulnerable groups, including returning refugees, IDPs and host communities. In addition to ongoing projects, the UN agencies and their partners in 2002 continue to identify crosscutting issues and strategic entry points to promote peace building. To this end, the UNCT for Somalia is developing three national, multi-agency initiatives that encompass both the humanitarian and developmental elements of a peace-building strategy. The first, *Skills for Somalis* will coordinate and build upon current efforts to provide technical and vocational training skills to Somali youth through the establishment of “centres of excellence.” The second, the *Provision of Basic Services* project (as an extension of the existing Reintegration of Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons programme), will attempt to ensure that the four basic services of water, sanitation, health and education are available to vulnerable communities of returnees, IDPs, host populations and marginalised minority groups (such as the Bantu and Bajuni tribes). The third, *Technical Expertise for Somali Professionals* will provide opportunities for the exchange of experience and knowledge and the development of uniform standards of operation to Somali professionals from a wide range of technical and administrative disciplines.

[...]

More generally, UN-wide public information initiatives overseen by the Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator’s (R/HC) office, included: 1) responding in a neutral and objective fashion to intense media speculation that Somalia might become the next target of the UN-led international coalition; 2) broadening the media’s scope of understanding regarding Somalia, in particular the potential for, as well as the constraints on, UN action, which led in 2002 to substantially renewed interest in the country; and 3) publicising core humanitarian principles, both in and outside of Somalia. These efforts were effectively supported by the development of a website for UN Agencies working in Somalia, media releases and trips, and information campaigns -- albeit in a limited manner due to lack of resources. As a result of increasing recognition of the need for sophisticated public information support of the UN Agencies operating in Somalia, a project to strengthen this function has been included in this CAP.” (UN, November 2002, p.3 ;4)

“Decentralised, rural livelihood support to resident populations at risk of destitution could help prevent further long-term economic displacement and reduce the need for the temporary economic displacement of those seeking urban labour to complement inadequate rural livelihoods. It could also potentially have a rural pull effect, encouraging the return of the economically displaced to their homelands. This type of approach would not solve the IDP problem, but can help reduce the pressure on and the numbers of IDPs in urban settings, where assistance is extremely difficult to provide and only temporary in nature.

To this end, based on the work done by UNCU/UN-OCHA, UN agencies and partners working in Somalia are stepping up their efforts to address the needs of IDPs and further explore livelihood approaches to assistance. Meanwhile, the authorities in areas where IDPs have sought refuge bear the responsibility of ensuring their protection and the respect of their rights. The UN and its partners have an important role to play in supporting and promoting their efforts in this regard.” (UN, November 2002, p.17)

### **Challenges**

“While UN agencies and NGOs have provided limited assistance to IDP communities, insecurity in areas such as Mogadishu and the Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Gedo regions has regularly hindered their efforts. As a result, aid agencies are exploring new ways to work effectively through local partners.

Additionally, the large number of seasonal, economic and thus temporary IDPs, mixed with the mass of more permanent IDPs, compounds the difficulties of providing assistance difficult in a manner, which does not encourage urban migration.” (UN, November 2002, p.17)

“Efforts to address the humanitarian and development needs of Somalia are hampered by, among other constraints, insecurity and limited humanitarian space; the lack of a central authority and the political fragmentation of local substitutes comprised mainly of *de facto* authorities. Further, the unwillingness or inability of these authorities to take responsibility for the special needs of IDPs and other vulnerable groups, as well as the safety and security of aid workers, often hinders progress. Aid actors in Somalia must also counter misperceptions of the UN as a whole due to the role and failures of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), UN involvement in the stalled Arta process, the UN’s position on Somalia (including the non-recognition by UN Member States of ‘Somaliland’ as an independent state) and the status accorded to the TNG [...] through its participation in the General Assembly, the origins of which are often misunderstood.

Further, overcoming the inherent constraints of a cross-border operation continue to pose challenges to the UN system, which has been based in Kenya since UNOSOM’s withdrawal in 1995. These include high operating expenses and the difficulties of remote information gathering and analysis. As a result, the UN, while continuing to maintain its Somalia country offices in Nairobi, will continue to the greatest extent possible, security conditions permitting, to decentralise programme management to Somalia and establish operational sub-offices, as has been done with some success by a few operational agencies such as UNICEF, which maintains a base in Jowhar.” (UN, November 2002, p.14)

### **UN Joint Action and Recovery Plan for Somalia (JARP) launched in 2002**

- JARP prepared by the UNCT is a common framework for agency programming in humanitarian, recovery and development assistance aimed at strengthening coordination
- In the absence of a functioning national partner, UNCT partnership includes local and regional authorities, civil society, national and international NGOs
- Strategy of JARP is to use humanitarian and development assistance for grass roots peace-building complementing IGAD and supported by the UN Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia
- JARP’s 4 priorities include 1) protection and integration 2) primary and vocational education 3) maternal and child health 4) food security
- JARP focuses on IDPs protection and integration needs and longer-term development needs including governance, rule of law, institution-building, economic recovery and support civil-society
- The inter-agency Joint Working Group (JWG) will be responsible of information exchange on JARP progress and four working groups will monitor JARP’s implementation

“1.The UN Joint Action and Recovery Plan (JARP) for Somalia for 2002-2003 is a common strategic framework for the humanitarian and development activities of UN agencies operating in Somalia. It aims to strengthen UN coordination in programming, resource mobilisation and programme execution, and through this to increase the UN system’s impact in Somalia.

2. The JARP was prepared by the UN Country Team (UNCT) during 2001-2002, drawing on frameworks established by the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) and the annual UN inter-agency consolidated appeal (CAP). At the end of 2003 the UNCT will review implementation of the JARP and, based on findings, extend the JARP (with revisions as needed) or prepare a new JARP or equivalent to cover a multi-year period beginning from 2004, in line with the harmonisation of agency programming cycles scheduled for 2004.

3. The strategy and priorities set out in the JARP were formulated by the UNCT on the basis of its assessment of the humanitarian and development situation in Somalia. In the absence of an overall national partner, the UNCT drew on a range of partners and sources for its assessment and determination of priorities. These included local and regional Somali authorities, civil society organisations, national and international NGOs and individual agency assessments and reports. JARP priority areas were selected according to criteria of consensus over priority issues, areas of existing collaboration, and areas and activities where the UN has a comparative advantage and most impact.

4. The return of peace and stability in Somalia is of paramount importance for the avoidance of further humanitarian crises and for the development of the country and its people. The JARP sets out a strategy for the UN system in Somalia to use humanitarian and development assistance *to build peace from the grassroots up, creating conditions that will help sustain an eventual agreement between warring parties*. This approach aims to complement UN support to the efforts of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), or other concerned parties, to bring about peace through political negotiations. It is supported by the establishment in 2002 of the UN Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia, which is intended to support ground-level peace-building activities by agencies and supplement the inter-agency CAP for Somalia.

5. The JARP is structured around four overall priority areas for assistance, which were formulated and developed by thematic working groups during 2001: (i) Protection and integration, (ii) Primary-level and vocational education, (iii) Maternal and child health, and communicable diseases, and (iv) Food security.

[...]

7. In **Protection and integration**, the JARP defines the overall objective or intended outcome of UN assistance as: *Increased protection and sustainable integration of refugees, returnees, IDPs, demobilised militia (including women and children) and resident vulnerable populations, supported by improved governance and economic recovery*. The UN system will aim to address together the immediate humanitarian and protection needs of vulnerable populations, and the longer-term development needs, such as governance, the rule of law, institution-building, economic recovery and the development of civil society. The JARP sets out a framework of outputs and activities in two areas:

Capacity building of local and regional authorities and civil society organisations; and  
Increased economic opportunities.

[...]

The inter-agency Joint Working Group (JWG) is responsible for assisting the exchange of information about on-going and planned programmes and facilitating the development of joint initiatives.

13. Other bodies with roles in UN system coordination and support include: the Heads of Agencies group, the Security Management Team, the Joint Working Group (composed of senior programme officers), the UN Coordination Unit / OCHA, the Humanitarian Response Group, the Gender and Human Rights Working Group, the Operations Working Group, the Information Officers Group, the Statistical Working Group and the Data and Information Management Unit. Four thematic groups, each with a designated lead agency, are responsible for monitoring the goals and objectives set out in the JARP and for liaising within the UN system and the broader aid community to ensure optimal distribution of programmes and resources." (UN, 27 September 2002, pp.3-5)

## Selected UN activities 2003

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### Strengthening IDP protection one of three priorities of the UNCT (2003)

- UN is developing a multi-agency approach to strengthen protection mechanisms in Somalia through an inter-agency advocacy campaign
- OCHA and UNICEF assessing IDP protection and livelihood needs in Kismayo
- Protection programmers have only received 21% of the funds appealed in CAP 2003
- UNDP Operational Framework recommends that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement be placed into an Islamic 'faith-based' context to attract Somali leaders' acceptance

“The third priority area for the UNCT is protection and human rights, which aims to ensure better protection in all respects for vulnerable communities in Somalia, including women and children, IDPs, refugees and minority groups, and to raise the standards of observations of human rights. To this end, the UN and its partners are in the process of developing a comprehensive multi-agency approach to strengthening protection mechanism in Somalia, including through a sustained inter-agency advocacy campaign in respect to Somalia leaders, including faction representatives, elders, religious leaders and civil society. OCHA, in collaboration with UNICEF and others, is conducting a pilot assessment of IDP needs in Kismayo that will combine protection and livelihood needs using analytical framework. This is an innovative approach intended to enable a multi-sectoral, potentially, multi-agency response and involve working closely with local authorities to assist them in meeting their responsibilities for the protection of civilians, in particular IDPs. It is hoped that this approach can then be replicated throughout Somalia. Humanitarian policy workshops are also being planned for the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), as well as the Puntland authorities. Continued funding of OCHA, operational agencies in the field and NGOs are critical to the success of these initiatives. Existing protection programmes in the CAP are only 21% funded.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.8)

« The **Guiding Principles for IDPs** should underpin all protection activities throughout Somalia. The principles must be clearly laid out to all authorities at every opportunity. Although based on international conventions and covenants that Somalia signed, there appears to be considerable ambivalence among Somali leaders to accepting the Guiding Principles either because they are not legally binding or because they are seen as a 'western' instrument. The latter concern should be addressed by placing the Guiding Principles into an Islamic 'faith-based' context since all the principles are also manifest in key Islamic writings.” (UNDP, 31 July 2002, p.5)

### UNCT initiated research projects to analyse IDP vulnerability and develop country strategy

“Amidst increasing concern over the deplorable conditions of IDPs and minorities – who comprise nearly half of an estimated chronically vulnerable 750,000 Somalis -- the year also saw innovative attempts to better define vulnerability in the Somali context. At the request of the UNCT, *A UN Report on Internally Displaced Persons in Somalia* was published in July 2002, which provided a first comprehensive contextual analysis of internal displacement. As part of this process, a draft *Operational Framework for Vulnerable Communities in Somalia* has been developed as the basis for further discussion among the UNCT, with the ultimate aim of developing a countrywide strategy for addressing vulnerability. Using a community-based approach, it seeks to: 1) set objectives and modalities for supporting dedicated national actors in the implementation of both short- and long-term interventions designed to address the needs of the most acutely vulnerable communities, and 2) in doing so, to challenge conventional programme planning

methods by encouraging organisations to assess needs in a more holistic manner, as opposed to strategising strictly within the confines of their mandate.” (UN, November 2002, p.3)

### **IRIN Outreach Radio Project covers IDP and human rights (2003)**

- In January 2001 OCHA launched the IRIN Outreach Radio Project on the premises that freedom and pluralism of information can build human security and democracy
- The project supports conflict resolution and reconciliation and informs about the humanitarian situation
- Features cover peace process, education, refugees and IDPs, justice and the rule of law, health, HIV/AIDS, women’s issues, the environment and human rights

“Access to impartial, contextual information and open debate has the power to influence the behaviour of communities and nations. This access can strengthen human values and allow even remote populations to participate in governance and shape development. Without freedom and pluralism of information within societies, there can be no true democracy or human security.

The IRIN Outreach Radio Project was set up in January 2001 to provide impartial news and information to the victims of humanitarian crises and to provide them with a better understanding of the activities and objectives of the humanitarian community. At the same time, this project is an attempt by IRIN to seriously address the information and technology imbalances that exist in developing countries by undertaking the capacity building of radio stations in Somalia.

IRIN Outreach Radio chose Somalia as a pilot project with the aim of providing the Somali people with access to vital and unbiased information. Somalia was identified and selected in a bid to support its peace process and its attempt to emerge from conflict. Radio was recognised as the most efficient channel through which to reach local communities and to make them aware of what was happening in their country by countering propaganda and misinformation.

### **ACTIVITIES**

The Outreach Radio Project supports efforts towards conflict resolution and reconciliation by providing radio broadcasters in Somalia with special audio features which are recorded in the Somali language in the IRIN studio in Nairobi, and sent to state and private radio stations for broadcasting. The themes of the audio programmes (features) cover such areas as developments in the peace process, education, refugees and IDPs, justice and the rule of law, health, HIV/AIDS, women’s issues, the environment and human rights. In 2003, the project will continue to support the peace process by helping to make local communities, internally displaced people and refugees aware of what is happening in the country and involve them in issues that affect their lives.

In 2003, IRIN radio will be incorporating new ideas into its project so as to ensure a more bottom-up approach to radio programming. Key elements of the Radio project will be the formation of partnerships with NGOs and other voluntary bodies, such as community-based organisations and other groups engaged in community development in selected rural areas, specifically those affected by conflict.

Through its collaboration with NGOs and community-based organisations, IRIN will promote humanitarian principles and human rights through training and advocacy, as well as enhance the capacity of national radio journalists to gather and deliver relevant, timely and impartial information. Part of this approach will involve bringing local radio journalists together for intensive training with the radio team and working with them on the ground in their respective countries. Co-productions between IRIN and local radio stations will also be undertaken, allowing partners to learn new production and digital editing techniques and

encouraging them to abide by the fundamental principles and guidelines of professional, ethical and balanced reporting.” (UN, November 2002, p.119)

### **UNDP basic services project to IDP settlements to achieve minimum standards (2003)**

- UNDP project aims at providing basic services to all IDP settlement camps in Somalia
- Main targets will be urban centers where IDP spontaneous settlements have grown
- UNDP aims to achieve SPHERE minimum standards including access to water, sanitation, and basic health services

“Despite the fact that Somalia remains a country without an effective central government with a broad political mandate, levels of conflict and violence have decreased over the last five years in many areas and particularly in the north western and north eastern parts of the country. Official refugee camps in Ethiopia and Djibouti are being closed down and Somali refugees from these camps are being resettled in their home regions. In addition to these official returnees, there has been spontaneous migration by people escaping drought in Ethiopia. Opportunities for making a peaceful living are considered to be greatest in the main urban centres and this perception coupled with limited humanitarian assistance to rural areas, continuing localised violence and natural disasters has encouraged significant internal human migration (mainly by the marginalised minority clans) from rural to urban areas within Somalia.

Physical evidence of displacement can be seen in the exponential growth of urban populations in Somalia and the mushrooming of official and unofficial settlements for displaced persons across Somalia and particularly in and around the main urban centres of Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Bosasso, Burco, Galkaiyo and Baidoa.

Living conditions in these settlement areas are harsh and fundamentally contravene standards outlined in the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (SPHERE). An estimated one in twenty people in Somalia are living under makeshift plastic shelter, without access to water and sanitation, with limited or no educational or economic opportunities and in the shadow of an unacceptably high risk of disease and violence to the person.

#### **The Target Group**

This proposal focuses on Somalis who are vulnerable by reason of their physical displacement and identifies these people through their habitation of particular settlement sites. The project will directly and indirectly benefit the host communities who suffer the strain of expanding pressure on services and opportunities.

#### **Aim**

To achieve the minimum standards as stated in the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (SPHERE) for access to clean water and sanitation and access to basic health services in the displaced person settlement areas in Somalia. Minimum standards in relation to education in these settlements will also be identified and observed separately and implemented as part of project activity.

#### **Outcomes**

Project funding is being sought to implement quick impact projects to address gaps in basic services. The project will also establish a coordination system to support the work of many agencies in the field. The coordination system will systematically provide credible data and analysis on living conditions and access to basic services in the relevant settlement areas as well as provide an activity and results framework against which agencies can make commitments and report the impact of their work.” (UN, 3 June 2003)

## **UNDP Emergency Reproductive Health Project for IDPs in northwestern Somalia (2003)**

- UNDP seeks to provide reproductive health services to 15,000 IDPs living in settlement camps around Hargeisa and Burao
- UNDP project aims at improving a situation where 1600 women die out of 100,000 live births

“Somalia has one the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. One thousand and six hundred women die for every 100,000 live births. It is estimated that the situation is even worse in the settlements where IDPs and returnees from exile live, who have limited access to scarce basic health services. Between 1992 and 2001, about 420,000 Somalis have returned home from camps in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen and Eritrea. Of these, 53% returned to north-western Somalia. An estimated 30% of Hargeisa's population is comprised of recent returnees, while there are approximately 15,000 IDPs in the north-western towns of Hargeisa and Burao. About 12,500 refugee returnees and IDP families have settled in five major areas in Hargeisa, namely Sheikh Nuur, Mohamed Mooge, Sinai, Ayaha and Aw Aden. All five areas lack basic reproductive health and family planning services.

A baseline survey will be conducted to allow progress to be measured. Activities and achievements will be documented using the SACB monthly and quarterly reporting formats. A final project evaluation and report will also be prepared to this effect.” (UN, November 2002,p.37)

## **UNDP undertakes second phase of the programmed for the reintegration of returnees and IDPs (2003)**

- UNDP pursues to second phase of the multi-agency programmed providing basic social services and economic opportunities to returnees, IDPs and host communities
- Over 38,000 IDPs living around major northwestern towns will be targeted
- First phase completed in June 2002 identified specific needs and included implementation of quick impact pilot project in Somaliland
- In Puntland activities were not implemented due to insecurity
- UNDP will subcontract UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, UNFPA, ILO, UN Habitat, local authorities, international and local NGOs as implementing partners
- The Second phase will focus on basic social services, enhancing economic opportunities, governance and basic infrastructure

“Hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees fled to neighbouring countries between 1988 and 1991 as result of Somalia’s bitter civil war, which devastated the nation’s towns and cities and left its infrastructure in ruins. At its peak, the Somali refugee population in Ethiopia alone numbered over 600,000. In response to the flight of the Somali population, refugee camps were established in Region Five of Ethiopia, along the Somali border and in Djibouti. Since 1991, approximately 400,000 voluntarily left the camps to return to their places of origin in northwestern and northeastern Somalia. In addition, it is estimated that over 38,000 IDPs live in and around major towns in northwestern and northeastern regions. It is within the context of these returning, returned and IDPs that the need for an integrated and coordinated approach has been identified – hence the Reintegration of Refugees and IDPs Programme.

### **ACTIVITIES**

The first phase of the programme, which began in mid 2001 was completed in June 2002. The first phase entailed assessments, consultations and planning exercises to identify specific needs for the reintegration process, as well as preparations of detailed proposals for interventions required to address these needs. In

addition, pilot projects for quick impact in areas of immediate need were implemented. While programme activities were successfully implemented in ‘Somaliland’, no activity took place in ‘Puntland’ due to the absence of international presence following the recent political and security situation.

One of the final products from the first phase of the programme has been the Integrated Area Development Plan of Action (IADP) involving key actors in northwestern Somalia. These actors include key sectoral ministries, local government actors, local and international NGOs, UN agencies and the partner communities.

The key areas that will be addressed during the second phase of the programme are:

Basic social services – health, water & sanitation and education;

Enhancement of economic opportunities;

Governance;

Basic infrastructure.

Based on reintegration priorities identified through the Inter-agency Settlement Areas Assessment, 70% of the investment should be allocated for social and economic development, and 30% for capacity development activities. Implementation of project activities will take place through subcontracts with UN agencies, national and international NGOs, and local contractors following UNDP rules, regulations and procedures.” (UN, November 2002, p.96)

### **UNICEF project to improve water and sanitation services for IDPs in urban peripheries (2003)**

- UNICEF projects targets about 300,000 IDPs in major towns with no sanitation facilities and lack of access to protected water supplies
- UNICEF aims at curbing outbreaks of diarrhea such as cholera by building latrines and protecting water supplies
- UNICEF aims at reducing high death rates among IDPs in urban settlements caused by preventable diseases

“Access to clean water in crowded urban situations is among the most immediate and essential needs faced by displaced populations. In most major towns in Somalia host IDPs living in poor sanitation conditions with inadequately protected water supplies and no sanitation facilities. The water supplies are very often from highly polluted shallow wells. Often lacking both hygiene awareness and sanitation facilities most people excrete in the general area of their accommodation and water supply. Most of these people are completely destitute and barely meet their daily survival needs. Their dwellings are generally constructed from sticks and covered with cardboard or metal sheets made from flattened oil drums. In such situations, communicable and water born diseases can take a quick and costly toll on the lives of children and adults. Outbreaks of diarrhoea, cholera and other diseases result from the lack of sanitation and/or poor water supply.

The construction of latrines and the improvement and protection of water supplies in these vulnerable, peri-urban communities is expected to reduce diseases, and this mortality and morbidity, in such areas.

UNICEF aims to support emergency water supplies to: 1) prevent and limit the most egregious effects of displacement and food insecurity, 2) support the rehabilitation of basic rural and urban water supply systems, 3) increase the availability and reduce the resources needed to obtain safe water, and 4) reduce mortality and morbidity through the promotion of improved hygiene and environmental sanitation, community management and ownership. Strategies will include promotion of the involvement of local authorities, community members, women’s groups and the private sector in the planning and

implementation of basic water and sanitation services in IDP and poor peri-urban settlements” (UN, November 2002, p. 60)

### **IOM pilot project to improve socio-economic status of IDPs in Somaliland (2003)**

- IOM project facilitates a community-based approach to reintegration by creating employment and market opportunities for IDPs, returnees and vulnerable groups
- Pilot project will provide vocational training and micro-finance

“The overall objective of the pilot project is to contribute in facilitating community-based approach for reintegration of returnees as well as local populations by increasing economic opportunities and thus in peace building and national reconstruction efforts of Somaliland through reintegration process.

The immediate aim of this project is to create sustainable self-employment and employment opportunities for returnees, displaced and low income persons including women through micro-credit, thereby facilitating their integration, self-sufficiency and reducing migratory pressures in ‘Somaliland’. The project will target the area of Hargeisa.

It is envisaged that the small pilot project for vocational training and micro finance in ‘Somaliland’ will result in income generation activities and stimulate local economies and markets. The income accrued from these activities is expected to uplift the social and economic status of the host communities, yield additional positive results for both individual beneficiaries as well as contribute to the ongoing reconstruction efforts in ‘Somaliland’. It also aims to bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation/development assistance in ‘Somaliland’. This project is expected to compliment similar initiatives geared towards income generating opportunities and the need to enhance the skilled labour force in Somalia.” (UN, November 2002, p.114)

## **International response 2002**

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### **OCHA IDP Unit workshop on vulnerable communities in Somalia (2002)**

- OCHA IDP Unit convened a workshop on vulnerable communities in Hargeisa 21-24 July 2002
- It aimed at exploring how the international community can best support national actors to answer the needs of IDPs
- It aimed at determining responsibility and accountability for protection and assistance for IDPs
- It seeks ways to establish enhanced information base on IDPs
- The workshop gathered international and UN agencies and over half of the participants were Somali nationals
- Based on the workshop’s outputs the Unit developed an Operational Framework for Vulnerable Communities

“The Unit for Internal Displacement in OCHA was requested by the UN HC/RC to act as co-facilitator for a workshop on Vulnerability Communities in Somalia convened in Hargeisa from 21-24 July 2002. Specifically, the Workshop was tasked with: \_ Exploring how the international community can best support national actors committed to interventions that address the fundamental need of vulnerable

communities, especially IDPs; \_ Determining responsibility and accountability for protection, assistance and durable solutions for IDPs in Somalia; \_ Establishing an enhanced information base on IDPs (how many, where, what condition, the primary needs, etc) drawn from participating UN agencies and NGOs currently operating inside Somalia.

The Unit was also required to produce a first draft of an operational framework for addressing vulnerable communities based upon the discussions and outputs of the Workshop. A Senior IDP Advisor from the Unit was deployed and was assisted by a junior colleague from the Unit.

### **3 The Workshop on Vulnerable Communities in Somalia**

The workshop's 40 participants were drawn from a broad range of stakeholders, namely UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNIFEM, UNESCO, UNHCR, WHO, OCHA, OHCHR, IOM, FSAU, SCF (UK), CARE, IRC, Danish Refugee Council, WSP, IMC, CRD, Africa 70, Puntland Development Research Center, USAID, and the EC.

Well over half of the participants were Somali nationals, including representatives from Mogadishu, the south/central regions and Puntland.

The workshop evaluated a number of research papers on IDPs, minority groups and vulnerable populations and sought to define an operational framework through which the needs of such populations can best be addressed, especially in areas where there was little or no international presence.

### **4 The Operational Framework for Vulnerable Communities in Somalia**

Based upon the workshop's discussions and outputs, the Unit developed a first draft of an Operational Framework for Vulnerable Communities in Somalia that proposes a set of objectives and operational modalities that the international community should adopt in assisting dedicated Somali actors in addressing the needs of vulnerable communities, including IDPs. The underpinning construct of the Framework is that leadership needs to be given to Somali actors and that a crosscutting 'livelihood approach' (based on a framework developed by DFID) should be adopted instead of the more traditional sectoral approach used by the UN. The Framework addresses the issues of vulnerable target population, the operational environment, protection and access, responsibility and accountability, roles of Somali, assets and vulnerabilities to be addressed, and resource mobilization.

### **5 Next Steps [...]**

Parallel to the Framework consultations, the OCHA Somalia team will develop a matrix of responsibilities, based upon the workshop findings, which will provide the basis for future systemic interventions on behalf of the most vulnerable." (OCHA IDP Unit, 7 August 2002)

## **Return and reintegration of IDPs and returnees is one of the three priorities of UN 2002 Appeal**

- Joint UNDP/UNHCR project to promote sustainable reintegration of returnees and IDPs in northwestern and northeastern Somalia
- Reintegration efforts in Hargeisa, Burao, Bosasso and Garowe in Northern Somalia include dissemination of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
- Many IDPs reside in areas of return therefore assistance programs target IDPs returnees as well as host communities totaling 670,000 beneficiaries
- Security conditions in the northeast and northwest of Somalia have attracted many displaced and returnees
- Return and reintegration greatly hampered by recurrent livestock import bans undermining absorptive capacity of the Northwest

- The programme addresses physical needs in sectors such as water, education and health, as well as long-term socio-economic requirements by strengthening policy and governance structures through participation and capacity-building
- The first phase of the programme will produce an inter-agency needs assessment in view to facilitate reintegration of IDPs and returnees
- The second phase will be in light of the assessment findings to implement projects to strengthen governance, enlarging economic opportunities and improving basic social services

"Saving lives and supporting livelihoods;  
Supporting good governance, peace building and economic recovery;  
Assisting resettlement and reintegration of displaced populations." (UN, November 2001)

"The Programme for Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons in Somalia is part of a sub-regional initiative launched by IGAD, UNHCR and UNDP to facilitate the reintegration of uprooted populations in the Horn of Africa.

[...]

Initial implementation will be in four pilot districts - Hargeysa and Burao in Northwest Somalia and Bosasso and Garowe in Northeast Somalia. It will then expand into other areas of northern Somalia, which require support in reintegrating returning refugee and displaced populations." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR , pp.1,2)

"As part of a sub-regional initiative to facilitate the reintegration of up-rooted populations in the Horn of Africa, a joint UNDP/UNHCR programme has been formulated and implemented to promote sustainable reintegration by providing adequate basic social services and economic opportunities for returnees and the host communities. During phase I of this joint UNDP/UNHCR programme, wide consultations have taken place to ensure the full participation of the authorities and the communities in reintegration activities. Mechanisms are also in place to coordinate activities of all UN agencies and international NGOs in returnees receiving communities. The second phase involves the implementation of identified interventions, initially in four pilot districts, and later expanding to other areas. The programme targets the northwestern and northeastern regions of Somalia as the two areas requiring support in reintegrating returning refugees and displaced populations

[...]

Efforts to promote human rights, gender equity and the eradication of all forms of discrimination – as necessary conditions for the return of refugees – included the dissemination in 'Somaliland' of the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* and international humanitarian and human rights law in the Somali language.

[...]

While opportunities for joint agency action to support reintegration were abundant, some of these could not be carried out due to lack of funding available to agencies." (UN, November 2002, p.9,10)

**Objectives:**

"Under Phase I of this project, the Programme Management Team, with the full participation of central, district and local authorities, will undertake a planning and assessment process, which will result in the preparation of a detailed interagency, integrated development programme aimed at supporting the reintegration of refugees and IDPs within the host communities in four selected districts. At the same time, a number of development projects will be implemented in each of the programme areas." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR June 2002, 29)

**Implementing partners: UNHCR and UNDP:**

"Between 1993 and 2000 UNHCR spent approximately US\$12.5 million (excluding international procurement such as vehicles, pipes, pumps etc.) on its programme in Northwest Somalia which served to facilitate the repatriation and reintegration process by rehabilitating and reconstructing water, infrastructure, agriculture and environmental projects through QIP mechanisms. Although all these project

initiatives have been geared to benefit directly the returnees in their respective areas of origin, the internally displaced population and the population in the impacted areas have benefited and continue to benefit from the project assistance packages.

[...]

The UNDP-Somalia Programme Strategy has three inter-linked programme objectives: (i) Peace and Security; (ii) Governance; (iii) Economic Recovery and Poverty Eradication." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, pp.7, 9)

**Other UN organizations involved:**

***UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, WFP, WHO, FAO, IFAD, UNHCHR, UNIFEM***

**NGOs involved:**

***Danish Refugee Council (DRC), SC-USA, Swiss Group, IRC***

**Target groups:**

"Based on UNICEF (1998) population figures, it is estimated that the pilot phase of this project will benefit at least 670,000 persons[...].

The direct beneficiaries of this programme will be the individual families and groups (returnees, internally displaced persons and the receiving communities) of the selected districts of intervention. They will benefit from projects designed to provide essential services and generate income and livelihoods." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.23)

"In a country that has to deal with the consequences of large numbers of people who are displaced, the distinction between internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees has little relevance. In the case of Somalia, refugees as well as IDPs may be reluctant to return to their home areas since they remain replete with mines. Many former refugees are now IDPs since on-going conflict often prevents them from accessing their regions of origin. Equally significantly, demobilised militia, who may still retain their arms, have little incentive to return to their original towns or villages.

The impact of these categories of displaced people upon the communities they enter and the needs of the displaced themselves rarely benefit from a process of categorisation. In this sense, any intervention must assume a holistic perspective that does not categorise different populations within a community but instead addresses the needs of the entire community. Viewing displacement from such a holistic perspective is the only way to foster durable solutions that will positively affect communities as a whole. (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR; June 2002, pp.5-6)

**Justification:**

"The authorities of Northeast and Northwest Somalia have requested support from UNDP and UNHCR to support the process of reintegrating returning refugees and displaced populations through rehabilitation activities. It is generally agreed that to achieve this successfully a multi-sectoral, multi-agency coordinated approach and development-oriented activities are required.

UNDP and UNHCR have built upon the experience gained through the implementation of the November, 1997 agreement on "Co-operation with regard to development activities affecting refugees and returnees", and this joint proposal for Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons in Somalia was instituted subsequent to this agreement." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR June 2002, p.15)

"In a country that has to deal with the consequences of large numbers of people who are displaced, the distinction between internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees has little relevance. In the case of Somalia, refugees as well as IDPs may be reluctant to return to their home areas since they remain replete with mines. Many former refugees are now IDPs since on-going conflict often prevents them from accessing their regions of origin. Equally significantly, demobilised militia, who may still retain their arms, have little incentive to return to their original towns or villages." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, pp.5-6)

"Many of the IDPs actually reside in areas to which Somali refugees will return. Therefore targeting the returnees and ignoring the IDPs would negatively affect the reintegration process especially the reconciliation aspect. Although UNHCR is not directly responsible for IDPs in Somalia and does not provide individual assistance packages to them, they will benefit from the reintegration activities in those areas receiving returnees." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.106)

"The present prevailing security conditions in many regions – particularly the northeast and northwest of Somalia – has prepared the way for the return and reintegration of many of these populations. UNHCR and UNDP's joint efforts in Somalia are part of the Regional Programme for Refugee reintegration recognising the need to promote integrated and comprehensive development to returnees and resident populations alike, in areas of return as well as former host communities. The comprehensive and lasting reintegration and rehabilitation of returnees and IDPs cannot be sustained without rebuilding the productive capacities of the affected areas." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.105)

"The Northeast have not yet developed such a specific plan to address repatriation and reintegration needs, but a recent statement the authorities in the Northeast highlighted the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs as a high priority on their policy agenda. A thorough assessment of the specific needs of Northeast Somalia, particularly in relation to IDPs, is a crucial factor in ensuring that a successful reintegration and rehabilitation process occurs. The first phase of this programme needs to ascertain the current situation regarding returning refugees, IDPs and demobilised militias and the existing capacity to deal with this." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.5)

## **NGO Response**

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### **Action Contre la Faim continually works to assist IDPs in Mogadishu (2000-2002)**

- ACF admits more than 250 severely malnourished children in its Therapeutic Feeding Centres in Mogadishu
- ACF is one of only aid organizations working in north and south Mogadishu
- ACF programmes work to fight malnutrition and support clean water access

"More than 250 severely malnourished children are admitted each month to the two Therapeutic Feeding Centres run by Action Against Hunger in north and south Mogadishu, where the children receive intensive treatment and immunisation.

To add to this dramatic situation, cholera, an endemic disease, usually occurs from December to May and affects several thousand people each year.

Action Against Hunger is preparing to launch an anti-cholera programme amongst the most vulnerable to avoid the spread of the epidemic." (ACF, 21 December 2001)

"Etant l'une des rares organisations humanitaires encore présentes à Mogadishu, tant au sud qu'au nord de la ville, Action contre la Faim intervient tant auprès des populations déplacées dans les camps qu'auprès des résidents, marqués par des années de guerre civile. Elle s'emploie maintenant à lutter contre la malnutrition de la population, notamment des déplacés vivants dans la capitale et a pour objectif de développer le réseau d'eau potable. De plus, et afin de répondre à la grave crise alimentaire dans le sud, Action contre la Faim a récemment ouvert un programme nutritionnel dans la ville de Luuq, région de Gedo. Enfin, et afin d'apporter un soutien logistique à ces deux bases, Action contre la Faim vient également d'installer une base arrière dans la ville de Merca." (ACF 2000, "Contexte")

## **CARE projects for IDPs in areas of food security (2002)**

- Objectives include improve food and livelihood security for 162,860 persons displaced in southern Somalia
- Food for work projects as well as Therapeutic Feeding for will primarily target IDPs
- CARE will purchase sorghum seeds from surplus areas to sell them to areas affected by conflict and drought such as Bay, Gedo and Bakol

"CARE proposes to significantly improve the food and livelihood security of 162,860 persons displaced by the continuing conflict in Somalia, through emergency and rehabilitation activities in 6 regions of Somalia. Food for Peace commodities will be incorporated into two major project components, including Food for Work (FFW) and Emergency Food Distributions (EFD). Supplementary and/or Therapeutic Feeding for extremely vulnerable individuals, primarily recent IDPs will be conducted through the assistance of other international NGOs operating in the regions.

Project Area: 24 districts in 8 regions - Middle Juba, Hiran, Bakol, Bay, Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle and Galgadud." (Care, Project Information, 2002)

"This proposal is a request to OFDA to fund the provision of 350 metric tons of sorghum seeds to 17,500 farmers in the rain fed areas of Bay located in Southern Somalia. For the past 8 months, 158,000 people have been coping with critical food insecurity as a result of sporadic internal clan fighting, looting and limited water supply. In response, the international community, the UN, and PVOs have implemented a targeted relief assistance initiative in the regions of Bay, Bakool, and Gedo to support both residents and internally displaced populations.

The intent of this complementary project is to purchase locally available sorghum seeds from surplus regions and transport them along with CARE's food to the chronically vulnerable areas." (CARE, Project Information, 2002)

## **Donor Response**

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### **Financial response to the 2003 CAP for Somalia**

- Revised requirements for the Somalia CAP 2003 amount to US 71.5 million as of June 2003
- CAP 2003 only 26% funded at June 2003 out of US\$77.8 million targeting up to 900,000 vulnerable people
- Food needs have only received 13,2% of the total amount appealed for as of June 2003
- The non-food sector has only received 28% of the total amount appealed for as of June 2003
- The education sector has only received 12% of funding requested as of June 2003
- Coordination activities received generous amount of 63% of total needs as of June 2003
- Protection programmers were only 21% funded
- Donors response to the Somalia CAP 2003 low in all sectors because funds earmarked for Africa were re-located to the Iraq crisis
- Assessment or programs indefinitely postponed due to unmet modest needs of CAP 2003

"United Nations (UN) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have achieved limited lifesaving and peace building interventions despite chronic under-funding. The current CAP is only 26% funded at the mid-year point, and a further US 53 million is requested to fulfill current requirements. Areas of particular

concern regarding funding include the education, health, water and sanitation and economic recovery sectors.

[...]

Through the 2003 CAP, UN agencies and NGOs requested US 77.8 million targeting between 800,000 and 900,000 vulnerable people throughout Somalia. As of 22 May, the total response to the Appeal was US 18,367,014. All sectors, with the exception of coordination and multi-sectoral reintegration assistance, are poorly funded. So far, only US 1,615,133 has been contributed for food, totalling 13.2% of the food needs originally appealed for. The non-food sectors only received 28% of the total funding requested, or US 16,751,681. The education sector, in particular, remains a concern. As of 22 May, only US 700,000 had been received for education through the CAP. Overall, a total of US 53 million remains unfunded from the revised requirement of US 71.5 million.

[...]

Existing programmes in the education sector have been only 12% funded through the CAP.

[...]

Robust funding of the coordination sector (63% of total needs) has so far allowed UN to expand its presence in the field. However, for coordination networks to become fully operational, it is necessary that the remaining component of US 485,000 be provided. A full complement of staff will allow for an effective decentralisation of coordination activities in the country and for implementation of OCHA's other goals, especially, in the areas of policy with a focus on IDP protection and assistance, humanitarian access, information analysis sharing and advocacy.

[...]

The revised appeal requirement remains modest at only US 71.5 million. Donors are urged not to let the present and future demands in Iraq further darken the outlook for Somalia.

[...]

Existing protection programmes in the CAP are only 21% funded.

[...]

As the international humanitarian community launches what may become one of the largest single humanitarian operations in history to respond to the needs of Iraq, the danger persists that donor funds and attention will be drawn away from the equally urgent needs of Africa, including Somalia. As of 29th April, funding through the CAP was low in virtually all sectors. Efforts to initiate new programmes and maintain the pace of existing ones may be jeopardised if the modest needs of the 2003 CAP are not met in a timely manner. Some donors have already indicated that funds initially earmarked for Africa are now being re-allocated to the Iraqi response. In addition to the diversion of funding from Somalia activities, some programmes have already been delayed or indefinitely postponed as technical experts recruited to carry out assessments or support activities inside the country are increasingly, based on the travel advisories of their national governments, declining to accept employment within Somalia.

To achieve peace and stability in Somalia, the international community needs to remain fully engaged. Although dismally low, human development indicators have remained steady for the past several years, indicating the positive effect of humanitarian aid and development assistance in keeping the situation stable. However, without increased and sustained donors' commitment, the outlook for Somalia remains grim. Any reduction in the existing modest response efforts, both relief as well as medium to long term, would immediately upset the precarious balance achieved, with particularly devastating effects on women and children." (UN, 3 June 2003, p.1 ;4 ;8 ;9 ;10)

### **State of funding for CAP 2002**

- UN requests over 83 million US\$ in 2002 Consolidated Appeal (November 2001)
- As of end 2002 47%, of the total revised Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal (CAP) 2002 for Somalia was funded an increased compared to only 21.7% in 2001
- Both the water and sanitation and food sectors were more than fully funded in 2002

- Return, resettlement and reintegration projects received more than half of funds pledged
- Security and coordination sectors saw a drop in funding as well as relief and recovery programmes accounted for less than 10% of the total funding

***CAP funding 2002:***

“As of 1 October 2002, donors had contributed US\$ 38,754,113 [...], or 47%, of the total revised *Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal (CAP) 2002 for Somalia* requirement of US\$ 82,496,251. In relation to the percentage of funds contributed towards the total appeal, this represents a significant increase over the previous year. In that year, only 21.7% of the total of US\$ 140,442,999 revised requirements were covered. However, total contributions in real terms, increased a moderate US\$ 8.3 million, from US\$ 30,473,727 in 2001 to US\$ 38,754,113 in 2002.

[...]

An analysis of the funding received through the CAP for 2001 and 2002 shows slight increases in the percentage of needs funded for the agriculture and economic recovery and infrastructure, and large jumps in the funding of the water and sanitation and food sectors. Both were more than fully funded. The water and sanitation sector received funds to cover 107% of its requirements compared to only 31% in 2001. Similarly, funding of the food sector dramatically increased from roughly US\$ 4.7 million, or 28% of the sectoral requirements, to 19 million in 2002, covering more than 100% of the needs. The mine action sector saw its level of funding go from zero in 2001 to being 25% funded in 2002. The return, resettlement and reintegration sector [...] saw a 33% increase in the percentage of needs covered in 2002, with more than half of its total appeal being funded. The coordination and security sectors, however, saw a drop off in the percentage of sectoral requirements funded, of 29 and 55 respectively. The education and protection, human rights and rule of law sectors saw only slight decreases in the percentage of their programmes funded in 2001 versus 2002.

[...]

Also notable is the huge disparity in funding between relief and recovery programmes. In 2002, roughly 60% of the 2002 CAP was comprised of relief activities, while the remaining 40% of the appeal was for governance, peace-building, economic reconstruction and reintegration and resettlement programmes. Yet, despite the necessity of addressing both relief and recovery programmes simultaneously in Somalia, less than 10% of the total assistance provided through the CAP in 2002 went towards recovery programmes. It is hoped that, in keeping with the Security Council’s call for expanded humanitarian and development projects -- including specific community-based, peace-building activities -- funding for these activities will be more balanced in 2003.” (UN, November 2002, p.10,11)

## **Gaps**

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### **Information gaps in Somalia prove deleterious to humanitarian programming and advocacy (2003)**

- OCHA and SACB information efforts have not been fully implemented due to absence of staff

“The OCHA network is starting to improve the quality and quantity of information coming out of the field that is feeding into the aid community through the SACB structures and to UN Headquarters level through regular weekly and monthly updates, together with reports to the Security Council and General Assembly. The UN has continued to support public awareness and media activities, but the absence of a dedicated staff person has meant that these activities have not been fully implemented. OCHA is actively working with the International NGO community to establish ways in which the network can best benefit the wider aid community in Somalia.” (UN, 3 June 2003, p.5)

## **Donor disengagement in Somalia (2002)**

- Donor contributions decreased by 90% between 1992 to 2002

“The disengagement of the international community since the failure of the UN military mission has been slow but steady over the last ten years. The number of international aid agencies working in Somalia has dropped dramatically from over 200 in 1992 to 61 today. Meanwhile, donor funding has dropped by 90% over the same period. The needs themselves continue unabated, far exceeding the operational capacity of all aid agencies currently working in Somalia put together.” (MSF, 9 December 2002)

## **Lack of clear mandate and coordination to assist IDPs (2002)**

- There is no clarity as to whom should provide IDPs with assistance in Somaliland
- Assistance to IDPs has been on ad hoc basis
- IDPs complained of diversion of relief supplies by local authorities in Hargeisa

“International aid agencies lack coordination when dealing with long-term assistance for internally displaced and returnee populations in the self-declared republic of Somaliland, northwestern Somalia, says a report from the United Nations Coordination Unit/Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNCU/OCHA).

"The primary reason is the problem associated with which agency has, or should have, a mandate to assist these communities," said the joint report. Efforts to form a joint committee to sort out this issue had also not materialised, it added.

As a result, the "little assistance" delivered to the region to date had been on an ad hoc basis. This meant that the prospect of as many as 80,000 returnees to Somaliland arriving over the next two years was raising "grave concerns" with regard to increased social and economic pressures on both local authorities and resident populations.

UNCU/OCHA recommended that any further assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs), particularly those in Dima camp in the Somaliland capital, Hargeysa, should be conducted with the consultation of the IDPs themselves, as complaints regarding the diversion of relief supplies by local authorities had been lodged. It was also necessary to establish a system of monitoring and evaluating the delivery of any relief supplies.” (IRIN 15 August 2002)

## **Policy and recommendations**

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### **UNCU recommendations for IDPs in Somaliland and Puntland (2002)**

- Legal frameworks for land-ownership for IDPs must be established
- Local governments to develop clear IDP policy
- Conduct delivery of humanitarian assistance and services with full consultation and participation of IDPs to avoid diversions and answer appropriate needs
- Urban planning to integrate 30,000 IDPs in Bosasso needed
- Human rights should be monitored in IDP settlements

***Somaliland:***

“The relocation and resettlement of IDPs granting security of tenure in cooperation with the local municipality should be a matter of urgent discussion between international agencies and governmental authorities.

The local government and municipal authorities should be encouraged to outline a clear policy statement with respect to their policy vis-a-vis IDPs in Somaliland. This should include clear guidelines with respect to the social and legal status of IDPs of southern origin.

There is lack of coordination among international agencies in terms of long-term assistance to IDP and Returnee populations. The primary reason is the problem associated with which agency has, or should have, a mandate to assist these communities. Efforts among international agencies to convene a joint committee have not materialized. As a result the little assistance delivered so far has been conducted on ad-hoc basis. The prospect of as many as 80,000 returnees arriving to northwest Somalia over the next 2 years raised grave concerns about the increasing economic and social burden to local municipal authorities and resident populations.

In light of the fact that IDPs, particularly those in Dima Camp, have complained that intended relief supplies are regularly diverted by local authorities, any further assistance from international agencies should be conducted with the consultation of the IDPs themselves.

In addition, the international agencies need to establish a mechanism of monitoring and evaluating the delivery of assistance.

A short-term food for work program for IDPs in Dima camp should be introduced to rebuild roads in Hargeisa that were destroyed by the 1999 floods. This would generate employment and improve the nutritional and health problems which are particularly acute among the Ajjuran of Dima Camp.” (UNCU 30 July 2002, p.13)

***Bosasso:***

“There is a vital need for the implementation of an urban planning program for Bosasso town which would incorporate the wide range of planning problems of the estimated 30,000 IDPs in and around Bosasso.

There must be a clear and official recognition of the problem by the Puntland State. This must be stated in official policy by both municipal and central authorities. At present central authorities and local authorities are not in agreement in terms of the future of Bosasso’s IDPs. Government officials would like most IDPs to be eventually repatriated to south and central Somalia, while the Mayor of Bosasso is keen to find a permanent solution within the context of the Bosasso municipality.

As an important pre-requisite for future investment and project assistance for the IDPs on the part of governmental and international agencies, is a legal framework for land-ownership and the legal status of the IDPs must be established.

To avoid raising expectations and avoid political and social problems, any project or service delivered to the IDP camps should be done so with the full consultation and participation of the elders of the respective communities.

An independent agency or local NGO with the full knowledge and cooperation of the Municipal and State authorities should monitor the abuse of human rights in the IDP camps which range from sexual assault and rape to homicide. The UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR)—Somalia should take the lead in this endeavor in cooperation with well-trained local NGOs.

Finally, there is a vital need for coordination between international agencies and NGOs with respect to Bosasso's IDP population. As yet, coordination and information sharing between agencies has been dismally poor. Africa 70s intervention in terms of mapping the composition and outlining the priority needs of the IDPs has yet to be supported seriously by other international agencies. Agency staff have pointed out that this stems from conflicting mandates and responsibilities and a lack of interest on the part of local authorities. However, our own research found that key governmental staff are keen to design and implement humanitarian and long-term assistance to the IDPs. Local authorities have shown their good faith by setting aside public land for a pilot resettlement project.” (UNCUU, 30 July 2002, pp.21-2)

*In order to read about UNCU's particular recommendations for Hargeisa, Buroa-Yirowe, and Awdal region please consult the source below.*

## **Reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**

### **Known references to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (as of July 2002)**

- References to the Guiding Principles Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

### **Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation**

None

### **Other references to the Guiding Principles**

None

### **Availability of the Guiding Principles**

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have been translated in Arabic in 1998

You can access the Arab version here:

[http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/principles\\_arab.pdf](http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/principles_arab.pdf)

### **Training on the Guiding Principles**

None

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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AFP	Agence France Presse
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
DSA	Digil Salvation Army
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FFT	Food-For-Training
FFW	Food-For-Work
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (AIDS)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	International Committee for Somali
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
MRR&R	Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MT	Metric Tonne
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organization of Africa Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
RRA	Rahanwein Resistance Army
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SSNM	Southern Somali National Movement
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCU	United Nations Coordination Unit
UNDP EUE	United Nations Development Programme - Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
USAID	United States Agency for International Agency
VAW	Violence Against Women
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

## LIST OF SOURCES USED

(alphabetical order)

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